to continue his game of divide-and-rule. The Carlists had split into three or four factions after the extinction of their main line, but they were determined never to permit the return of the orthodox "usurpers," even though they might run the risk of foreign intervention. When the monarchist crescendo of 1943 was at its height, a lieutenant serving one of the current Carlist pretenders, Don Carlos (grandson through the female line of the former pretender Carlos VII), made an alternative suggestion to Falange leaders. He proposed that they all create a large diversionary action among Spanish monarchists in favor of Don Carlos. This would deprive Don Juan, the regular Bourbon candidate, of that near-unanimity of monarchist support he would need to impose himself on the regime.

This proposal, first advanced in March of 1943 by a Carlist lawyer from Valencia, was accepted with alacrity. Through the anti-monarchist Falange, the government financed a "clandestine" Carlist campaign in favor of Don Carlos. Within three or four months this raised some doubt in the minds of the middle classes as to the sole legitimacy of the claim of Don Juan. The orthodox monarchists were temporarily forestalled, and the regime survived another threat.

Such inner division and mutual enmity guaranteed the continuity of the pseudo-Falange state under so skillful a maneuverer as Francisco Franco. As the original proponent of this 1943 gambit wrote fifteen years later:

> If we should see ourselves in the same situation one hundred times, we would do the same thing one hundred times, for a hundred years of the government of Franco, with all the corruption of its administration, is preferable to one year of Don Juan, which would be the swift bridge to Communism.[16]

Franco's strength was based on the weakness and mutual hatred of his opponents.

XVII

PLAYING OUT THE STRING

After the tide of the war turned in 1942-43, the regime began to make serious efforts to escape the onus of its foreign ideological affiliations. There was no longer much talk in Spain about supporting international fascism, and the regime's opposition to the Soviet Union was officially predicated on the need to protect "Christian Europe" from "Asiatic Communism." Hitler made one last effort to draw Spain into the war in January 1943, when the party Secretary, Arrese, made a visit to Germany. Arrese's Catholic convictions made him a fully reliable representative of the Caudillo in such a situation; his lack of enthusiasm for radical fascism would keep him from lending any support to a mere pro-Nazi front abroad. He replied to the entreaties of Nazi leaders by saying that Spain was quite willing to make a contribution to the struggle against Communism, but that such a war must be based on the principles of the Christian West, which meant that it could not involve hostility to the Anglo-Saxon powers. Furthermore, there was no logic in alliance with an Asiatic and pagan power like Japan, which was destroying all the achievements of Christian civilization in the Far East. In order for Spain to participate in the Second World War, Arrese said, the entire system of opposing alliances would have to be changed. All Spain would offer was increased support on the Russian front after Hitler had made a separate peace in the West; there was little point in maintaining one Spanish Blue Division in Russia unless another were sent to the Philippines to oppose Japanese Shintoist aggression.[1] By 1943 Hitler may no longer have been opposed in principle to a separate peace with the West, but his revolution of nihilism had gone too far to make such a move practical. This being the case, the Spanish regime moved farther and farther away.

During the last year of the war, the Franco regime made a des-

perate attempt to divest itself of the worst outward trappings of fascism. In such an effort, of course, the Falange was one of the Caudillo's chief liabilities.[2] When the formation of a new cabinet was finally announced on July 20, 1945, only two names appeared from the Falange. General Asensio, a "Falange General," was replaced by an orthodox conservative militarist. Arrese was dismissed from the post of Minister and Secretary-General of the "Movement" (as the party was now innocuously referred to), and his seat was left vacant to point up the insignificance of the party in the new scheme of things.

In a public address the Caudillo declared that the Falange was not really a state political party, but a sort of administrative "instrument of national unification." The party line dropped off very sharply. There was no more talk about the impending doom of the Western democracies or the manifest superiority of martial values and institutionalized violence. On July 27 the Vice-Secretariat of Popular Education, which controlled propaganda, was taken out of the FET party structure and placed under the Ministry of National Education. More and more of the trappings of fascist display were discarded with each passing month. A decree of September 11, 1945, repealed the 1937 law that had made the raised-arm fascist salute mandatory for the nation.[3]

The theoretical significance of the party steadily diminished as a liberalized façade was erected for the regime. Arrese himself had been chiefly instrumental in preparing the decree of July 1942 that restored an official Cortes to Spain in the guise of a fake representative chamber packed with official appointees ratified by means of extremely indirect corporate elections. In 1943 the first elections had been held for *enlaces sindicales,* the local representatives of each syndicate group. These halfhearted attempts to deny the reality of dictatorship were supplemented in mid-1945 by a new municipal election law. This law provided that municipal voters would be allowed on occasion to choose between alternate candidates, both of whom would be nominated by the regime. One third of the municipal representatives were to be elected by the heads of families, another third by members of the local syndicates, and the remainder by the first two-thirds already chosen. Appointments to all significant executive posts were to be made from above.

On July 17, 1945, the Caudillo suddenly announced a Fuero de los Españoles, a Spanish bill of rights, which became the law of the land. The new *fuero* contained a series of provisions ostensibly aimed at guaranteeing the security of citizens from arbitrary procedure; the "guarantees," however, remained in the realm of general principles, and no specific safeguards were given. The main joker in the pack was Article 33, which stated that "the exercise of the Rights recognized in this Bill of Rights may not attack the spiritual, national, and social unity of Spain."[4] On October 22, 1945, growing a bit desperate, Franco promulgated a law by which issues of transcendent national concern could be submitted to popular referendum, naturally at the discretion of the Caudillo.

None of this greatly impressed the Western democracies, who saw fit to withdraw their diplomatic representatives from Madrid. Franco's wartime friendship with National Socialism had made Spain the pariah of the Western world. Her regime was banished from the circle of civilized diplomacy.

But the silent treatment never had its desired effect on Franco. The six years of isolation that the nation endured after the end of World War II possibly did more to solidify the dictatorship than had the six years of internal police terror preceding them. Faced by a hostile world, many Spanish moderates who might otherwise have built an effective opposition had no recourse but to identify their fate with that of the regime.

Although the liberal "reforms" were purely window dressing designed to pacify certain foreign and domestic critics, political repression did begin to diminish in degree. This was because internal resistance, which had never slackened throughout the six years of the World War, commenced to fall off in 1946. The Spanish Left had felt sure that the defeat of the fascist powers in central Europe would foreshadow the end of Franco's rule. When the Western democracies made no direct move against the regime, the Leftist underground began to lose hope. Defections greatly increased in volume.

Seven years of practice had noticeably increased the efficiency of the Spanish political police. Their organization had at first been poor and clumsy, and they had compensated with primitive ferocity for what they lacked in professional control. By 1946 they were able

to crack down on the Leftist underground with real effectiveness; a large series of arrests broke the back of the resistance groups. After 1947 sizeable organized underground units ceased to exist.

