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Francisco Franco and the Formation of the Falange Española Tradicionalista

On 1 October 1936 Francisco Franco assumed complete power as chief of state of Nationalist Spain. Within a matter of weeks he had moved from being one of the most respected figures in the military hierarchy and youngest of the major generals to holding the most extensive authority of any chief of state in Spanish history, a position that he would occupy for nearly four decades. There is no evidence that this was the result of any long-premeditated plan. Franco had never been a "political general" but had earned his rapid promotions by "combat merits" in the Moroccan campaigns between 1912 and 1926. He then served as the first director of the army's new General Military Academy from 1928 until its dissolution by the Republic in 1931. Despite this blow to his career, he had not initially conspired against the Republic, which soon restored him to active command and then promoted him to major general in 1934. He had served the Radical administration of Lerroux as special military adviser, supervising the repression of the revolutionary insurrection of 1934 in Asturias. Gil Robles made him chief of the General Staff in 1935, a position he held until the return of the left to power in February 1936.

He had refused to lead any military action against the Republican government; then, on the morrow of the last elections, he had urged higher constituted authority to declare martial law and annul the returns. Named military commander of the Canaries, he remained in relatively close touch with the military conspiracy, yet as late as 12 July, when a special plane was being readied to fly him to Spanish Morocco, he refused to agree to the revolt. He changed his mind the following day after hearing of the assassination of Calvo Sotelo. Unlike José Antonio Primo de Rivera, Franco had seen war and preferred to avoid the politics of catastrophe. Unlike the leader of Spanish fascism, he had sought to avoid, or

at least delay, rather than to promote civil war. His final agreement came when he concluded that it was more dangerous not to participate in a revolt than to join it.

Franco held to certain basic political attitudes and values, formed no later than the 1920s, throughout his life. He was a Spanish nationalist who believed in a Regenerationist program to create a strong, unified, and influential Spain. He preferred an authoritarian political system above parliament and political parties. Franco was a firm if formalistic Catholic and a cultural traditionalist, opposed to what he viewed as the cultural and intellectual poisons of most aspects of modernity. The only sort of modernization that he sought was technological and economic, to create the necessary basis for a strong and prosperous Spain. Having built his reputation in Morocco, he was also a devout believer in empire, and was convinced that Spain should expand, if possible, its holdings in Africa. His chief political guide and inspiration had been the Primo de Rivera regime, which first revealed to him what an authoritarian government could accomplish, even if its lack of clear political content had inevitably resulted in its demise. Franco believed that it was important to learn from the failure of the Dictadura and thus to avoid what he termed "el error Primo de Rivera"—the lack of a real political system and doctrine. This was a major point of similarity between Franco and José Antonio, though the enormous differences in personality, temperament, experience, and background between the two men meant that while José Antonio was more radical and fascistic, Franco was more cautious and conservative. Franco had not so much disagreed with the longstanding conspiracy to restore the monarchy as he had doubted its feasibility, and during the first weeks of the Civil War he gave the appearance of accepting Mola's project of maintaining the Republic in a more rightist and authoritarian form.

Franco's role in the revolt was to take command of what became known as the Army of Africa, the military forces in the Protectorate who formed the only elite, battle-tested troops of the Nationalists. This gave him a position of special influence, reinforced by the fact that it was he rather than Mola who established the effective contacts with Rome and Berlin and was the main recipient of crucial Italian and German aid. This was made possible not merely by earlier monarchist contacts with Rome but even more by Franco's very effective relationship with the Italian consul in Tangier and with the head of the German Nazi Party in Morocco.[1] On 3 August Franco was made the ninth member of the rebel Junta de Defensa, as his elite units began their drive north from Seville to seize Madrid.

It was during the early phase of the final drive on the capital, in the second half of September, that pressure arose within the Junta de Defensa

General Francisco Franco and Colonel Juan Yagüe (the chief Falangist in the military), in the streets of Seville, August 1936

to have Franco recognized as commander-in-chief and also as acting head of the insurgent government. This goal stemmed from a peculiar alliance of monarchists (both inside and outside the military) and various individual military supporters of Franco. Since there was no rival candidate—not even the more self-effacing Mola—Franco was selected without any serious opposition. The monarchists counted on Franco's favorable attitude toward the monarchy as a guarantee of a restoration, but initially nothing was done to restrict or place a time limit on Franco's powers. Though the official decree named him "chief of the Government of the

State" rather than chief of state, any limitation was disclaimed by the additional words that he assumed "all the powers of the state." Thus Franco's assumption of unlimited authority gave him, at least in theory, broader personal powers than those held by Mussolini, Stalin, or Hitler, for even in Germany there remained a parliament, though shorn of authority.[2]

By this point Franco's own political thinking had become more specific, and he had firmly decided that there must be a drastically new system to replace the Republic, one based on the model of the new nationalist authoritarian states in Europe. To avoid "el error Primo de Rivera," such a state must possess clear doctrine and structure. While receiving a visit from the German ambassador to Lisbon on 6 October, he assured the latter that he would develop a firm program that would be accepted by all the forces supporting the Nationalists, whether Catholic rightist, Falangist, or monarchist. At that time, however, there was not yet any exact strategy for achieving this. During the final months of 1936, Franco was fully occupied with the effort to seize Madrid and could devote little attention to politics. During these weeks, what he most appreciated from the Falange was its military volunteers, whose militia guarded long stretches of inactive front, helped to police the rearguard, and formed battalions for the combat forces as well.

THE FALANGIST MILITIA

The greater share of Falangist energy during the Civil War was directed toward military and paramilitary functions. From the first days of the revolt, the party became the chief source of paramilitary volunteers. The approximately 20,000 Carlist volunteers (Requetés) who flocked to the insurgent cause during the first weeks were in some cases better trained and prepared and often made better soldiers, providing an indispensable contribution to Mola's combat forces and to the later Nationalist Army (with unusually high casualty rates),[3] but the Falangists were much more numerous. By 7 September, 4,000 Falangist volunteers were said to be serving in Aragón with the Quinta Bandera de Aragón alone,[4] and by the following month all Falangist volunteers totaled more than 35,000. This amounted to at least 55 percent of all civilian volunteers with the forces of Franco,[5] and their number continued to grow rapidly.

José Antonio's orders for the revolt had stipulated that no more than one-third of the Falangist forces in any specific area would serve under regular army command. However, the acting jefe nacional of militia, Luis Aguilar, was killed in Madrid at the beginning of the conflict, and his successor, Agustín Aznar, devoted himself more to political affairs and



Falangist militia in Salamanca

the attempts to rescue José Antonio. The Nationalist zone was ruled by martial law, making all forces subject to military discipline, and though most Falangist units did not at first have regular army officers, they could not operate as independent forces, either.

The prospect of a longer civil war made it necessary to consider stronger organization and leadership. Falangist militia units had no real officers of their own (aside from their own Primera Línea leaders) other than those provided by the regular army, and no means to train any. The Junta de Mando did not initially act in this area but was soon persuaded to do so, and before the end of 1936 two small training schools for Falangist officers were formed, first at La Jarilla near Seville and later at Pedro Llen outside Salamanca. The latter, opened in February 1937, was directed by the experienced Finnish officer Carl von Haartman (a veteran of the Finnish civil war against communism)[6] and partly staffed by a small cadre of German instructors.[7]

These schools were not particularly successful. Many of the best candidates bypassed the Falangist rubric and entered the regular army's courses for "alféreces provisionales" (reserve lieutenants). The program at Seville was so short-lived that it never completed its first full course, its directors finally recommending that the Junta de Mando settle for a quota of the army assignments for the training of regular alféreces provisionales.[8]

The problem was partially solved on 22 December 1936, when Franco

decreed the unification of all militia groups in the Nationalist zone under regular army command.[9] Henceforth all such forces would be fully subject to regular army discipline, and their senior commanders would normally be regular officers, though in fact veteran militia leaders were sometimes given temporary army rank. This decision—which made eminent military sense—had been partly provoked earlier that month by the announcement from the Carlist leader Fal Conde of plans to open a Royal Military Academy for Requetés. Franco saw this as a much more serious political challenge than the Falangist efforts because of its semiofficial character and use of the term "Royal," particularly in view of the fact that the Carlists had created their own parallel state administration under the Junta Nacional Carlista, which contained subsections equivalent in function to government ministries. Franco forced Fal Conde to choose between court-martial and exile; Fal selected the latter.[10]

Even after the nominal unification, many militia units remained poorly organized. The first Inspector nacional, Gen. José Monasterio, was appointed a full month later.[11] The Junta de Mando was permitted to go ahead with its own training school at Pedro Llen, even though on 28 January 1937 provision was officially made for officer candidates from the militias to enter the regular army courses for alféreces provisionales.[12] Variation in size and structure from battalion to battalion and from province to province remained extreme; some banderas (battalions) of the Falange included nearly two thousand volunteers, others only a few hundred. There was also more than a little difference in the rate of volunteering from province to province.

Aznar was himself not the most skilled organizer and administrator, but in the spring of 1937 he arranged to have a few of the better Falangist commanders recalled from the front to assist in organization and training. Before much was accomplished there occurred the crisis of political unification (described below) in which the entire upper class of officer candidates at Pedro Llen was temporarily placed under arrest and the facility completely taken over by the army.[13]

Falangist banderas varied considerably in combat ability. Draft dodgers sometimes joined to escape the full rigors of military discipline or to disguise a leftist political identity, and certain units were "regarded almost with derision by the various units of the army and by the 'Reds.'"[14] Furthermore, the military regularly preempted the ablest militia volunteers for the regular forces. Records of the Falange in Burgos show that 9,120 volunteers joined the militia in that province prior to 19 April 1937. Four hundred ninety were listed as casualties. Of the remainder, 4,252—presumably the more able half—were taken for the regular army.

Yet numerous Falangist banderas acquitted themselves well on a variety of fronts, and sometimes also served, like the Requetés, as shock troops. Aragonese Falangists, for example, served bravely in defensive positions against heavy Republican attacks during 1936 and 1937. Some banderas were included in a number of the elite divisions of the Nationalist Army during the decisive campaigns of 1937 and 1938.[15]

Full statistics are unavailable. Falangist recruiters sometimes labored to recruit volunteers for the regular army as well. After the Italian divisions began to withdraw following the defeat at Guadalajara in March 1937, Falangist volunteers helped in part to fill the Spanish contingents for the mixed units of the "Freccie Nere" (Black Arrows) and "Freccie Azzurre" (Blue Arrows). By the beginning of 1937, Falangist spokesmen referred to 100,000 Falangist militiamen, of whom half were said to be at the front, but this was an approximation and probably something of an exaggeration as well.[16] Years later, the Excombatientes organization circulated lists of 147 Falangist and Carlist banderas and tercios (including, of course, volunteers originally with other militia groups as well) with 244,077 volunteers and 95,000 total casualties.[17] Both the latter figures are doubtless exaggerations, based in part on duplicate memberships.

General Rafael Casas de la Vega, the principal historian of the militia, has found that by the end of the war, 96,376 militia volunteers were still on the "Estadillo de fuerzas" of the Nationalist Army, while some 32,000 others had become alféreces or sergeants. A total of 17,015 were listed as killed or dead of wounds—a rate that, if correct, would be twice as high as that of the regular army—while some 26,000 had been invalided out, for a grand total of 172,000.[18] Yet this total may in some ways be an underestimate, for it would not include all the volunteers drained off into the regular army.

There is no doubt that the militia volunteers were numerous and made an important contribution to the victory of the Nationalists. Their performance was uneven, as in the case of most sizable forces. As befit an organization dedicated to militancy and the priority of violence, the main Falangist contribution to the war was in combat—and also in repression.

FALANGISTS IN THE REPRESSION

Though a systematic effort was made in the months before the Civil War to identify the Falange as the chief source of the political violence in Spain, no single aspect of the Falange's history has so blackened its reputation as its role—true and alleged—in the repression in the Nationalist zone, particularly during 1936–1937. Republican commentators found it

easy to spotlight the role of the Falangists, since they were presumably the "most fascist," but other sectors among the Nationalists also preferred to blame the Falangists as much as possible, particularly after the Civil War was over.

The reality was, first of all, extremely bad. As soon as the fighting started, both sides began seizing political enemies and executing them, sometimes together with military prisoners, in horrendous numbers. This process started with the killing of dozens of military personnel and Falangists by revolutionary militia when the former tried to surrender in Madrid's Montaña barracks on 19 July 1936, and rapidly escalated on both sides. Large-scale political killings are a standard feature of twentieth-century revolutionary civil wars, and took place in Russia, Finland, eastern and central Europe, and east Asia. This century's revolutionary wars have demonized the adversary in apocalyptic and chiliastic terms, permitting him no quarter as the very incarnation of evil in a desperate struggle in which only the physical liquidation of the enemy can assure one's own salvation.

It is impossible reliably to quantify the repression during the Civil War. Guesswork with global demographic statistics by such commentators as Gabriel Jackson[19] and Elena de la Souchère[20] is completely illusory and unreliable. The only attempt to employ a systematic methodology to quantify the total number of deaths was the painstaking study by Ramón Salas Larrazábal,[21] by far the most detailed study that has ever been done, but its assumption that all deaths were eventually recorded in some fashion in the local or provincial district in which they occurred cannot be fully accepted. Thus his conclusion that there were approximately 72,500 executions in the Republican zone and only 35,500 in the Nationalist zone is probably in error—the figure is much too low for the latter and too high for the former. A number of provincial studies have attempted to quantify the repression in individual provinces or regions, but these seem often to be motivated politically to "expose" the repression by the Nationalists, often only study one side, and in most cases are also uncertain in methodology.[22] The most objective recent global analysis is that by Angel David Martín Prieto, which has concluded that repression in the Nationalist rearguard took approximately 55,000 lives, that repression in the Republican rearguard took approximately 60,000, and that there were approximately 25,000 to 30,000 executions in Spain during the years immediately following the war.[23] As many people were killed in the repression as in military combat.

There is no doubt that Falangists played a significant role in the brutal repression in the Nationalist zone and were guilty of many crimes, but it is not clear that their role was so disproportionate or their general responsibility so great as was often alleged. Murder during the Spanish Civil War bore many different political names. A judicial state of war was officially decreed for the Nationalist zone by the Junta de Defensa on 28 July 1936, and on 31 August all military and naval tribunals were ordered to proceed under "sumarísimo" (summary) rules.[24] The military command, on both the national and the local levels, was responsible for the repression from the beginning. Local army commanders and military governors thus bore the overall responsibility for directing most of the repression during the first six or seven months, and after February 1937 the system of military tribunals became more orderly and comprehensive.

Though the arrest and liquidation of political enemies was generally supervised by military officials from the beginning, during the early months various militia groups—as in the Republican zone—were permitted to operate to some extent on their own. In various provinces Falangist groups therefore conducted widespread repression with a certain degree of autonomy for several months, just as rightist militia groups did. Moreover, victims marked for killing by the military and police authorities in the first months were often executed by civilians. Since soldiers were needed at the front, the actual killings were carried out by the Civil Guards, Assault Guards (in areas where they joined the rebels), Falangists, and other militia groups. It seems to be correct that Falangists—in part simply because of their now greater numbers—played this role to a greater extent than any other political group, but they frequently did so as policemen and executioners for the military rather than as independent agents.

One of the better local studies of the structure of repression is the recent work on Zaragoza and its environs by Julia Cifuentes Checa and Pilar Maluenda Pons. They found that, of the 3,117 killings they were able to identify, no fewer than 2,578 took place in 1936. Few of these first executions were directed by military courts, but by 1938 nearly all of the much smaller total of 255 were so directed.[25] This is probably roughly indicative of the situation in the Nationalist zone as a whole.

After the fighting began, most of the Falangist Primera Línea was assigned to military duty, while the older members or those in poorer physical condition of the Segunda Línea were assigned to security and "vigilancia." In some areas the latter were disproportionately used for the repression. The flood of new members sometimes gravitated toward such tasks, while the "cantonalismo" under which local units functioned during the first months left provincial leaders somewhat greater autonomy for a short period. During the first weeks in Logroño there functioned a

special tribunal for the repression composed of an army officer, a regular court judge, and one representative each from the Falange, the Carlists, and Renovacion Española.[26]

Falangists were guilty individually or collectively of thousands of killings, yet there was also a tendency on the part of their allies, as well as their opponents, to make them scapegoats for the entire repression. This was because their real role was bad enough and because they were fascists and, with the swagger and glorification of violence typical of the fascist style, sometimes boasted of their exploits. Unfortunately for the people of Spain, the real essence of "fascist style" was shared by many different groups on both sides: the military, monarchists, anarchists, Communists, Socialists, and sometimes even left Republicans.

The most notorious single killing of the many thousands in the Nationalist zone was that of the poet Federico García Lorca. This and several thousand other executions in Granada were directed by the local military governor and physically carried out by the Civil Guards, Assault Guards, and the "Escuadra Negra" (Black Squad), a mainly rightist militia group, as well as Falangists. The only people who attempted to save Lorca were in fact Falangists: Lorca was for some time sheltered in the family home of one of the principal Falangist leaders.[27] Antonio Ruiz Vilaplana, a jurist who escaped from the Nationalist zone, gave a somewhat similar report from a northern district, declaring that to his knowledge the Falangist leaders were the only ones who tried to restrain their members. He explained:

> The Falange . . . has been surrounded by a sinister fame, born of certain deeds, but exploited unjustly by elements who have exceeded it in the quantity and quality of repressive acts. . . .
>
> It was useful to the clerical and monarchist forces, jealous of the expansion of the Falange, to emphasize the repressive activities of the latter, thus diverting attention from their own direct participation in this work. In this respect the polemic sustained between the Falange and the Requeté–monarchist sector about this is interesting, because in the course of it the Falange, and most recently Radio F. E. of Valladolid, declared repeatedly that they had not acted as a repressive force on their own, but with the agreement of the military authorities.
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> The Falange must take its share of the responsibility for vengeance and social repression, but ought not to bear the exclusive blame.[28]

Manuel Hedilla's radio address on Christmas Eve 1936 stressed the need to discipline the repression and to avoid injustice—a forlorn hope, at best, but still one of the very few occasions on which a leader in the Nationalist zone spoke publicly in favor of limiting the repression.[29]

The other side of the coin, of course, was that Falangists were prime targets of the repression in the Republican zone. Nearly all the hundreds held in prison in those provinces at the beginning of the war were executed. Along with military personnel, for example, Falangists formed one of the two prime categories of those slaughtered in the mass executions at Paracuellos del Jarama—the "Spanish Katyn"—and several other spots behind the Madrid front in November 1936, the largest single atrocity on either side. No other European fascist movement, not even the Legion of the Archangel Michael in Romania, lost such a large proportion of its membership in the struggle for power, yet another singularity of fascism in Spain.

THE JUNTA DE MANDO AND THE EXPANSION OF THE FALANGE UNDER MANUEL HEDILLA

The purpose of the new Junta de Mando that had been organized in meetings held on 29 August and 2 September was to restore some form of central leadership and administration to the party, overcoming the confusion and "cantonalismo" of the first six weeks of the Civil War. Manuel Hedilla Larrey was selected as the jefe of the Junta largely because he was the highest-ranking party leader to survive, a national councillor and national inspector during the spring of 1936 who had helped provide what little cohesion the party retained during the months of clandestinity. Hedilla was a former naval mechanic from a lower-middle-class family in northeastern Santander province who had briefly operated a trucking service and at one time served as technical supervisor for the Sindicatos Agrícolas Montañeses in Santander, in connection with which he had formed one of the first Falangist syndicates. He had been away on an organizational visit to Galicia when the revolt began, and from that point had stepped forward to try to restore some leadership to a fragmented organization that by the late summer of 1936 was undergoing what was very possibly the most rapid growth of any political party in Spanish history.

Hedilla was honest, taciturn, and somewhat slow of speech, but a dedicated Falangist who recognized the need for leadership and administration. He faced a difficult internal political situation in addition to all the objective demands of rapid expansion and civil war, for the epigoni of José Antonio were divided and eagerly jockeying for power among themselves. Several general cliques formed. Hedilla was particularly supported by some of the other district leaders from the north and center, such as Jesús Muro in Aragon, José Moreno in Navarre, and José Sainz in Toledo. The tightest power bloc was made up of the "legitimists" from the Madrid leadership, headed by Agustín Aznar, the militia chief and coordina-

tor of efforts to rescue José Antonio. Sancho Dávila was also important in this circle, as was José Antonio's former legal assistant Rafael Garcerán, who arrived in Salamanca on 8 September and was soon made territorial chief for the surrounding region of León. The legitimists were at first not particularly jealous of Hedilla, whose manner was modest; it was some of the more powerful regional leaders who were creating powerful fiefdoms who represented a problem. The ones who particularly aroused concern were Andrés Redondo in Valladolid, who had quickly succeeded his fallen brother there as provincial chief and also territorial chief for part of Old Castile, Ramón Cazañas in the insurgent base of Morocco, and Joaquín Miranda in the main southern power center of Seville, who was very influential in the Falange in the south.[30] There was some overlap between these sectors, as Redondo often leaned in the direction of the legitimists.