The index of slaughter also fell off. As Manuel Halcón, the Falange *jefe local* of Seville, had said as early as 1938, "Our Christian principles do not permit us to kill *all* our enemies."[5] There is no way to determine how many political prisoners were killed during the first five or six years following the Civil War, but the figure was in the tens of thousands. In 1944 an official connected with the Ministry of Justice handed the Associated Press representative a slip of paper with a figure on it that was supposed to mark the number of people killed by the state during the past five years. It read 192,684, though this was probably a considerable exaggeration.[6]

Between 1946 and 1950 Franco's regime lived wholly within its own little world. The internal opposition was impotent, and foreigners remained entirely aloof. The brutality and bloodletting of 1936–44, the disappointments of 1945–46, and the internal antagonisms characteristic of Spanish politics had temporarily broken the back of the Left. The regime could afford to ease up.

After mid-1945 the Caudillo's only concern with the Falange was to keep it quiet. He had hit a good balance in domestic affairs, giving economics to the Bank, military affairs (with liberal opportunities for graft) to the Army, moral life and much of education to the Church, subsidies to the monarchists, foreign affairs to Catholic Action, lip-service to the Carlists, tentative security to the middle classes, rhetoric (at least until 1945) and employment to the party, job tenure and promises to the workers. It was stabilization on a very low level, but it worked. The national inertia was enormous.

The party had played its role well, serving as both a mask and an instrument for the dictatorship. It was now an ossified bureaucracy, in which active membership steadily decreased. Most of the veterans registered in the *Vieja guardia* no longer participated in party affairs with the slightest trace of zeal or energy.

The party organization had been left under the caretaker administration of Rodrigo Vivar Téllez, the alternate Vice Secretary-General. Vivar Téllez was said to be an irreproachable gentleman,

delicate, honest, and levelheaded, if not brilliant. He had been a judge in Málaga and had come up the power scale with Arrese. Personally, Franco never cared for Téllez because of his frankness, but he trusted in his loyalty. Vivar Téllez was no Falangist, and he could not see why the farce had to be kept up. The FET was clearly a spent force. With the party mired in corruption and bureaucratic pettifoggery, virtually no one believed in it any longer. The sun of fascism had set in Europe, and the continued existence of the party prejudiced the regime in the eyes of the victorious democracies. The Vice Secretary-General suggested that the most logical thing to do would be to disband the whole party structure and dissolve the Falange, hinting that such fossils should be preserved in museums.

Franco refused even to consider the idea. To discard the Falange entirely would disrupt the tight little system he had established. How could "the Crusade" maintain its rationale and coherence without the official instrument of "national coordination"? The lack of an official patronage machine and political façade would leave the regime too naked. The Falange was still much too valuable a pawn to consider removing it from the game. Its very weakness made it more desirable than before.

After 1945 the Falangists found themselves in a definite minority among other Nationalists. They were increasingly resented by Catholics and conservatives, who saw them either as radical totalitarians or as crypto-Reds. The Falange's emphasis on economic reform and its desire to implement the reunion of social classes collided with the immobile conservatism of the dominant Right, with its great distrust of the working class. As one Falangist noted, "As soon as the Cortes began to function, it was curious to observe how those least inclined to discussion, those most authoritarian, were precisely those who were not identified with the Falange."[7] Since Franco had provided a variety of temptations to lure Falangists from active politics, and had frustrated their every initiative, "More than one [Falangist] felt as though he had had his 'wings clipped' and took refuge in professional life, not by choice, but rather out of despair that matters were not following the course that he had desired."[8] During the postwar period Falangism was mainly confined to the field of literary rhetoric.

Members of the old guard who still remained active hoped that the passage of time would strengthen the Spanish economy enough to permit the structural reforms necessary to fulfill the party platform. The last party Secretary, José Luis de Arrese, was closer to Franco than any other *camisa vieja,* and he still cherished the notion that the Caudillo might someday see fit to install a more equitable syndicalist program. Arrese's Falangism, however, was Franco-Falangism; it was not the nihilistic radicalism of Ramiro Ledesma or the humanistic voluntarism of José Antonio. The only one of the Falange's founders who had espoused an orientation similar to Arrese's was perhaps Onésimo Redondo. Arrese professed loyalty to the ideals and plans of José Antonio, but his real political acts seemed to aim at other goals.

As Arrese publicly stressed, the development of the Civil War, the incontrovertible authority of Franco among the Nationalists, and the political growth of the Nationalist front as a coordination of all forces behind the Caudillo had created an entirely new political situation. These developments had made it impossible to fulfill the original party ambitions of the Falange, but there was left nonetheless a body of doctrine and a social program that ought to guide the path of state and society in Spain during the coming decades.

Arrese always liked to talk of the possibility that the regime might socialize much of the economic structure and make the Cortes more representative. He was still opposed to the political Right, writing in 1947 that "in Spain the worst opponent of Falangism has always been the man of the Right."[9] The harmless rhetoric of Arrese condemned capitalism as a cardinal sin of the modern age, and the Falangist leader always talked as though the absolute elimination of usury were imperative. Arrese lent his name to several books, in part written by other theorists, which presented abstract schema by which Spain would be able permanently to transcend class struggle. In the late forties, Arrese's group stressed the old Falange doctrine that labor was not a mere material commodity, but the human aspect of an organic social process of an organic process of production. It was proposed in party propaganda that all members of the productive system ought to feel a common interest in

their work, which should be conducted on a cooperative basis, with profits shared by management and labor alike. Arrese declared that he would have liked to see the syndical system evolve into a chain of cooperatives, in which selfish private capitalism would be abolished.[10]

All this was simply whistling in the dark against the reality of the reactionary triumph of Spanish capitalism, a triumph that Franco evidently had no desire to disturb.

However desirable economic transformation seemed to Arrese, he admittedly regarded it as secondary to the preservation of Spanish unity and "Christian principles." Class struggle and economic exploitation were among the primary causes of the breakup of modern society, but to remove the causes was not so urgent as to contain the new Anti-Christ: atheistic, anti-Christian Communism. This was the axis of modern politics, and all other factors must be subordinated to common resistance of the great foe. Security for such a struggle could be found only behind the bulwark of Catholic religiosity, and only the leadership of the Caudillo and the political values of the Movement could avert the dire danger of revolution.