Hedilla completely lacked the qualities, charisma, and personal leadership of José Antonio. Many of the party bosses now affected an exaggerated fascist style with uniforms, confiscated fancy cars, and large, almost feudal, armed retinues. Hedilla, by comparison, lived modestly with his wife and three children and was comparatively unostentatious. He seemed relatively indifferent to the frequent opportunities for corruption and arrogance indulged in by many of his colleagues, but it was soon feared that he lacked the personality and political skill to impose leadership on a party whose character, he admitted, was one of "considerable disorder and great ambition."[31] Thus after a few months an Italian Fascist journalist wrote:

> One cannot say that his appearance reveals incontrovertible signs of a leader, and nothing would indicate that he could show himself tomorrow to be that statesman for whom Spain waits. I should rather call him an excellent lieutenant, an energetic and scrupulous executor of orders, indeed the man needed in this hour when all power is concentrated in the hands of the military. . . . The lack of a true leader constitutes the great handicap of Falangism.[32]

The German representative appointed to Franco's government in November, a Nazi Party member and sometime army general named Wilhelm Faupel, sought to influence and assist Hedilla politically, but eventually came to much the same conclusion: "Hedilla was a completely honest person, but by no means equal to the demand imposed on a leader of the Falange. He was surrounded by a whole crowd of ambitious young persons who influenced him instead of being influenced and led by him."[33]

Hedilla seemed at first reasonably successful in his relations with the military command. On 25 September, during the days of transition into

Manuel Hedilla Larrey, head of the Falangist Junta de Mando, 1936–1937

Franco's mando único (sole command), the insurgent Junta de Defensa had issued a decree that categorically prohibited "all worker and management political and syndical activities of a political character so long as the present circumstances continue . . . , eliminating, if necessary, every kind of political and syndical activities or partisanship of a party nature, even those activities involving the highest motives."[34] This decree was not, however, normally enforced against Falangists and Carlists, the semi-official auxiliaries of the insurgency.

Hedilla moved the office of the Junta de Mando to Salamanca after Franco established his headquarters there on 1 October. The Falangist leadership sought to cooperate very broadly with the military, announcing on 19 October that it had officially forbidden Falangist battalions to fly their own red-black-red flags at the front, though inevitably some points of friction arose. Hedilla spoke not infrequently with the new Generalissimo, who would occasionally ask his opinions and even go to the trouble of flattering him. But he did not readily give in to the Falangist's requests. Nothing was done, for example, to try to arrange the exchange of members of Hedilla's family trapped in the Republican zone.

Firm and clear leadership was all the more important because the literally scores of thousands of new party members and militia volunteers had little notion of Falangist national syndicalism and its ideology. An American correspondent sympathetic to the Nationalists wrote of the new Falangists:

> Actually I found there were very few of them who had even taken the trouble to inquire into the doctrines of the party. Many of the younger ones had joined up because the smart blue uniform gave them a decided advantage over Red youth in the matter of their girl friends. The greatest number had undoubtedly joined up as being the simplest way to help their country. I have questioned dozens of them here, there, and everywhere; I found them on duty on the roads, guarding post-offices, banks, etc., and none of them was clear about anything except that they were anti-Red. One of them told me quite simply that he "guessed it was a kind of Communism, only much better expressed."[35]

The development of propaganda and indoctrination was thus of prime importance. The opportunity was all the greater because, though Franco had an official propaganda chief in his government, the new military regime devoted much less proportionate energy to propaganda than the opposing Republican government did. The Falange's jefe nacional of press and propaganda was the very young journalist Vicente Cadenas, appointed by José Antonio under the stressful conditions of April 1936. He

maintained his own office in San Sebastián (hardly the best arrangement, but then the administrative branches of Franco's own government were also geographically dispersed) and worked energetically with limited resources to expand facilities, opening a second office in Salamanca. The first Falangist daily, *Arriba España,* had been initiated in Pamplona on the first of August under the direction of the Falangist priest Fermín Yzurdiaga (also known as "el cura azul"—the blue priest), but the daily that Cadenas later initiated in San Sebastián, *Unidad,* was the nearest thing to an official, national Falangist daily.

Cadenas organized the Falange's first National Congress of Press and Propaganda, held in Salamanca on 25–27 February 1937. There he presented an elaborate "National Press Plan," accompanied by proposals for a new Falangist press agency, a national publishing house, a school of journalism, and a school of political studies.[36] By that time there were approximately forty Falangist publications, featuring, in addition to daily and weekly papers, the theoretical journal *F. E.,* a cultural journal called *Vértice, Flechas* (*Arrows*) for children, and the picture magazine *Fotos.* Falangist style was also propagated through a myriad of posters, calendars, uniforms, and ceremonies, and a small Falangist film company was formed in Morocco.[37]

Falangist demagogy was not a materialist demagogy of tangible economic promises but a fascist demagogy that preached unity and sacrifice as well as social justice and economic readjustment. In an interview for Italian correspondents on 11 March 1937, Hedilla outlined a broadly and militantly nationalist program. He declared that the Falange's goals were to capture the Red masses, to eliminate their leaders, and to organize Falangist volunteers serving at the front into a National Militia that would survive the war and create a unified, militarily strong Spain.[38]

The party press devoted considerable space to favorable reports on the Nazis, the Italian Fascists, and minor fascist movements. Periodic outbursts of anti-Semitism also occurred, despite the absence of Jews in Spain. The notorious forgery of the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" was dusted off by several party publicists.[39]

Falangist spokesmen readily accepted their affinity with Italian Fascism and Nazism, admitting derivations from the former,[40] but they also sought to affirm the uniquely Spanish identity of the movement. In one of his first major interviews as head of the Junta de Mando, Hedilla declared to a correspondent of the official German news agency DNB: "We are and feel ourselves to be of the same blood as Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, and proclaim our most open sympathy with these revolutions. This does not and should not mean that our fascism is an imitation. It is a fascism born Spanish, that ought to and will continue

to be Spanish."[41] Falangist propagandists also took some pains to distinguish their doctrine from racism and ultra-statism per se. In what would become a standard trope for them and for the government of the Nationalists generally, they preferred to compare their ideology to the policy of unity of the Reyes Católicos. Their propaganda did differ significantly from that of most European fascist groups in its emphasis on Catholicism, and religious themes swelled as the war progressed. As Hedilla declared in a newspaper interview in October: "The pagan sense of the cult of the Fatherland and subordination to race, force, and so forth, which one finds in some foreign movements of an analogous type, is replaced in ours by a strong current of spirituality very much in accord with our tradition."[42]

Church leaders would eventually characterize the struggle as a holy crusade, and Falangist spokesmen increasingly emphasized that all Spanish institutions must be imbued with a specifically Catholic spirit. Fermín Yzurdiaga, the Pamplona priest who directed *Arriba España* and was one of the party's most active propagandists, developed an ideological circle in the Navarrese capital and eventually rose to the post of chief of press and propaganda of the official new FET after April 1937. In a major address delivered by radio on Christmas Eve 1936, Hedilla declared that the doctrine of the Falange was "the expression of divine justice in this century," and that the party's mission was to "*sow love.*"[43]

Despite this increasing religious emphasis, more than a little friction was created by the Falangists' opposition to the right and by their "leftist" economic pronouncements, to the point where rightists in the Nationalist zone occasionally called them "our Reds" and "FAIlangist" (Anarcho-langists). During the early months Falangists sometimes demonstrated antipathy toward readoption of the historic monarchist red-and-yellow flag, and showed even more hostility toward CEDA leaders. Gil Robles was virtually driven out of town by Falangists when he appeared briefly in Burgos in August, and the democratic CEDA leader Giménez Fernández was temporarily forced into hiding by them in Cádiz province.

Falangist propaganda was much more directed toward the working class than that of any other group among the Nationalists. The tone had been set by Onésimo Redondo in his only speech during the few days between his liberation from prison and his sudden death, as he declared over Radio Valladolid:

> The doctrine and program of the Falange is impregnated with the broadest and deepest concern: to redeem the proletariat. . . . Let us give back to the workers the spiritual patrimony that they have lost, conquering for them, above all, the satisfaction and security of nourishment in their daily life.
>
> The capitalists and the wealthy will be traitors to the Patria if, immersed in a facile euphoria . . . they continue as they have, with incorrigible egotism, concerned exclusively with their own interests, without looking to the side or rear to witness the wake of hunger, scarcity, and suffering that follows them and closes in on them.[44]

Hedilla closed his Christmas Eve radio address with the following peroration:

> Open arms to the worker and to the peasant!
> Let there be only one nobility, that of labor!
> May the bosses of industry, the countryside, the bank, and the city disappear!
> Let us extirpate the idle!
> Work, well remunerated, for everyone!
> The state must care for your children as for its own blood!
> May none of the social gains obtained by workers remain on paper alone, without effect, but be converted into reality![45]

Falangist publications were subjected to censorship by the military government and sometimes suffered deletions. The censors were disturbed not so much by abstract demagogy, as in the passages above, as by any tendency to claim public authority or prescribe the specific outcomes of state policy in political or social matters.

Perhaps the most notable single conflict about propaganda during the autumn and winter of 1936–37 developed after the Junta de Mando insisted on reprinting on its first anniversary José Antonio's electoral campaign speech of 2 February 1936, which had proclaimed the need to "have the courage to dismantle capitalism." After the Junta de Mando had issued orders to all Falangist papers and to all provincial chiefs to reproduce this discourse, the Delegation of Press and Propaganda of Franco's government decided that the Falangists had gone too far. On 31 January 1937 it dispatched telegrams to Falangist officials and publishers categorically forbidding republication or distribution of the speech on the grounds that it violated the decree of 25 September. This was an almost unprecedented step in the Nationalist zone, and some of the provincial leaders ignored it. José Andino ordered 25,000 copies prepared for distribution in Burgos, and other copies were distributed in Salamanca, while the speech was also read over the radio in Burgos and Valladolid. For this action a number of Falangists were arrested, the most notable detainees

being Dionisio Ridruejo, provincial chief of Valladolid, Antonio Tovar, José Antonio Girón, and Javier Martínez de Bedoya. Though all were released within four days, plans were made for prosecution (in most cases never carried out). In the name of Franco, the deputy chief of the General Staff of the army sent a message to Hedilla ordering that he purge the "undesirables infiltrated into the organization" and discharge the provincial leaders in Burgos, Valladolid, and Salamanca (though this order also seems to have been rescinded).[46]

Concern about Falangist radicalism was heightened by the influx of leftists trapped in rebel territory. By early 1937 in some districts of the western part of Seville province, up to 69 percent of the members were workers and farm laborers previously attracted to the left. After Málaga fell on 10 February, a thousand new members joined the Falange within twenty-four hours, many of them former leftists.[47] Similarly, in Logroño and Navarre liberals and leftists joined the party as a means of thwarting Carlists. In Andalusia and Extremadura Falangist organizers sometimes followed the military advance into worker and farm-laborer districts, registering leftists and incorporating them into the militia. After the occupation of the northern Republican zone, many leftist miners were brought into the Falange, if only on the most nominal basis.[48]

Party membership did not always save former leftists. They were often required to volunteer for the combat militia, where some were killed while others sometimes deserted to their former comrades. New party members with strong leftist records were not exempt from the repression; a number were executed.[49]

Nonetheless the party continued to welcome former liberals and leftists, though so many sometimes joined that it became temporarily necessary, as at Salamanca, to suspend such admissions.[50] Falangist posters read: "The past is not important to us. . . . There is room in our ranks as comrades for all who share our goals and the desire to redeem the Patria."[51] As late as six months after the war ended, so many of those arrested in the wholesale purges conducted by military tribunals were found to have enrolled in the Falange that a special order was finally published, on 9 September 1939, stipulating that everyone arrested in the future would have to be asked if he was a member of the movement. If the reply was affirmative, Falangist authorities would be notified immediately.[52]

Under the Junta de Mando progress was made in developing the party's auxiliary organizations. The military government's veto of 25 September on new politically affiliated syndical activities was soon overcome by Hedilla, and the Confederación de Obreros Nacional-Sindicalistas (CONS) was revived and expanded, though it would not become a major organization under wartime conditions. The SEU was also reconstituted.

A Falangist children's organization was created, at first called "Balillas" in imitation of Italian Fascism but soon changed to the more Spanish and independent-sounding "Flechas" (Arrows).

It soon developed, however, that after the militia the most important of the Falangist auxiliary organizations was the Sección Femenina, which quickly began to expand into a mass organization. The Sección's most important activity was its network of social welfare centers, first established in Valladolid in the winter of 1936–37 by Mercedes Sanz Bachiller, the widow of Onésimo Redondo. It was initially called Auxilio de Invierno in imitation of the Nazi Winterhilfe, but later hispanized as Auxilio Social. Originally created especially for the care of orphans and other needy children suffering under wartime conditions, the centers of Auxilio Social quickly expanded into maternity care and the large-scale provision of food and clothing for the needy. The Sección Femenina organized volunteer female labor for the war effort, particularly in military hospitals and laundries, counting 1,250 local centers by the beginning of 1938 and nearly 3,000 by 1939. This became the largest single welfare and assistance network in Spanish history to that date, and filled a very important role in the relief of suffering during the war.[53]

The third plenary meeting of the party's National Council was convened by Hedilla for 20 November. There was, of course, no anticipation that this would become the most fateful date in the history of the movement to that point. Word of José Antonio's execution reached the councillors by radio from the Republican zone that very evening. They were stunned, but there remained considerable doubt as to whether it was really true. Could this be more Republican propaganda to weaken Falangism? In view of the uncertainties and the potential effect on the movement, it was quickly decided that no announcement would be made regarding José Antonio's fate, though in the weeks to come his death would increasingly be accepted as a fact by most of the leaders.

This naturally raised the question once more of leadership and the succession, but for the time being everything continued as before, since no productive alternative was available. José Antonio himself had not been the best judge of personnel or leaders, and was as much influenced by cronyism as anything else, though he did have the critical sense to perceive that the party's secondary leadership structure was weak. A personal supporter would in turn later complain that Hedilla's "principal mistake . . . lay in respecting overmuch all the appointments made by José Antonio, or attributed to him, which had been made, in any event, in conditions absolutely different from those of the second half of 1936."[54]

By December 1936 it had become clear that the Falange had a leadership problem, related to both the succession to the regular Jefatura Nacio-

nal and the autonomy and centrifugal tendencies among the provincial leaders. According to one reading, the worst cases of excess among the latter might be found in Andalusia, where the legitimist Sancho Dávila had acquired extensive power, in Extremadura under José Luna, under Andrés Redondo in Valladolid, and under José Moreno in Navarre, Alava, and Guipuzcoa. None of these leaders challenged Hedilla directly, and most of them at one time or another had supported him as a necessary convenience, but all tended to act with a degree of independence, and the same might be said for a number of leaders in other provinces.

There was also a distinctive Falangist culture and propaganda center in Pamplona led by the "cura azul," Yzurdiaga, which featured the eminent Catalan philosopher and essayist Eugenio d'Ors and also included several other writers and intellectuals, of whom the most capable was the young Pedro Laín Entralgo. D'Ors had migrated from moderate Catalanism and cultural vanguardism to Spanish nationalism and his own style of "cultural fascism," with heavily classical overtones. As a strong supporter of Hedilla, Yzurdiaga obtained approval to begin a new cultural and intellectual review called *Jerarquía* (the name patterned directly on the leading Italian Fascist journal *Gerarchia*), subtitled "La revista negra de la Falange" ("The Black Journal of the Falange"—again featuring the prime color of Italian Fascism). *Jerarquía* was supported not only by Hedilla but also by other leading young Falangist writers such as Ridruejo and Agustín de Foxá, but was much resented by other sectors of the party for seeking to usurp an elite role and copying the Italians too directly.[55]

The worst immediate problem developed in Valladolid between Andrés Redondo and a dissident faction of young militants led by José Antonio Girón and Luis González Vicén. Girón eventually fled to Hedilla in Salamanca, declaring that Redondo wanted him killed. Redondo himself followed Girón to Hedilla's office and, according to the latter, burst in, with little regard for Hedilla, in order to punish Girón. In his most drastic act as head of the Junta de Mando, Hedilla discharged Redondo "explosively," replacing him with Ridruejo as the new provincial chief, Girón as territorial inspector, and Vicén as a national inspector of militias.[56]

In this tense and difficult situation, the meeting of the National Council on 20 November—though only a rump meeting, since the many missing councillors had not been replaced—officially ratified the leadership of the provisional Junta de Mando. Hedilla would later admit that the Junta "met rarely. We tried to have regular meetings, but in practice, and for reasons not under my control, it was hard to get the members to meet in Burgos or in Salamanca. Once we had a meeting in Seville."[57] The most active period, in fact, was the six weeks following the National Council, for the Junta de Mando met four times between 5 December and 8 January.

At the meeting on 5 December, the "legitimist" Garcerán was named secretary of the Junta, and one week later it was agreed that the auxiliary services that were being developed would be known henceforth as the Technical Services of the Falange. At the latter meeting it was also stressed that Hedilla should be known simply as the Jefe de la Junta de Mando Provisional, not as Jefe Nacional. On the seventeenth it was agreed to send delegations to Rome and Berlin to establish more formal relations with the Fascist and Nazi parties.[58]

The earlier removal of Andrés Redondo was ratified at the meeting on 8 January, which also approved the new statutes of the CONS and the new juvenile organization, the Flechas. The Junta agreed that Hedilla should approach Franco to ask for greater autonomy for the militia and the syndicates, topics that he had dealt with in the past, and took further measures to restructure the administration and territorial organization of the party. National delegates for press and propaganda were approved in the persons of José Antonio Giménez Arnau and Tito Menéndez Rubio.[59]

Relations with the Fascist and Nazi parties ought presumably to have been very important to the Falangist leaders, whose publications were full of the highest praise for the Italian and German regimes. Hedilla apparently received personal invitations to visit both Rome and Berlin, but declined them. Though he was not at all the illiterate that his enemies portrayed and had a strong enough grasp of the Falangist program, his lack of sophistication in dealing with foreign representatives and international affairs became a handicap, and he failed altogether to use the offered Italian and German contacts to strengthen the Falange or its position in the Nationalist zone. The small delegation headed by José Sainz was approved on 5 December and carried out a successful visit to Nazi organizations in Germany, but generally failed to broaden contacts with Italy, which would have been the most useful foreign ties.[60]

THE UNIFICATION

It was clear to Franco from the very beginning of his rule that his new regime must develop a strong political base of its own, with a doctrine and capacity for mass mobilization. Whereas in October 1936, Franco's first month in power, the monarchist leader Goicoechea had talked of the need for a broad "patriotic front," that sounded too much like the limited Primo de Rivera regime. Similarly, Franco's older brother Nicolás, who was at first his chief adviser and head of his secretariat, played with the

notion of creating a "Partido Franquista" (Francoist Party), but this was soon rejected as too shallow and personalistic, in the manner of a Caribbean banana republic.

The two movements that had semiofficially collaborated in what was now coming to be called the Movimiento Nacional were the Falange and the Carlists,[61] the various other rightist groups proving comparatively less effective in mobilizing military manpower and new members. In 1933, before founding the Falange, José Antonio had referred to the Carlists as the only existing political force with a sound national doctrine, but he believed that Carlism was too old-fashioned and inadequate in social and economic affairs.

Franco found brief moments to talk with leaders of the various anti-Republican forces and also looked at proposals for corporative reorganization of political and economic structures. After the arrival of the first German and Italian diplomatic representatives, Wilhelm Faupel and Roberto Cantalupo, he assured them that he was aware of the need for a modern new social program, later telling Faupel that if necessary Falangist doctrine could be incorporated without the Falange itself.[62] He also discussed the problem at least briefly with Hedilla, and before the end of November 1936 the two asked the head of the Falange's Servicio Exterior, Felipe Ximénez de Sandoval, to sketch out possible terms of unification of Falangists and Carlists.[63]

By the closing days of 1936, Franco's administration had become more rigorous, and propaganda efforts increased. The censorship tightened and the slogan "Una Patria Un Estado Un Caudillo" (an obvious imitation of "Ein Volk Ein Reich Ein Führer") began to be used.