Such an attitude played directly into the hands of the proponents of military dictatorship and big business. Arrese's conundrum (political liberty = disunity = rebellion = anticlericalism = Communism = Anti-Christ) precluded any kind of independent stand against the dictatorship. Arrese's Franco-Falangism was thus truthfully no longer "fascism." It was simply military authoritarianism buttressed on every side by Catholicism and propped up by a state syndical system. It lacked any aggressive, dynamic, or radical overtones. Arrese could honor the old fascism only as a halfway measure:

> Fascism is not a complete formula. . . . It is correct insofar as it searches for a solution to the dilemma of capitalism [versus] communism, but it is mistaken when it does not decide to abandon a materialistic attitude, the only way of achieving the desired transcendence. Furthermore, if fascism had not been silenced by the thunder of cannons it would have ended in failure; better said, it would have failed in its final mission of illuminating a new era.[11]

The trouble with fascism was that it was too materialistic, too nihilistically radical. It was not Catholic. Thus it had been unable to save European civilization from Communism and prepare for the postmodern epoch.

During these years, the Falange had only one vital political function—to serve as checkmate to the royalists. This became doubly important when Franco decided to pacify the orthodox Right by providing a means of legal succession for his regime. On July 6, 1947, a Law of Succession was submitted to the Spanish people in national referendum. It recognized General Francisco Franco as Caudillo and rightful Chief of the Spanish State. Further sections stipulated that "when the office of Chief of State was vacant," a Regency Council would take over the national government to prepare the restoration of the Monarchy. In the meantime a Council of the Realm, appointed by the Caudillo, would assist him in establishing the rules and procedures whereby the eventual transition might be carried out.[12]

The referendum achieved its inevitably overwhelming success, and the Caudillo's government became a sort of pro-Regency. The old-guard Falangists were emphatic antimonarchists and strongly objected to these vague provisions for restoration, but no one listened to them. By 1947 old guard Falangists were something of a laughingstock in Spain.

Their political stock rose a point or two in the following year, after an unsuccessful interview between the Caudillo and the Pretender, Don Juan, in Portugal. Don Juan let it be known that he would not consider the restored Monarchy as a mere legal continuation of the Franco regime, adding that he could not approve the present government's state party and its Twenty-six Points. This clouded the political atmosphere once more and left the Caudillo disposed to make another token gesture with the moribund Falange.

In 1948 Raimundo Fernández Cuesta was reappointed Minister and Secretary-General of the Movement, thereby filling a post that had lain vacant for three years. The brief flurry of activity occasioned by the ensuing effort to restore some life to the organization was designed only to bring the monarchists up short. It was far too late to inject new life into the party, even if that had been desired.

Spain's isolation came to a close in 1950, when the Cold War against Communism became uncomfortably warm. Official recognition was extended to the dictatorship when a United States ambassador was appointed to Madrid. The resulting tendency to draw the Franco state into an anti-Communist alliance was natural, if ultimately reprehensible.

Economically, in 1950 the country was not very far from where it had been in 1936. Lacking foreign aid, it had taken nearly ten years to repair measurably the destruction wrought by the Civil War. This progress had been further prolonged by the deprivation and isolation accompanying a long international conflict. Living standards had not improved during all this time, and in some areas they had even declined. The nation's economic resources were in the grip of a ruthlessly capitalistic system tempered by state economic controls. Raw materials, import licenses, foreign exchange, international trade, some aspects of credit, and many of the conditions of internal production were fixed by government fiat according to the economic laws and syndical norms first drawn up in 1940-41. Finance, however, was only intermittently affected by state restrictions. The banking world received a free hand in ordinary matters and was, in fact, aided by the government ministries.

The defeat of the Left, the eclipse of the sentimental Right, long years of black market operations, and the shock dealt traditional customs by the total nature of the Civil War, combined with the more sophisticated economic environment of the midcentury, all tended to revitalize the Spanish businessman. By 1950 Spain was much closer to being a capitalist country than ever before. The margin of profit for the possessing groups soon became very high, and the rate of capital formation in established enterprises was great.

During the nineteen-fifties capital investment reached considerable proportions. Spain embarked on her greatest period of industrial expansion since the halcyon years of World War I. According to the Banco Central's Annual Report for 1959, the national index of industrial production increased approximately one hundred per cent between 1951 and 1958. This was made possible by a ruthless policy of wage and price pressure maintained by the major financial and industrial concerns, which still controlled basic economics. Further-

more, the association of government industries (INI), a pet project of the regime, poured billions of pesetas into a variety of state factories and government economic projects. Such investment went ahead so fast that it soon outstripped the actual productive capacity of the economic system.

Competition within the business world was sometimes strong, and prices were kept high to assure the rate of capital accumulation. Costs were often excessive, for Spain lacked the secondary industries, the engineers, and the skilled workmen to sustain a program of rapid industrial expansion. The dependence on imports to maintain the system was extreme. The government itself went off the deep end to continue an inefficient program of economic expansion. United States aid, which reached significant proportions by 1953, momentarily helped to stabilize the situation but then aggravated it by encouraging the business world to risk further imbalance. The natural result of this state of affairs was a process of creeping inflation, which became serious after 1955.

The only idealism still alive within the party lay among the "Falanges Universitarias," the student following of the Movement. Except in the first few years following the war, these young Falangists were never more than a minority among the university youth, but there was belief and fervor in their ranks. After getting out into the world, however, even such ardent spirits were liable to lose much of their enthusiasm. Between 1945 and 1955 a series of student groups and youth associations connected with the schools attempted to revitalize, and even to rethink, *falangismo* for the young. In a dictatorship influenced by five or six powerful pressure groups, this required an increasingly greater effort. Such interest was impossible to sustain, and after 1955 the nation's youth sank into political apathy.

This phenomenon was not undesired by the regime. During the first years of his rule, the Caudillo found that it was going to be impossible to build a viable ideological state. The instrument—the party—was both untrustworthy and incapable, while the opposition from the major powers of the Right was too strong. Thus Franco had settled for the façade-state, the political farce, in order to provide a formal framework that might hold the governmental system together. Outside the circle of officeholders and the official party, only

acquiescence was required. Since there was nothing vital for the people of Spain to support, Franco's basic goal was to keep them satisfied to ignore politics. With the Left driven out of sight, the Right absorbed in religion and profits, and the official party a laughingstock, bread and circuses were the order of the day.

For the first time in fifteen years, bread became more abundant. Real wages increased slightly as production expanded, even though the lion's share of the return went to capital. As for circuses, Spain became one of the most sports-conscious countries in Europe. Newspaper editors who cut the sports content of their journals to less than forty or fifty per cent might feel the weight of official displeasure. Madrid was one of the two European capitals to harbor a full-sized daily sports paper, which was also the largest selling newspaper in the country. To top it off, the biggest soccer stadium in the world was erected in the nation's capital.

During the Civil War the official chronicler of the Cuartel General had written: "Let us not deceive ourselves—when this war ends we shall dominate many who have been conquered, BUT NO ONE WHO HAS BEEN CONVINCED."[13] As it turned out, Franco was never so anxious to convince them that he would risk setting their minds to work.

By 1955, if not before, Madrid was politically the most cynical city in Europe. Every political ideology of the modern world had been introduced there during the nineteen-thirties. Each had suffered either physical defeat in the Civil War or moral pollution in the years following. There was no sign that any significant part of the population really believed in anything, beyond the minority that attended church. With each passing year, the vanquished Left seemed to become more divided, rancorous, and ineffective. As production slowly increased, there was more room for economic differentiation, and the attention of ambitious workers inevitably became fixed more on economic than on political goals. There was no political life. The only public issues in Spain were certain economic realities.

Owing to these factors, the only Falangist to win recognition during the years of the long cabinet (1945–57) was José Antonio Girón, the militia leader who had become the Minister of Labor. He took his position seriously and did something to create within the government a greater sensitivity to the workers' needs. The frame-

work of advanced social legislation was installed, although the norms set were too ridiculously low to provide for real well-being. The most attractive feature of the syndical structure was the job security and featherbedding written into it. Underemployment was the norm, but unemployment hardly existed. Girón received credit for trying to improve the situation, even though his underlings were notorious for peculation. He even achieved a certain kind of popularity among such hardened groups as the miners of Asturias.[14]

However, in the inflationary spiral set off during the nineteen-fifties, it was impossible for the workers, urban or agricultural, to keep up. Lest the recrudescence of extreme economic discontent reawaken the political feeling that had lain dormant for eight years, some sort of adjustment was in order. Girón took credit once more for an enormous across-the-board wage increase effected in 1956. Owing to the complicated nature of the Spanish wage system, the real increase was neither so great nor so immediate as it then seemed, but the gesture was obvious. This action had the logical effect of speeding up the inflationary process considerably. A series of illegal strikes occurred in several industrial areas during 1955 and 1956. Even Catholic liberals began to grow restless.

Several *camisas viejas* began to speak their minds once more. Said Carlos Juan Ruiz de la Fuente at the 1956 *Vieja guardia* congress: "Our capitalism fixed its mold in 1936. More and larger. [It is] the only Marxist capitalism still surviving."[15] Some sort of change was obviously called for, since the Ministry of Economics required better management and the state system itself needed strengthening.

In this climate of opinion, the Monarchy, as Franco's titular successor, rapidly gained popularity. Already established by the 1947 law to succeed the Caudillo, it looked like the way out to some conservatives. If they had not been heretofore, all bankers became monarchists. Most functionaries of the regime began to whisper secretly to foreigners that they were really monarchists, not *franquistas*. Just as a conservative Republic had been sanctioned by the Right to prevent a more serious blowup in 1931, so the same elements began to look toward a slightly constitutionalized monarchy for their salvation in 1956. Sniffing danger, the Church hierarchy also began to gather up its collective robes and withdraw from the Caudillo. The regime found itself in narrow straits for the first time in a decade.

Franco thought it prudent to rely on the trustworthy Arrese in such a difficult situation, and in 1956 the latter was once more given the Caudillo's blessing as Secretary-General of the party. Old-guard Falangists were certain that Arrese had been restored in order to accomplish a major institutional change, and within a year the Falange's membership was said to have increased by 35,000, which was the first rise in the number of members since the Civil War. Leaders of the FET suddenly began to realize that this might be their last chance. The Caudillo might need them to help transform his dictatorship into a more viable political system, and if veteran Falangists did not seize the present moment to reorient the Spanish state, it might be forever too late. Accordingly, a commission was appointed to consider revising the statutes of the Movement and to propose an extension of the "Fundamental Laws" to broaden the base of the regime. In addition to Arrese, several former Falangist leaders and National Council members participated, among them such men as Luis González Vicén, José Antonio Elola, Vicente Salas Pombo, Francisco Javier Conde, and Rafael Sánchez Mazas.

The commission, however, was entirely dominated by Franco-Falangists, and little interest was shown in restoring the Falange to a place of primary influence as a party, or even in building up its following among the people. Instead, the commission members were concerned with providing a more viable structure for the Franco state by arranging a little more representation for "safe" elements. This would offer the possibility of continuing the edifice in the future, beyond the life-span of the Caudillo.

The only radical Falangist voice on the commission was that of Luis González Vicén, the former militia leader from Valladolid, who was a friend of Girón, a National Council member, and an anti-guerrilla trouble shooter for the regime. Vicén proposed to construct Spanish political representation through the framework of an expanded Falange, which would become the executor of the new state and would build a more representative and equitable economic system. After engaging in a considerable argument during the course of one meeting, Vicén decided that he could get nowhere against the wishes of the majority and resigned.

In a letter to Arrese, dated June 8, 1956, Vicén tried to explain the criteria for his action. He agreed that after the Civil War the Falange

could no longer have aspired to a position as an independent political party. "... The party, which was by necessity a movement, ought to have transformed itself into something else a long time ago ... [something] which I say—I know not if correctly—ought to be transformed into a System." If the party were transformed into a regular structure of government, the arbitrary personal rule of a Caudillo would no longer be necessary.

> A System so conceived not only does not need a *Jefe* but rather finds—which is much more important—that his presence is prejudicial for his rule and for the System itself. The System ought to be one of collective rule with only circumstantial Caudillo-rule. An elective National Council with a precise structure is the axis of everything and the instrument that assumes all the functions of the *Jefatura,* which it can delegate in as many ways as may be thought convenient, either to individual or smaller committees.[16]

The Falange National Council, which should oversee the work of the Spanish state, should be free of either military or clerical influence. Vicén emphasized that he did not deny the right of the Army and the Church hierarchy to be represented in all important national decisions, but he strongly opposed reserving special seats for them on the National Council. "Their proper place ... is in the Cortes, that is, together with the Spanish people in its legislative activity. There they undoubtedly have their place, together with many other professional groups and strata of the country."[17] Vicén emphasized that Spain was a Catholic country, and that because of that very fact he resented any attempt by the Church hierarchy to establish particularistic privileges. The Spanish people deserved to be spared the possible conflicts resulting from such a situation, since its religious unity was the only form of union wrought by the regime.[18] At the same time, Vicén feared that recent signs of Church withdrawal might indicate a willingness of the Church to help scuttle the regime.[19]

The Army posed an even greater problem than the Church. In any critical situation, Vicén continued, the Army seemed to think itself authorized to act as the political arbiter of Spain, even though it lacked political education or political discipline. Since the only values the Army knew were "heroism, sacrifice, and love for the

Fatherland," it was never prepared for positive political intervention, and whenever it had attempted such intervention it had acted merely as another sectarian political group. If it should attempt to control the transformation of the Spanish state, it would "be regarded by Spaniards as a conquering Army implicated in political work and therefore, as the conqueror of its own country, converted into its political subject. Political armies have failed in every land."[20]

The third member of Vicén's unholy trinity was Spanish capitalism, or the political Right. "The Spanish Right, which has always labored under the influence of the fear and worry caused by its own lack of authentic content, has constantly shouted: Church and Army."[21] Only such spiritual and military authority could save its "precarious position" in Spanish life.