The Carlists also began to undertake new political initiatives. More than a few individual members of the CEDA had joined the Carlists, and the conde de Rodezno, key political leader of the Carlists in Navarre, talked with certain CEDA figures about the possibility of a more general movement from the CEDA to Carlism. His thinking was that all the Catholic forces should form one large group to avoid Falangistization or fascistization, but the Carlist national jefe-delegado, Fal Conde, as usual opposed any concessions to other Catholic or rightist groups.

The strongest, and also most independent, group of Carlists, the Navarrese, were more willing at least to consider alternatives. Thus on 19 December 1936 the Carlist writer Román Oyarzun published an article in *El Pensamiento Navarro* (Pamplona) entitled "An Idea: Requeté and Fascio":

> There are things that I don't like about fascism, among other things its flag, whose colors are the same as those of the FAI, its uniform, which can be confused with those of the Red militia (which can even give rise to dangerous incidents on the battlefield), its habit of calling members "comrades," a word that sounds bad (having been prostituted by Marxists, those same Marxists who have hunted down with gunshots so many valiant and noble Falangists in our cities), and other things possibly of more importance. But this should not prevent our realizing that we have many things in common, and that it might be useful to tighten the bonds of union, reducing the rough spots and rounding the corners . . . rather than deepening divisions or encouraging conflict.
>
> . . . Both forces have their roots in the people, both fill their ranks from the masses; in neither of them do the big plutocratic interests have a place of privilege or positions of command. . . . Both forces are believers and confess to God. Between them exists no fundamental incompatibility.
>
> . . . Reader: though you may oppose the idea, consider that the goal is noble and patriotic.

For his part, Hedilla declared in *Arriba España* on 6 January: "The tendency toward the formation of a single force is undeniable. We believe that this will come about by Falange Española assimilating . . . those points of traditionalism that are compatible with the needs of the moment. . . . In the religious field there is nothing to do, because everything is resolved." The Falange, he added "sought the re-Christianization of society according to evangelical norms," which distinguished it from foreign fascisms.

Two days later, on 8 January, the very small Partido Nacionalista Español of Dr. Albiñana officially merged with the Carlists, while in the Canaries the local sector of Renovación Española had also joined the local Carlists, producing a new hybrid uniform. Soon afterward, the Confederación Española de Sindicatos Obreros, the main Catholic syndical organization, joined the Carlist Obra Nacional Corporativa. The main leaders of the CEDA and of Renovación Española nonetheless remained aloof.

The first direct political cooperation between Falangists and Carlists took place at the close of October, when leaders of the two organizations made a detailed agreement concerning the division of political and press facilities and office space in the Madrid that they assumed was about to be conquered.[64] By January, some were thinking about more serious negotiations. On behalf of the "legitimist" sector of the Falange, Sancho Dávila had an inconclusive conversation with Rodezno in January.[65] Though that discussion had been covert, hidden even from Hedilla, the head of the Junta de Mando approved a trip by Dávila, José Luis Alfaro, and the twenty-three-year-old Pedro Gamero del Castillo to negotiate

with Fal Conde in his Lisbon exile on 16–17 February. The Falangists proposed that the Carlists simply join the now-larger Falange, with the ultimate goal of a "traditional monarchy," whereas the representatives of the Comunión Tradicionalista proposed no more than a temporary alliance to restore the monarchy under Don Javier, the Carlist heir. All they could agree on was to leave open the possibility of new discussions, pledge no agreements with third parties, and oppose formation of any new government in which they would not play the leading roles.[66] Further conversations were then held in Salamanca on 23 and 27 February. On that occasion Gamero observed that "it could be said that Traditionalism represents predominantly doctrine and the Falange predominantly proselytism," a formulation that enraged Rodezno. The new Falangist proposal was that the Comunión Tradicionalista join the larger Falange, which would retain most Carlist symbols and would be ruled by a triumvirate in which the Carlist regent Don Javier would play a role. Such a proposal failed, however, to speak to the issue of establishing a Carlist monarchy and state, which were the basic Carlist goals.[67]

The Spanish conflict had awakened much keener interest among Italian Fascists than among German Nazis, for obvious reasons. The first major Fascist Party delegation to Spain was the fact-finding mission of Roberto Farinacci, former secretary of the party and still a leading Fascist, which arrived in Spain at the beginning of February. It was then and afterward alleged that Farinacci's mission was to encourage a new corporate state under the duke of Aosta, younger brother of Vittorio Emanuele, as king of Spain (a sort of Fascist variant of the nineteenth-century enterprise of D. Amadeo), but in fact it had no such rigid agenda. Cantalupo, the new Italian diplomatic representative, thought that the Falange was a sort of undeveloped fascist party lacking "organic doctrine." A common tendency among Italian Fascists, as among Nazis, was to express grave concern over the "reactionary" influence of the Church, the military, and the right in the new Spanish regime. Farinacci reported that his impressions of his meeting with Franco on 4 February were "not rosy." Though Franco was younger and less "ignorant" than most of the Spanish generals, he was "rather timid" and talked vaguely about the need for some sort of corporatism. Mola, he thought, was "much more astute and intelligent."[68]

If anything, Farinacci found the Falange less impressive than did Cantalupo. He worked to convince Franco and others of the need for a sort of "Partido Nacional Español" that would have a strong pro-worker social program. Farinacci spoke with both Hedilla and Rodezno, and floated the idea of a broader government in which Franco might be prime minister, with Mola and one or two other generals in the cabinet, together with some technocrats and the Falangist and Carlist leaders.

Whatever the effect of Farinacci's visit, from February on Franco showed more interest in political organization. The arrival in Salamanca of his brother-in-law, Ramon Serrano Súñer, also played a role. Serrano had been radicalized by the war and the executions of his brothers in Madrid and of José Antonio. He had the higher education, trained lawyer's skill, and direct political experience that Franco lacked, and soon became the Generalissimo's chief adviser, displacing the latter's brother Nicolás.

Serrano later wrote that by the time he had arrived in Salamanca Franco "was already considering the idea of reducing to a common denominator the various parties and ideologies of the Movement. He showed me some statutes of the Falange with his copious marginal annotations. He had also established comparisons between the speeches of José Antonio and those of the Carlist Pradera." The problem with Carlism, according to Serrano, was that "it suffered from a certain political anachronism. On the other hand, a good part of its doctrine was included in Falangist thought, and the latter had, moreover, the social, revolutionary content that should permit Nationalist Spain to absorb ideologically Red Spain, which was our great ambition and our great duty." Conversely, the problem with the Falange was that "it was full of masses of new members coming from the Republic and from anarchosyndicalism. . . . Its leaders were old provincial chiefs, generally little known, or excessively young activists, or even, in many cases, new improvisations."[69] A party sometimes referred to as the "FAIlange" and "our Reds" would require firm control, as well as combination with more conservative elements.

A speech by Franco on 18 February was more direct than anything he had said to that point. In the "Nationalist camp," he declared, "there is no question about a movement that could be called exclusively fascist. . . . If our Movement were exclusively fascist, I would have no reluctance in saying so, since I consider fascism a respectable form of government." He went on to emphasize the importance of a "national ideology," which he said was most evident in the Falange and the Comunión Tradicionalista.[70] Franco would nonetheless continue to mark time for well over a month, preoccupied by the military coordination of the last offensive against Republican Madrid.

At the Falange's first National Congress of Press and Propaganda, held at the end of February, Hedilla spoke of "the decided will to achieve power," though he was clearly aware of the need to "pact" in order to get

there. When Tito Menéndez, the new national delegate for propaganda, met with Danzi, the Italian press attaché in Salamanca, he avowed that Spain should be "Italophile in a totalitarian way" and "should accept a spiritual paternity that can only be Mussolinian." Menéndez went on to assure him that "Franco is the today; we are the tomorrow," and that the Falange could absorb the Carlists as the Italian Fascists had absorbed the Italian Nationalist Association in 1923. Hedilla had much the same things to say when Danzi spoke with him a few days later.[71]

Cantalupo also met with the Falangist leaders during this period, and on 23 February Hedilla gave him a letter to transmit to Mussolini. He assured Cantalupo that the Falange would be "totalitarian," though at the moment it insisted only on full autonomy and not on control of the government, which should not include either "generals" or "priests." Whereas Cantalupo thought Franco and his brother were "unimpressive fellows," he found Hedilla "hardheaded, elementary, distrustful."[72]

Other Falangists thought that Hedilla was being increasingly influenced by personal advisers such as the journalist Victor de la Serna and the chemist José Antonio Serrallach, both of whom had the reputation of being strongly pro-Nazi.[73] They were accused of trying to develop a sort of "cult of personality" around Hedilla; a Falangist press article entitled "Hedilla at 120 kilometers an hour" much annoyed other party luminaries. Paradoxically, he was being accused of being both a weak and ineffective leader and also of trying to advance himself too much. Yet many of the other leading party figures—Aznar, Moreno, Muro, Arcadio Carrasco in Córdoba—made a poor impression through their exaggerated "fascist style," with big cars, large retinues of guards and subordinates, and abuse of power. There was still no alternative national leader. By the spring of 1937 the legitimists were finding a new focus in the home of Pilar Primo de Rivera, now directing the Sección Femenina from Salamanca. While some of the militia leaders talked of the need for a stern "Falangist general" like Juan Yagüe to run the party, and other malcontents simply wanted a change of leadership in general, without any candidates in mind, the legitimists continued to insist that no new Jefe Nacional be selected until José Antonio's death could be fully verified. In the meantime, they pushed for the exchange from the Republican zone of Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, the former secretary general; but when Hedilla presented this request to Serrano Súñer, the latter called it morally indefensible, since it had not yet been possible to arrange exchanges for people of greater rank and importance.[74]

The Carlist leadership was meanwhile dividing on the issue of a political compromise with Franco. The regent, Don Javier, sent a letter to Rodezno fully supporting Fal Conde's rejection of a fusion, which the regent insisted be given also to Franco, who was infuriated by it. Yet the political leadership of Carlism within the Nationalist zone was now dominated by the Navarrese, who obtained the resignation of the acting Junta Nacional Carlista, replaced by the formation in Burgos on 22 March of a new Council of Tradition led by Rodezno's Navarrese. Its president, José Martínez Berasain, then had a cordial meeting with Franco, who was assured of cooperation. Franco subsequently met with Rodezno on 9 April and with other Carlist leaders two days later, telling them that he would soon move toward a unification of political groups. When they pointed out that Salazar had not followed such a strategy in Portugal, Franco countered that this was why Salazar's government was weak.[75] Meanwhile, the Carlists' "alfonsino" counterpart, Renovación Española, had dissolved itself on 8 March, its leader declaring that all the rightist forces were in favor of a more advanced social policy and that the wartime emergency required "a totalitarian structure . . . in a purely organic system, in which all have a place to fill."[76]

Hedilla was apparently encouraged by agents from Franco's headquarters to believe that the main interests of the Falange would be upheld in any process of unification. The most important of the latter were the "captains from Mallorca": two Falangist army officers, Ladislao López Bassa and Vicente Sergio Orbaneja, from the main garrison in the Balearics. López Bassa was a Falangist veteran, one of the founders of the party on Mallorca, and Orbaneja a distant relative of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. They seem to have assured Hedilla that the core Falangist leaders would play the predominant roles in a united party.[77] Some observers noted that Hedilla now spoke publicly of Franco in the most glowing terms.