According to Vicén, one of Spain's basic political problems was

> the failure to liquidate the Civil War, which at the present time still finds itself in almost the same condition as in 1939. ... In this very moment, the difference between being a Red or a non-Red, between having supported the Movement or not, in other words between conquerors and conquered, is a reality in national life and in the administrative decisions of the government. The accessibility of power which is perfectly delimited between conquerors and conquered, the treatment of citizens in which the difference is equally marked, the chance for social influence and many other factors, clearly indicate that this most grave problem still lacks solution. If this is so obvious from our camp you can easily imagine how it appears from the other side. They not only regard themselves as defeated and politically unsatisfied; they see themselves treated as second-class Spaniards and exaggerate the injustice which they receive, building up hatred against the other half whom they think the cause of the evil.[22]

Thus the transition of the nationalist movement from its present dictatorship into a comprehensive political system would have to take some account of the other half of the nation. If the Franco state were equated with the Movement, it would represent only half of Spain and would never be able to build a firm foundation for the future. The danger was doubly great because the Falange, the only organized political force behind the present limited Movement, was not really strong:

> Any political action requires a force which the Falange at this moment does not have, and which it must urgently seek if it does not wish to continue waving the flag and representing every interest save its own. This strength can only come from two places, either from a *Jefe* of great prestige, such as the one it presently has, or from its own mass and the strategic position which it gains within the state structure.[23]

Vicén strongly disapproved of permitting the Falange to continue to rely merely on the authority of a personal leader like Franco, for the following reasons:

> 1. Because of the mortality and mutability of men.
> 2. Because it [dictatorship] bears within itself an absolute rule that can, in some cases, result in tyranny.
> 3. Because in it is employed the personal and direct method of naming the commander, with its grave consequences of coercing leaders, [promoting] servility, and denying liberty to men who fulfill functions of judging and acting, and with the danger that when the commander errs (and the commander errs since he is a man, even though he may err less than other men), the error is automatically supported by everyone and can take the dimensions of a cataclysm.
> 4. Because, unfortunately, men are capricious, above all, the men who are more highly placed, and the country cannot be forced to suffer the caprice and fickleness of any one man no matter how high he may be.
> 5. Because this procedure of force and command from the top downward unleashes in the nation the activity of all the incorrigibles of unmerited ambition, since one arrives at a position of influence through personal connection and not through work, political service, knowledge, or personal qualities.
> 6. Because there is no way, in this type of command, to take advantage of a country's wealth of talent, since all nominations have to be made among those who are known by or visible to the one who makes the appointment, and one man, however exceptional he may be, can never have before his sight or imagination more than a limited number of persons, and no filing system can replace personal acquaintance.
> 7. Because a selection of the worst is made, since only those are seen whose temperament, economic ambition, or lack of employment lead them to make themselves seen.[24]

An exiled Red could hardly have written a more balanced condemnation than Vicén's critique of the political structure that he

himself had helped to create. The solution, to Vicén, was not a return to full political democracy on the model of the Republic, but a broadening of the present governmental structure to incorporate all the Spanish people. He proposed that the Falange's National Council be empowered to name candidates for Chief of the Spanish State and to guarantee the honesty of all elections held. Furthermore, the National Council should supervise all functions of the state and exercise a virtual veto power over all government actions. All adult Spaniards would vote in "presidential" elections for a Chief of State among the candidates chosen by the Council.

Vicén outlined concrete structural proposals for reorganizing the entire Spanish state. The new political system would rest on universal suffrage channeled through indirect representation. Local government officials and representatives would be chosen by direct vote of all the local populace, but they in turn would elect the members of the provincial assemblies and part of the national Cortes. One third of the total membership of the Cortes would be chosen in this way, a second third of the members would be chosen by the syndicates (either indirectly or, in the case of the great national syndicates, by direct vote among syndical members), and the final third would be composed of eminent Spaniards from different categories selected by the government. The Cortes would have the power to pass national legislation, to approve the Chief of Government (or Prime Minister) appointed by the Chief of State, to deny its confidence to a cabinet and thus force it to resign, to oversee and criticize the functioning of the government, and to veto all tax bills. Dissolutions and new elections were not to be held more often than every two years.

Parallel to the establishment of more representative government, Vicén proposed that the Falange organization be strengthened and democratized. Each local *Jons* should elect its own leader by vote, although the choice should be approved by the *jefe provincial.* The latter would still be empowered to depose the *jefe local,* but only with the support of the Provincial Council. The local *Jons* could also present a vote of censure against its *jefe,* although the resolution of such a matter lay in the hands of the Provincial Council.

The total membership of the Falange in each province was to elect the members of its Provincial Council, which would then select the

jefe provincial, the choice of whom might always be vetoed by the party's National Council, if it saw fit. The National Council itself would be in part composed of the fifty *jefes provinciales,* themselves chosen through indirect election. The second third of the Council members would be elected directly by the party members. The remaining members of the Council would be appointive officeholders and outstanding individuals chosen by the national leadership. The National Council would then select the party's *Jefe Nacional* and would also designate the members of the Junta Política. It would be the Council's duty to oversee the political purity of the Spanish state, having the right to veto laws, to criticize and force reforms, and to purge the party membership.

The political vacuum that surrounded the Franco regime simply could not continue. As Vicén wrote to Arrese, "Gauge as precisely as you can the fact that the mass of Spaniards have been turned out into complete chaos, without leaders, standards, or organization. . . ." If the attempt to turn the Falange "movement" into a "system" should fail, "One cannot even calculate what the reaction might be."[25] It would be catastrophic for the remaining Falange leaders to await the demise of Franco before reorganizing their forces, which were nearing exhaustion already. After the end of Franco, the Army and the monarchists would try to eliminate the Falange altogether. It would then be too late to construct a viable system. Vicén asked Arrese,

> Do you think that it could [then] be done? It is more probable that we would be cast out by the monarchists and the king himself, who very logically would wish to remove the presence of a Falange in large part imposed, but not loved. We would remain with the leaflets that you are now editing in our hands and with the memory of our present lack of vision, if not of our cowardice and conformity.[26]

It would take some years to put a "system" into functional operation, and each passing month thus became precious. The remaining days of the Caudillo's rule ought to be used in building up all the prestige and strength obtainable:

> One must do everything very rapidly in order to take advantage of the years remaining to the Caudillo, in order that he may leave the future of the Patria secure, and not leave us in the tremendous uncertainty that we know today.[27]

Vicén's proposals were considered too extreme by the other members of the commission. They thought it would be impossible to re-Falangize Spain; all that might be accomplished was the safeguarding of the political goals of the Movement by the National Council, whose composition would not, however, be very Falangist. The commission members were only concerned about transforming the present absolute dictatorship into a "system" under a quasi-constitutional monarchy.