Hedilla also moved, somewhat belatedly, to rally more support from the Italians and Germans. The Italian ambassador and press attaché were assured that Franco was a reactionary while Falangists were revolutionary men of the left who would tolerate the portly Generalissimo only for the duration of the war. Though his supporters pictured Hedilla as a charismatic leader of working-class origins who could provide political leadership for a united fascist party that would be totally beyond the grasp of a general like Franco, Cantalupo in fact regarded the head of the Junta de Mando as poorly educated and essentially mediocre.[78] Only the German representative Faupel could have been considered a real foreign supporter of Hedilla. "According to Cantalupo, Faupel despised Franco and, immediately after the battle of Guadalajara, told him on two separate occasions that it was necessary to eliminate Franco in order to give power to the Falange, which, for the Germans, meant Hedilla."[79] Higher German officials, however, gave such thinking no endorsement.

Other Falangist leaders were more overtly belligerent than Hedilla, and at the last regular meeting of the Junta de Mando on 30 March they approved unanimously a very labored sentence that they instructed Hedilla to dispatch to Franco:

> In view of the attacks directed at our movement by the servants of the state, who are generally old politicians declared enemies of the Falange, and of the difficult circumstances undergone by the military situation, it is agreed to send a message to the Chief of State requesting for Falange the political task of governing the country, save for the Departments of War and Navy.[80]

Whether or not Hedilla supported this demand in the meeting, he clearly soon had second thoughts about it, explaining later that, since "I considered it in some respects inappropriate, I impugned it [*sic*] with another document that I strongly supported, and circumstances have shown that I was right, but I ended up resigning myself to the votes of the rest."[81] The "other document" prepared by Hedilla apparently softened the demand and made references to the greater support and representativeness of a unified movement based on the Falange. Nonetheless, pressure from the other party chiefs forced Hedilla within a matter of days to transmit the original demand without his more accommodating message. It undoubtedly irritated Franco but made not the slightest impression on him.

Franco apparently made his final decision on 11 April, when he asked Serrano Súñer to finish drafting the terms for a fusion of the Falangists and Carlists. That same day Nicolás Franco told the Italian press attaché that Franco must quickly seize control of the parties, for a dangerous dissidence was developing, and Franco said much the same to Faupel, observing that the Falangists, like the Nazi Brown Shirts in 1934, had to be firmly controlled.[82] Meanwhile, he obtained the agreement of Mola and the other top generals, including Yagüe, the senior Falangist officer, for his plans.

Hedilla finally began to react by the end of the first week of April, trying to assess the attitude of the party leaders, making direct contact with various militia leaders, and also discussing possible terms with the Carlists. He generally had the support of most (though not all) Falangist leaders in the northern provinces, while the "legitimists" and other dissidents were stronger in the south. The important leaders in Valladolid (Girón and Ridruejo) tended toward a discreet neutrality. On 12 April he told several Falangist leaders in San Sebastián that an agreement would soon be reached with the Carlists. Meanwhile, López Bassa and Orbaneja initiated their own unification process with the Mallorcan Carlists, and on the fourteenth, sixth anniversary of the founding of the Republic, the leaders of the JAP, the CEDA youth group, denounced "political parties" and declared their complete loyalty to Franco. At almost the same time Hedilla learned that the Carlists were too divided to deal directly with the Falangist leadership and would wait for Franco to act. He therefore asked subordinates to prepare a list of his political opponents within the party and moved on the fourteenth to ratify his position by scheduling a new meeting of the party's National Council in Burgos for the twenty-fifth.[83]

By April a Falangist "theater of the absurd" was developing. Agents of the Generalissimo were encouraging Hedilla to reaffirm his authority within the party while stimulating his opponents to challenge him directly. The goal was to create maximum conditions of internal turmoil and weakness that would facilitate and justify Franco's takeover. The main opposition to Hedilla continued to come from the legitimists, but they were also supported to some degree by others, such as José Moreno (transferred by Hedilla from the provincial jefatura in Navarre to the central Falangist administration in Salamanca) and Fernando González Vélez, a medical doctor who some months earlier had become provincial chief of León.

After informing Franco of their intentions and moving a squad of armed supporters into Salamanca, on mid-morning of 16 April the core legitimist leaders (Aznar, Dávila, and Garcerán) and Moreno went to the office of the Junta de Mando to present Hedilla with a series of grave charges of failure and malfeasance, attributed above all to what they called the "manifest ineptitude of comrade Manuel Hedilla, due to his illiteracy, which makes him fall into the hands of the most bankrupt assassins and of the men most dangerous for the movement, of whom he is the prisoner."[84] They accused him of replacing the Junta de Mando with his own personal clique. Basing themselves on a party statute that stipulated that if the Jefe Nacional had to be absent from Spanish territory for any length of time, a triumvirate would govern in his absence, they announced that they possessed a majority of the votes on the Junta and were now deposing Hedilla in favor of a new triumvirate composed of Aznar, Dávila, and Moreno, with Garcerán as secretary. The new triumvirs then took over. During the course of the day, both they and Hedilla presented themselves separately at Franco's headquarters to inform his staff of these developments. Both sides were cajoled into believing that they enjoyed the government's acceptance.

Hedilla thus felt free to initiate his counterattack. Late on the evening of the sixteenth, the Finnish officer Carl von Haartman, head of the Falangist officer training school at Pedro Llen just outside Salamanca, received orders to arm his cadets and move them into the city to secure the

Falangist headquarters. Von Haartman insisted on obtaining such orders in writing. When these arrived shortly after midnight, he moved his armed officer cadets into Salamanca, where the police made no effort to impede their entry. They seized control of the office of the Junta de Mando and several other Falangist sites about 1:30 A.M. on the seventeenth. Small detachments of armed Hedilla loyalists were then sent to the homes of the dissident triumvirs in the middle of the night. When they entered Dávila's quarters, the latter's bodyguard shot and killed José María Alonso Goya, the head of Hedilla's personal escort, and was then himself killed in turn. Dávila was arrested. The detachment sent to Garcerán's residence was held off by pistol fire.

At this point Franco's forces intervened, occupying the Falangist center and arresting von Haartman, Dávila, and Garcerán on the charge of provoking disorders. All the Falangist officer candidates were temporarily arrested as well, while the government dispatched orders to all Falangist provincial leaders, warning them against any further disorder.

That day, the seventeenth, Hedilla hurriedly accelerated plans for the National Council, which he convened in Salamanca on the eighteenth. In a somewhat macabre scene, with Goya's embalmed corpse in an adjoining room, Hedilla's candidacy for the vacant post of Jefe Nacional was presented in an effort to strengthen his position prior to Franco's impending unification. Hedilla received ten votes, while eight councillors abstained and four voted for other candidates. Despite the lack of a majority, Hedilla was proclaimed the new Jefe Nacional.[85]

About 9:30 that evening he presented himself once more at Franco's headquarters, where he was cordially received by the Generalissimo. Soon afterward, as Hedilla waited, Franco announced the unification in a radio address that he had written himself in order to present his concept of the new party. Franco assured listeners that unity had its starting point in the Reyes Católicos and would include "nothing inorganic, hasty, or transitory." He stressed the open and eclectic character of the process, for, just as the Carlists would be joined with the Falangists, "other forces" would also be added to achieve "an effective and not an ordinary democracy."

> The movement that we lead today is just that: a movement more than a program. And as such it is in the process of development, subject to constant revision and improvement, to the degree that reality requires. . . . When we have completed this enormous task of spiritual and material reconstruction, if patriotic needs and the sentiments of the country so advise, we do not close the horizon to the possibility of establishing in the nation the secular regime that forged its unity and historical greatness.[86]

Thus at the outset Franco emphasized the eclectic and open-ended quality both of the new partido único and of his regime, avoiding any clear-cut fascist identity and even announcing the eventual possibility of a monarchist restoration, to which the revolutionary Falangists were strongly opposed.

Hedilla was still left to believe that he would play the leading role within the party itself. When the National Council was convened for the second day on 19 April, the corpse had been removed but a Civil Guard captain at the entrance relieved all the councillors of their pistols. There was no gesture of rebellion against Franco's announcement. Hedilla informed his colleagues that the official name of the new party had not been determined but that its program would be based on the Twenty-Seven Points with no more than two or three changes.[87]

The official decree of unification was released by the government at 9 P.M. on the nineteenth, announcing that, "as in other countries of totalitarian regime," the old must be combined with the new. All members of the Falange and the Comunión Tradicionalista would henceforth be joined in an official new partido único called Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J. O. N. S. "Other organizations and political parties are dissolved." The new party would be led by "the Chief of State, a Secretariat or Junta Política and a National Council."[88] Subsequent decrees named Franco the new Jefe Nacional, with Hedilla to be the first member of the new Junta Política and the organization to be directed by a new political secretariat under the captain of engineers and recent agent of Franco, Ladislao López Bassa. Membership in the FET would be open to all followers of the Movimiento Nacional, though new members would be subject to certain restrictions. The official program of the Falange was then adopted for the FET as the Twenty-Six Points (suppressing the final point, which had stated, "We shall make very few pacts"). On 24 April the raised arm was officially decreed to be "the national salute," and other Falangist slogans and insignia were similarly adopted, such as the blue shirt, the red-black-red banner, the symbol of the Yugo y flechas, the anthem "Cara al sol," the slogan "Arriba España," and the standard appellation of "camarada." That same day the military command ordered that the Falangist militia, the Requetés, and other militia units, which had just been nominally fused into a single organization, would be directly integrated into the regular army, though the Falangist and Requeté battalions would continue to form individual units.