After some months of deliberation the commission prepared a report and several "Anteproyectos," or draft laws. The theoretical "Bases" of the report stressed that the continuity of the Movement would be founded upon certain basic and incontrovertible political principles. Once these were accepted, differences in emphasis and execution might be tolerated so long as that did not result in the return to a political party system. At any rate, a formally integrated juridical structure must be built for the Spanish state, because the *caudillaje* could not continue after Franco's death: "The authority of the Caudillo is only lifelong. . . . By its very nature the authority of the Caudillo *is not susceptible to succession.*"[28]

The notion of a constitution was too formalisic and material, tending toward juridical relativism. State law ought instead to evolve through a successive series of Fundamental Laws. These Laws provided for the eventual transition of the Spanish state into a Monarchy through the guidance of a Council of the Realm.

Once the transition to monarchy was firmly established, the resulting problem was how to incorporate representation of the people. The Law of Succession was not to be interpreted as simply handing the Spanish state over to the King; this Law was to be interpreted simply as one of the Fundamental Laws, and it would be bound by their collective content. Thus, in accordance with the letter of these Laws, the Spanish state under the Monarchy must be representative. The "Bases" noted that the democratic tendency might not always be desirable, but that it was "irreversible."[29]

The National Movement, of course, was to be the basic reality behind any political representation. The unity of the Movement could not be destroyed in favor of a return to the old party system. The regrowth of parties, even on the basis of limited and controlled suffrage, would be a disaster. A restricted franchise would merely

create the opportunity for campaigns of demagoguery by disaffected elements, who would represent the excluded to themselves as constituting the *pays réel* as opposed to the *pays officiel*.

Representative government should not be interpreted to deny the King political power. The concept that "the King reigns, but does not govern" should not be employed to rob him of all influence. The King (or Chief of State) would name the Chief of Government (or Prime Minister) by himself, and would also appoint most of the representatives of the Movement. The cabinet should thus be responsible primarily to the Chief of State, not to the Cortes.

According to the proposed "Anteproyecto de Ley de Ordenación del Gobierno," the Chief of Government would be responsible to the Chief of State, and would be appointed for a period of five years, after the Chief of State had consulted with the president of the Cortes and the Secretary-General of the Movement. The Chief of Government could be removed either by the Chief of State or by the reiterated censure of the National Council of the Movement, to whom he would always be answerable for interpellation.

Cabinet ministers, on the other hand, because of their administrative functions, would be responsible to the Cortes itself. Three adverse votes by the National Council would defeat the Chief of Government himself. Censure by the Cortes would force resignation of any minister, unless the Chief of Government continued to support him, in which case the problem would be thrown into the lap of the National Council.

There would be no change in the composition of the Cortes, however, and decree laws would still be operative in some cases. It would be the duty of the Cortes to deal with legislation and not with political questions of basic orientation, which would be handled by the National Council. Under this new system, the people would be represented in three ways: by national referendums, by the Movement, and by the Cortes. No changes were to be made in the Fundamental Laws without a national referendum.[30]

The Commission also prepared an "Anteproyecto" to redefine the doctrinal principles of the Movement. The text made it clear that the original fascistic Twenty-six Points were obsolete. There was not a word about "Empire," and Spain was pledged to cooperate with all countries sincerely working for an international community.

There was no more mention of violence or radical projects, but only an emphasis on maintaining an army "in order that a military sense of life may inform all Spanish existence." That was as close as anyone could come in 1956 to the "sacred violence" of Onésimo Redondo. Otherwise, the proposed political catechism stressed the pre-eminence of Catholicism, national unity, social justice, and the viability of a moderated capitalism.

Arrese made a strong speech in favor of the proposed new Laws at an august gathering in Salamanca on September 29, 1956, the twentieth anniversary of Franco's rise to power. The proposed laws were circulated among members of the National Council and other interested parties, and they drew a wide variety of replies, many quite hostile. The Army, the Church, and the financial interests were strongly opposed to the new proposals, which they feared would dangerously increase the influence of Falangists. The only change they would countenance lay in the direction of an authoritarian monarchy. They preferred the present benevolent dictatorship to any revival of Falangism.

Twenty years of Francoism had brought nothing of the "new Spain" that José Antonio had once dreamed of, and the more intelligent *camisas viejas* were acutely aware of it. On the night of the twentieth anniversary of José Antonio's death, José Luis de Arrese read the following text over the National Radio:

> José Antonio: . . . Are you satisfied with us?
> I do not think so.
> And I think not because you struggled against materialism and egotism, while today men have forgotten the grandeur of your words only to run like thirsty madmen down the path of materialism and egotism.
> Because you wanted a Fatherland of poets and of dreamers eager for a difficult glory, while men seek only a catering, round-bellied Fatherland, full of starch, though it possess neither beauty nor gallantry.
> Because you preached sacrifice, while men look from one side to the other in order to hide themselves.
> Because you despised money, while men lust for money, and business is superimposed on duty, and brother sells brother, profiteering with the humble and the trials of the Fatherland.
> Because men confound your slogan of being better with getting along better.

Because spirit becomes carnal, sacrifice becomes gluttony, and brotherhood becomes avarice.

Because you called a cortege of thousands of martyrs that they might serve us as standard and guide, and yet men have not seen in the blood of your followers an example, and they find its memory uncomfortable, and they are annoyed when we repeat in their ears, closed to all generosity, our monotonous insistence on the example of our martyrs, to the extent that some exploit the fallen as a platform on which to climb or a springboard for business and self-indulgence.

José Antonio, you are not satisfied with us. You who watch us from your place, from your twentieth of November, with a profound sense of melancholy and scorn.

You cannot be satisfied with this mediocre, sensual life.[31]

Arrese went on to pledge that things would go better in the future, that the Falange and all of Spain would know how to live up to the vision of José Antonio and the founders of the party. His exposition of the dismal situation then prevailing, however, had a greater ring of truth and carried with it little hope for the future.

On December 29, 1956, Arrese presented a final report on the new Fundamental Laws to the Falange National Council. He announced that of the 151 Council members consulted, a total of 3, 16, and 14 had declared themselves entirely opposed to the "Anteproyectos" Nos. 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Among the other Council members "there was every kind of opinion, ranging from advocacy of a presidential-type Republic to support for a Constitution entrusted to the custody of the Armed Forces."[32]

"One of the most facile and monotonously repeated objections made by opponents of the Laws is that they represent an effort to construct a totalitarian regime. The Falange, precisely because it desires a Catholic state, repudiates the totalitarian state."[33] The opportunity for representation of a variety of interests would prevent any tendency toward undemocratic centralism. To show how little danger there was of excessive Falange influence, Arrese read off the following list of old-guard Falangist officeholders serving under the Franco system:

2 of the 16 ministers
1 of the 17 subsecretaries
8 of the 102 directors-general
18 of the 50 civil governors
8 of the 50 presidents of the provincial deputations
65 of the 151 national councilors of FET y de las JONS
137 of the 575 deputies in the Cortes
133 of the 738 provincial deputies
766 of the 9,155 mayors
2,226 of the 55,960 municipal councilmen

"That is to say," Arrese commented, "that the original Falange occupies approximately five per cent of the posts of leadership in Spain."[34]

Precisely because the Falange possessed so little effective power, its chances for getting the proposed new laws adopted were very slim. The final decision was up to the Caudillo, but he received an ever-increasing number of protests from bishops, military governors, and bankers, who strongly protested any quasi-representative Falangistization of Spain. After waiting two months more, he made his decision; the new laws were quietly buried and a major governmental shake-up was carried out in February 1957. The changes showed that there was never to be any reversion to the Falange, for the party was pushed almost completely out of the government. For example, José Antonio Girón had been Minister of Labor for sixteen years; it had been said that with his demagogic radio speeches and his injurious but impressive wage increases, he was building too strong a position ever to be ousted. But Girón was ejected and obviously would not be coming back. He was replaced by Fermín Sanz Orrio, a syndical chief who was entirely lacking in political initiative or personality. At the same time, Arrese was superseded by José Solís Ruiz, who had begun his career as a syndical zealot in the nineteen-forties and had ended up as a clever and capable party hack.

To defend himself and the party from the barrage of criticism leveled against them, Arrese found the courage to circulate a clandestine pamphlet in which it was declared that the Falangists had been "cast aside by the priests and the military, who are the ones who have governed from the very beginning." He went on to cite his report to the National Council meeting in which he had listed the number of old-guard Falangists who still occupied political positions, thus attempting to prove that "the Falange cannot be responsible for the situation of our *patria*."

However, Franco had already deprived Arrese of his personal independence by retaining him in the innocuous position of Minister of Housing. This made it impossible for Arrese to identify himself with political protest and further condemned him in the eyes of the opposition.

The new mainstay of the regime was its collaboration with leaders from the secret Catholic religious order and laymen's association "Opus Dei." This extremely hermetic and mysterious formation was founded by an Aragonese priest in 1929. Designed primarily to make Catholicism effective in the secular world, its membership was largely composed of laymen. The formal structure and composition of the group were wrapped in the darkest secrecy. Vows were strict, and the organization's growing number of lay members were held to very rigid standards.

Opus Dei had received its first impetus from the religious outburst attending the Civil War, and in 1939 it began to reach noticeable proportions. Its first opportunity to exert some influence within the government came when José Ibáñez Martín, an ex-Cedista, replaced Pedro Sáinz Rodríguez as Minister of Education in that year. The group continued to grow during the next two decades, and by 1957 it controlled large sections of Spanish education and was very influential in the financial world. It harbored several prominent political theorists and economic specialists, who advocated a strongly Rightist, even reactionary, political orientation. The financial experts of Opus Dei decried slipshod methods in government and in private economic circles. They advocated authoritarian rule without further ado, and preached a heavy-handed economic doctrine.[35] Since they were the spearhead of Spanish Catholicism, Franco turned to the "grupo Opus" as his logical alternative on the Right. Two Opus Dei men were brought into the 1957 cabinet, where they occupied the Ministries of Finance and Commerce.

The opposition began to cry that Franco had finally discarded the Falange mask and had now sold himself to the Catholic reaction. By no means. It was true that the FET had very nearly come to the end of the road. By 1957 no one belonged to the party who did not in some way make a living from it. The organization was rarely referred to as "the Falange," but more customarily as "the Movement,"

the euphemism commonly employed to alternate with "the Crusade" as a label for the group that won the Civil War. Many Spaniards had their own ideas about what kind of a movement it was. Nevertheless, the "grupo Opus" was not invited to partnership with the Caudillo in order to replace the Falange. The Opus group was merely being used by the Generalissimo as his latest pawn in a twenty-year-old game. The dictatorship needed to officially incorporate new support so that the responsibility for future policies could be shared by other shoulders. The Caudillo had once more arranged to sidestep potential difficulty by broadening his cabinet.

It took the Opus people two years to discover this, proving that they were hardly the practical men they claimed to be. When it finally became apparent that the Opus group had been brought in only to fill vacant seats in the latest round of musical chairs, and that it had fully compromised itself with the dictatorship without acquiring any important political influence, a spirit of revolt set in. During the winter of 1959 there was talk of an Opus-Army understanding about bringing back the Monarchy. This had very little basis in reality, however. The majority of Catholics did not support Opus Dei. Indeed, Catholic Action distrusted, and even despised, the arrogance and harshness of the Opus people.

Although it was next to impossible to gain concrete information about the group, the Opus drive seemed to be leveling off. Its economic representatives proved to be something less than the tough-minded geniuses they were supposed to be. Indeed, as the Caudillo doubtless planned, they were being saddled with much of the blame for Spain's rising inflation and continued economic squeeze. By the spring of 1959 it was rumored that the Opus people were becoming more lenient in their attitude toward liberalism; they probably realized that it might later be convenient if their enemies felt more liberal-minded toward them.

During 1958–59 prices rose more rapidly than ever, and the level of investment did not keep pace. Exports fell off, currency reserves reached the vanishing point, and the maze of government controls frustrated all attempts to stabilize the situation. The rate of small business failures increased alarmingly, and heavy industry began to lay off workers. The regime was on the verge of bankruptcy. Under-

ground opposition began to stir once more, and a series of strikes threatened to break out in the coming months.

Franco's time-worn economic system had finally run out of gas. In July 1959 a program of "liberalization" was begun. The peseta was drastically devalued and a wide variety of government controls and restrictions were removed. The administration of this new policy was for the time being left in the hands of the Opus ministers who had so zealously directed the old system. This prevented any disturbance of the current political *status quo* and deprived those particular Opus men of their remaining vestiges of political independence.