Creation of the FET represented the triumph of the "fascistized" rightists, denounced by Ledesma two years earlier, over the core fascists of the old Falange, and was an absolutely logical measure for Franco to take

Table 8.1. Arrests after the unification

F. E. members arrested	43
Requetés arrested	41
F. E. members sentenced	75
Requetés sentenced	21
FET members arrested	581
FET members tried	568
FET members sentenced	192

Source: Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, *Documentos inéditos para la historia del Generalísimo Franco*, 4 vols. (Madrid, 1992–94), I, 97–103.

in an all-out revolutionary civil war. The extent of the takeover was too complete and the subordination of the old leadership too great for some Falangists at first to accept. Hedilla found himself under pressure both from his closest supporters and from the rival legitimists not simply to hand the Falange over to Franco, though privately he acknowledged on various occasions that there was no way to resist effectively. He had, however, probably thought that he would be at least secretary general in charge of the new party and refused the proffered position on the Junta Política of the FET, though military headquarters cajoled him for several days. Representatives of the Axis powers sought to ease the tension by reviving the invitation for him to visit their countries, but Franco would not permit that. On 25 April Hedilla was arrested on charges of inciting disorder and rebellion.

There was no organized resistance among either Falangists or Carlists, though there were a number of cases of minor indiscipline and even small public demonstrations by Falangists in several cities.[89] As indicated in table 8.1, this led during the first days of the unification to 665 arrests and 288 condemnations, including 49 to life imprisonment, though all these sentences were eventually commuted.[90] The provinces in which the greatest number of arrests were made were Málaga (206), Salamanca (91), Seville (90), and Zaragoza (145).

The Carlists accepted the unification with skepticism but with even less resistance than the Falangists. Rodezno and the other Navarrese leaders managed to quiet the fears of the regent, Don Javier, for the moment, though in an interview with Franco shortly afterward they were shocked to hear him say that there was no real difference between the ideologies of the two forces.[91] All other political groups made haste to cooperate. From Lisbon, Gil Robles wrote on 25 April with directions for the dissolution of Acción Popular, the largest nucleus of the old CEDA.[92] There was no real challenge from any source.

Hedilla and more than twenty other Falangist leaders and militants were prosecuted for resisting the unification, and a number of them were also prosecuted on a second charge of being responsible for the disorder and violence of 17 April. Perhaps the major piece of documentary evidence on the first charge was a telegram sent from the Junta de Mando office on 22 April to all provincial leaders: "Given possible erroneous interpretations decree of unification, follow no orders other than those received from high authority." This was, according to the defense, simply dispatched to avoid confusion, but on the twenty-first Franco had ordered that all messages be sent from government offices only. Hedilla was condemned to death on both charges, while Daniel López Puertas (head of the group that went to Dávila's residence on the seventeenth) received a death sentence on the second charge. Nearly all the others indicted were sentenced to comparatively long prison terms, only Dávila and Garcerán being absolved. After a month and a half, following the intercession of Serrano Súñer and other Falangists, the death sentences were commuted. Within a period of several months to two years, nearly all of the several hundred sentences were commuted or completely rescinded. With few exceptions, Franco was not overly vindictive with dissident Falangists.

The principal exception was the luckless Hedilla, who was sent to solitary confinement in the Canaries for four years before being moved to more comfortable quarters on Mallorca in 1941. Only in 1946 was he completely freed and later permitted to establish himself comfortably in private business, where, using political contacts and his willingness to make some reparation, he was able to do quite well for himself.[93]

Despite or because of the injustices done to Hedilla and some of the Falangists, the operation was a major success for Franco. He had established a semifascist single party, based in large measure on the Italian model, but not slavishly imitative of foreign models. In an interview published in a pamphlet called *Ideario del Generalísimo*, released just before the unification, he had declared: "Our system will be based on a Portuguese or Italian model, though we will preserve our historic institutions." Later in an interview published by *ABC* (Seville) on 19 July, Franco would reiterate that the goal was a "totalitarian state." Yet the context in which he always placed this term, invoking the institutional structure of the Reyes Católicos, indicated that what Franco had in mind was not any system of total institutional control such as that of the Soviet Union or of the most radical fascists—a true functional totalitarianism—but simply a unitary and authoritarian state that permitted varying degrees of limited but traditional pluralism. As he put it in turning to one of his pet ideas in an interview for the *New York Times* in December 1937, "Spain has its own tradition, and the majority of the modern formulas that have been

discovered in the totalitarian countries can be found already incorporated within our national past."[94] In February, prior to the unification, Franco had declared that the Falange could not be considered a strictly fascist movement: "The Falange does not call itself fascist; its founder said so personally." The custom, very common in the Nationalist zone during the first months of the war, of referring to Falangists as "fascists" had disappeared by 1937, even though some writers or ideologues, rightist or Falangist, occasionally invoked the term on their own, sometimes using sui generis concepts.[95] All that Franco had been willing to admit before the unification was that the supposedly nonfascist character of the Falange "does not mean that there are not individual fascists *within it*" (Franco's italics).[96] The function of the FET, in his words, was to incorporate the "great neutral mass of the unaffiliated," and ideological rigidity would not be allowed to impede that.

Nine

The FET during the Civil War 1937–1939

One of Franco's principal achievements as Caudillo of the Nationalists in the Civil War was to avoid the political conflict and disunity that often weakened the Republican zone. He accomplished this in part through the creation of the nominally unified partido único, and negatively through simply banning all ordinary political activity from the Nationalist zone. In an *ABC* interview on 19 July, Franco proclaimed once more that his goal was "a totalitarian state." He reiterated that the FET was to serve as a great political melting pot for such a state: "There exists, moreover, in Spain a great neutral mass, that has not wanted to join any party. That mass, which might feel too timid to join the victors, will find in the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS the adequate channel to fuse itself with Nationalist Spain."[1]

The FET was designed to incorporate all political activity and, at the same time, to limit political activity. Thus no rapid political development followed the unification decree, for the goal was as much negative in the short run as it was positive. The new organization began with limited funds[2] and the first task given it by the governor general of Salamanca was to organize nursing courses.[3] Incorporation of local auxiliary units under the party structure began on 11 May, and the growth in membership proceeded apace.

It would nonetheless be difficult to develop the new party without the active support of most of the surviving leaders of the old Falange. Though most had not resisted the unification, the main figures remained skeptical and unconvinced. A number of the most important—such as Aznar, Girón, and Ridruejo of Valladolid, and Fernando González Vélez, the provincial chief of León—clustered around the home of Pilar Primo de Rivera in the plazuela de San Julián in Salamanca. They wished to remain faithful to the spirit of José Antonio while determining on what terms they would collaborate with the new party.[4]

Franco's representative in the initial development of the FET was his brother-in-law, Serrano Súñer, who a few months later, in January 1938, would become his first regular minister of the interior and the second most powerful figure in the Nationalist zone. Born into a Catalan-Aragonese family in 1901, the handsome, dapper, blue-eyed Serrano had been educated in law at the University of Madrid, where he was a senior classmate of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. Both were intelligent and serious, and both had lost their mothers at a very young age. They became close friends, and Serrano, who studied for a year in Rome at the beginning of the Mussolini regime, may have been among the first to awaken José Antonio's interest in Italian Fascism. Serrano soon became an elite state lawyer, number four in his class, and was assigned in the late 1920s to Zaragoza, where he met Franco, then the head of the new General Military Academy. Serrano Súñer briefly ranked as the most eligible bachelor among the upper middle class in Zaragoza, where this handsome, polite, and highly intelligent young man became known to some as "Jamón Serrano" (Serrano ham), because of his attractiveness as potential bridegroom. The young woman who won his favor was Zita Polo, younger sister of Franco's wife, thus establishing his close relationship with the general.

Under the Republic Serrano rose to a degree of minor prominence as one of the younger leaders of the CEDA, revealing oratorical and political skill as a Cortes deputy. All the scorn that Falangist propaganda heaped on the CEDA and its youth group, the nonviolent JAP, does not seem to have weakened the friendship between Serrano and José Antonio, and indeed Serrano represented the sector of the CEDA most prone to radicalization and proto-fascistization, as he drew ever closer to the Falangist chief during the spring and early summer of 1936. Trapped in Madrid at the outbreak of fighting, he was later arrested but was eventually moved to a prison hospital from which the slight Serrano escaped to a friendly foreign legation dressed as a woman. His two brothers, to whom he was very close, were less fortunate and were executed in the mass killings in Madrid. The experience of revolutionary civil war and the violent deaths of his brothers completed Serrano's radicalization; he was now determined to help create a strongly authoritarian, fascist-type state. His blond hair, already graying, turned mostly gray after his harrowing experiences, even though he was only thirty-six years of age, nine years younger than his all-powerful brother-in-law.[5]

During the first six months of the conflict, Franco had relied politically above all on his brother Nicolás, head of his political secretariat, but Serrano soon superseded Nicolás because of his greater political experience and talent (and not least because of the close relationship between Zita and Carmen Polo). The Serrano family even lived intimately with the Francos, being installed in the same episcopal palace that housed the Generalissimo's wife and daughter.

Within months Serrano would become a close friend of the twenty-four-year-old provincial chief of Valladolid, Dionisio Ridruejo, who has described him at that time in the following terms:

> He was very slender and always dressed in black civilian clothing. His hair, which had been blond, was already gray but abundant. His features were delicate and his hands unusually fine and well-manicured. His gestures were free though measured. He was very thin and when relaxed slightly bent as though burdened by a great weight. His gestures were melancholy . . . and he exhibited unusual courtesy.

He was not then the arrogant, overweening foreign minister of World War II, as Ridruejo adds: "The image that I evoke corresponds to the months in Salamanca and was very different; a Serrano of modest attire, with the bodily delicacy of an artist, pained, devoted, patient, and ruled by an almost insufferable moral tension."[6]

If his earlier orientation had been toward what the left called "clerical fascism" (meaning politically authoritarian and corporative Catholicism), he would later declare that he had felt totally "benumbed" by the time he reached Salamanca and now inclined toward a Falangism strongly combined with Catholicism. He proposed to realize as many of José Antonio's original Falangist goals as possible within the structure of a new juridically defined and institutionalized system. Even more than Franco, he sought to have the new regime avoid "el error Primo de Rivera."