During these years the foreign press was full of stories predicting the imminent collapse of "the little world of Don Caudillo." Such stories had little basis in reality. The dictatorship had issued from and capitalized on a series of profound divisions in the Spanish body politic, and in a certain sense, it had survived only by fanning these flames. So long as the Right feared and hated the Left, it would never dream of participating in a concerted effort to overthrow the regime. Not only were Right and Left divided against each other, but, as has been seen, they were divided within themselves. Economic affairs ultimately could influence this situation very little. The workers, who suffered most, were tightly corralled. The industrial and financial interests certainly could not complain; indeed, the dictator had always sheltered them from certain realities of the modern world. The Right could never rebel, while the Left still suffered the rigors of the police state.

For twenty years Franco had carefully fostered all the hatreds, enmities, divisions, and infantile fixations which beset Spanish politics in 1936. They were vital to him; they had been the permanent foundation of the "new Spain."

As for the Falange, after 1957 it was almost doubtful whether it was still alive, even in a technical sense. No one was sure what its name was. Not even the few thousand party members who still paid their trifling dues would argue that the Falange counted for anything. Whatever support the Falange or its former membership had lay outside the bounds of the shrunken, evaporated "Movement."

The only enthusiasts *falangismo* was able to muster were a handful of young people enrolled in the Guardias de Franco youth squads. Some of the more rebellious among them formed secret cells, and one group began to hearken back to Ramiro Ledesma and the JONS as the authentic expression of Spanish national syndicalism. These lads even began to prepare clandestine propaganda proselytizing their own version of the JONS. Early in 1958 they made a major effort to distribute material at the railway station of Atocha in Madrid, where most of them were arrested. Although the group was forced to disband, some of their fellows kept the feeling of dissent alive. In one case, an entire *centuria* of the Madrid Guardias de Franco was composed of young men who called themselves Hedillistas, in honor of Manuel Hedilla, the former head of the independent Falange's Junta de Mando.

Hedilla had finally been released from prison in 1947. The Archbishop of Valencia had privately declared that next to Jesus Christ, Manuel Hedilla had suffered more things unjustly than any other man in the world. The Church helped to make amends. Through the clerical contacts he had formed during his incarceration, Hedilla eventually became established in the lower levels of the industrial world, taking up partnerships in several enterprises.

He did little to encourage support among the young. He struck no political attitude, nor did he appear fundamentally interested in politics. The young rebels who chalked "Hedilla-JONS" slogans on walls in Madrid during 1958–59 were, as was customary in the party, very young and immature. They had nothing concrete to offer, and were very confused among themselves.

Nonetheless, a few party veterans wanted to use the sincere and incorruptible Hedilla, the only Falange leader still alive who was not compromised by the regime, as the focus for a new rally. In his native province of Santander, a group was formed which called itself Haz Ibérico. The program of this new clandestine formation was a sort of watered-down, technocratic form of national syndicalism, less extreme in its national claims and more moderate in its economic demands. It attracted several thousand followers scattered throughout northern Spain, but on a national level it had no significance.

The Haz Ibérico was not the only semiclandestine neo-Falange group in Spain. There were several others, partly interconnected. No

single unit was homogeneous, and the division of opinion among the units was extreme. All they had in common was a belief that some form of national syndicalism was necessary to shape and control the Spanish body politic. In his own way each member affirmed the importance of "restoring" *falangismo,* done to death by the compromises and distortions of the Caudillo. One spokesman declared that these scattered, loosely organized, neo-Falangist nuclei had some 25,000 affiliates by the spring of 1959. This was, of course, no more than a drop in the bucket; it represented next to nothing in the scale of Spanish politics.

By 1959 there was nothing to contradict the contention that *falangismo,* as an organized living force, was entirely dead. The same confusion and contradiction that had marked its beginnings now characterized its end. Neoclericalism and neo-Socialism prepared to contest the political stage, and most Spaniards could hardly recall that the Falange had ever existed.

Amid the unpleasant realities of *franquismo,* it seemed almost unreal to recall the political career of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. That the regime itself invoked his memory on every occasion appeared a trifle incongruous. As the Socialist Rodolfo Llopis said, José Antonio had been the victim of his own contradictions; his twisted and confused career led him to deny his basic instincts. José Antonio's greatest asset was an extremely fine sense of style. He was a very singular fascist, so different, in fact, that the term hardly suits him. His rhetoric was frequently wholesome and sometimes even sublime. His career was inherently tragic, and he has proved an ideal political martyr.

It is very difficult to trace the direct effect of José Antonio's ideas on the dictatorship that arose from the Civil War. Much of the form is there, but woefully little of the content. Considering the immaturity of the national syndicalist movement, it could hardly have been otherwise.

The Falange did contribute to the outbreak of the Civil War. Its fascist intransigence and hyperbole further strained the tense nerves of Spanish radicalism, which were already near the breaking point. But beyond this, the Falange was not in any large sense guilty of provoking the conflict. The Civil War was the product of profound so-

cial, political, and economic antagonisms, and to these the Falange merely reacted as a secondary catalyst. The Falange was by no means the most important group plotting open rebellion, and from the time the fighting began it was under the control of the militarists. Indeed, with its *Jefe* gone and its internal leadership confused, the Falange would probably have fallen into obscurity if Franco and the military had not found it a useful tool for conquest.

It was not simply by chance, however, that the Right hung on to the Falange and made it the *partido del Estado.* In the Western world, some sort of corporatism has become a logical response whenever the revolutionary demands of workers cannot be resolved by ordinary economic means. Something very similar to national syndicalism was the only device that could be used to harness the Spanish working class after the outbreak of the war in 1936. This was the indispensable contribution of *falangismo* to the Franco regime. To be sure, the syndical system was organized entirely as the government saw fit, but it was vital nevertheless.

The Falange itself never really had a plausible opportunity to grasp power, particularly after the dynamism of the *Jefe* was lost in the party's great hour of need. To try to achieve a synthesis of Left and Right without being able to enlist the support of either was impossible. While trying to fight the Left, the Falange was irresistibly swallowed up by the Right and by the master-maneuverer, Franco. Had it not been for the delicate nature of the Caudillo's juggling act, the party would never have retained a semi-independent identity as long as it did.

It was the emotional quality of their dialectic that led the Falangists to their doom. Once an all-embracing myth of national glory and unity had informed the totality of Falange doctrine, the possibility of maneuver and compromise, of adjustment to political reality, was lost. Faith in the effectiveness of political idealism had been a prime characteristic of European ideologies since the middle of the nineteenth century. Perhaps nowhere more than in Spain, the decade ending in 1945 brought on a cataclysmic disillusion. There remained only a nostalgic and ambiguous afterglow of the passions that once burned so fiercely.

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