Franco delegated Serrano to carry out the transformation of the FET, and in fact preferred that his brother-in-law become its first secretary general,[7] but Serrano was shrewd enough to perceive that this would be resented by the "camisas viejas" (the old shirts, as the party veterans began to be called). Instead, during the following weeks he carried on negotiations with some of the old Falangist leaders, and a somewhat vague but effective understanding was reached. The Falangists would fully accept Franco's new hierarchy, an organized national political system and state would be developed, and after the war a sincere effort would be made to carry out the national syndicalist program.[8]

The majority of Falangists who had been arrested, most of them rank-and-file militants, were soon released. Some, such as José Luis de Arrese, a relative by marriage of José Antonio and provincial chief of Málaga (where the largest number of arrests had taken place), were kept in prison for six months or more, and Hedilla himself would not be completely freed from all restrictions for nine years. More than a few Falangists con-

tinued to harbor private reservations, while others, such as the national councillor and provincial chief of Seville, Martín Ruiz Arenado, were willing to be convinced of Franco's sincerity. At any rate, they had no choice. Almost all accepted Serrano's argument that it would be better to participate and have the new FET set up and administered primarily by Falangists rather than by an assortment of Carlists and diverse right-wing opportunists. Some resolved to build as large a core of dominant camisas viejas within the organization as they could. González Vélez was a strong advocate of boring from within, and he was given Hedilla's vacant seat on the new Junta Política.[9]

What was called in the decree of 22 April the political secretariat of the FET contained only one other civilian camisa vieja, Joaquín Miranda of Seville. It included one military camisa vieja, Ladislao López Bassa, the captain of engineers from Mallorca who had actively promoted the unification on behalf of Franco and who became secretary of the Junta, and one military "neo-Falangist" or wartime affiliate, Lt. Col. Darío Gazapo Valdés of the General Staff. The other members were the unclassifiable but slavishly franquista Giménez Caballero (who had earlier served briefly as Franco's chief of propaganda) and four Carlists: the conde de Rodezno, Luis Arellano, Tomás Dolz de Espejo, and José Ma. Mazón. Serrano managed to convince Rodezno that it was his duty to serve, though the Carlist leader was reluctant and soon decided that he had made a mistake, privately terming López Bassa "un bruto."[10]

On 11 May Franco officially assumed supreme command of what was henceforth called La Milicia Nacional, into which all the diverse militia formations from various groups had already been fused. Subsequently Pilar Primo de Rivera was ratified in her position as Delegada Nacional de la Sección Femenina, as were José Luis Escario for Technical Services and Aznar as national inspector of militia.

In establishing the network of FET leadership, the norm was to appoint a Carlist provincial secretary in provinces where a Falangist veteran or neo-Falangist was provincial chief, and vice versa. González Vélez and most other camisa vieja leaders, however, made no secret of their determination that the FET should be totally dominated by camisas viejas, rather than achieving an evenly fused leadership with Carlists and others. To a degree, Serrano Súñer agreed, and thus Carlists were only awarded nine jefaturas provinciales, compared with twenty-two for Falangists. Equally galling for the Carlists was the wholesale adoption of Falangist symbols and liturgy, whereas little more than the red beret of Carlism was introduced into the FET.

Rarely spoken but generally assumed was the centrality of the Italian model, with the goal of full fascistization of the FET—something already accepted as a matter of course by the camisas viejas—and also of the new state. As Tusell points out, during the first year of the Civil War Franco did not employ a particularly fascist vocabulary in his public speeches, but this would begin to change under Serrano's influence. Also of some minor rhetorical importance in 1937 was Giménez Caballero, who (though forbidden by the Junta de Mando in December 1936 to make public declarations on behalf of the Falange) was extremely active in public meetings and propaganda.[11]

What was not important was the Junta Política, whose powers remained vague. Perhaps induced by Serrano, Franco at first attended weekly meetings, but soon realized that he was wasting his time. The Junta was divided between two camisas viejas, two opportunistic military neo-Falangists, and the Carlists. Soon members began to disappear physically: Gazapo was transferred to Aragon, Mazón was seriously injured in a traffic accident, and López Bassa became gravely ill. By July at least two of the Carlists—Rodezno and Arellano—stopped attending altogether.[12]

Work on the new organization proceeded through the summer, and the first party statutes, released on 4 August, preserved much of the original structure but made the new party even more hierarchical and authoritarian. Articles 47 and 48 defined Franco's role in the following terms:

> The Jefe Nacional of F.E.T. y de las J. O. N. S., supreme Caudillo of the Movement, personifies all its values and honors. As author of the historical era in which Spain acquires the possibilities of realizing its destiny and with that the goals of the Movement, the Jefe assumes in its entire plenitude the most absolute authority. The Jefe is responsible before God and before history.
>
> . . . The Caudillo has the right to designate his successor, who will receive from him the same dignities and obligations.

The statutes went on to declare:

> Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J. O. N. S. is the militant Movement that is the inspiration and base of the Spanish state, which in a communion of will and beliefs assumes the task of returning to Spain the profound sense of an indestructible unity of destiny and of resolute faith in its Catholic and imperial mission, as protagonist of history, to establish an economic regime transcending the interests of the individual, group, and class, for the increase of wealth, the service of the power of the state, of social justice, and of the Christian liberty of the person.
>
> Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J. O. N. S. is the discipline by which the people, united and in order, ascend to the state and by which the state imbues in the people the virtues of service, brotherhood, and hierarchy.

Article 27 stressed the importance of the party's Militia:

> In war and in peace, the Militia represents the ardent spirit of Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J. O. N. S., and its virile will to the service of the Patria as vigilant guard of its postulates against any internal enemy. More than a part of the Movement, the Militia is the Movement itself in a heroic attitude of military subordination.

Articles 29 and 30 defined the party's responsibility for the new Spanish syndical system:

> Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J. O. N. S. will create and maintain the syndical organization to structure labor and the production and distribution of goods. At all times the leaders of this organization will be drawn from the ranks of the Movement and will be shaped and trained by the latter, to guarantee that the syndical organization will be subordinated to the national interest and imbued with the ideals of the state.
>
> The national leadership of the Syndicates will be conferred on a single militant, and its internal order will have a vertical and hierarchical structure, in the manner of a commanding, just, and ordered army.

The statutes provided that the Caudillo would designate his successor secretly, to be proclaimed by the National Council only in the event of the Caudillo's death or permanent incapacity. The Jefe Nacional held direct authority to appoint provincial chiefs and members of the National Council, though henceforth in theory half of the advisory Junta Política would be chosen by the Jefe Nacional, half by the National Council. The local chiefs and local secretaries of the party would be designated by the provincial chiefs.

The Carlist component of the FET was defined as guaranteeing "historical continuity," and the representatives of the original Falange stood for "national revolution." Two categories of members were established: militants and adherents. The status of militants was reserved for those affiliated with the Falange and the Comunión Tradicionalista before the unification, for all military officers and NCOs (who automatically became members), and for those recognized for special service. Ordinary new affiliates would henceforth be relegated to the status of "adherents" and would be expected to "serve the FET without any of the rights" of full militants, full membership being granted only after a period of service.

Twelve National Services were created, mostly paralleling the state administration: foreign affairs, national education, press and propaganda, feminine section, social work, syndicates, youth organization, justice and law, initiatives and orientation of the work of the state, communications and transport, treasury and administration, and information and investigation. This elaborate structure of service cadres was designed to compensate for the FET membership's lack of preparation by training elite cadres that could later help administer the one-party state.[13] During August the outline of the future youth organization was also drawn up, and in October the statutes of the new SEU were approved, though membership was not at that time made obligatory for all university students. Subsequently a decree of 30 October announced that any appointment to a position in local or provincial government would require approval by the local chiefs of the FET and Civil Guard; such double authorization was declared necessary until the "new totalitarian state" was completed.

The only people powerful enough to make direct criticisms of the new FET were some of the major military commanders, who sometimes complained privately if not in public. Thus Col. Juan Beigbeder, high commissioner of the Moroccan Protectorate, would write to Franco on 10 June:

> I should like again to point out the need to intensify work with the laboring masses, and to be implacable with the little bosses and petty syndicates of Falangist leaders who represent nothing. In the Spanish Protectorate the High Commissioner ought to have the power to recommend the dismissal of the leaders of the Falange and also that none be named without his approval.[14]

In practice Beigbeder seems to have been given much of the authority that he desired and would later be credited with building a stronger FET structure in the Protectorate during the remainder of the Civil War.

Opposition naturally lingered among camisas viejas but it was diffuse and without structure, organization, or leadership. The only kind of complaint that Franco heard was the one sent to him by José Antonio Girón on behalf of the Falangist militia leaders in Valladolid. Girón emphasized the importance of the Militia's having a real political identity and role, insisting that this could build a more direct power base for the Caudillo at the expense of the monarchists, who would seek to weaken Franco by downgrading the FET. Girón stressed that it was important for the Militia to have a genuine leader of its own, and not merely a general of the regular army who would treat it as an ordinary army corps.[15] There is no indication that this argument impressed Franco.

Later in 1937 there appeared a series of leaflets attacking the capture of the Falange by the military government, signed "Falange Española Auténtica" (FEA). These sheets were clearly printed abroad, probably in France, and had little effect. Rumors linked their appearance to Vicente

Cadenas, last National delegate of press and propaganda prior to the unification, who had fled to France after 19 April. Cadenas later disclaimed any such initiative and, so far as he was able to learn, the actual existence of any such organization as the "Falange Española Auténtica" at that time.[16] It was also suggested that the initiative was the brainchild of Indalecio Prieto, though he never subsequently acknowledged any such activity. Having failed in their purpose, the pamphlets soon dwindled and disappeared, but the "FEA" would continue to remain a concern for the FET leadership.[17]

The old Falange had been formally Catholic and its leader a champion of neotraditionalist religion, but the new FET would have to embrace "national Catholicism" much more completely than the somewhat anticlerical party of José Antonio, for neotraditionalist Catholicism was a spiritual and ideological mainstay of the new regime and of the whole franquista effort in the Civil War. Hence the new national delegate of press and propaganda was "the blue priest," Fermín Yzurdiaga, the extravagant Pamplona cleric who had founded the party's first daily newspaper. A supporter of Hedilla before unification, he easily adjusted and became the living incarnation of the purple rhetoric that became characteristic of the FET, invoking God and praising Franco in the same breath. During 1937 his *Arriba España* normally ran a front-page caption reading "Por Dios y el César" (For God and the Caesar—the "César" having first been Hedilla, but now Franco). His extravagant language led the Falangist wit Agustín de Foxá to remark, paraphrasing the Popular Front slogan from the defense of Madrid, "Yzurdiaga will be the tomb of fascism." Appointed in May, his chief lieutenants were Dionisio Ridruejo as chief of propaganda and a veteran Carlist, Eladio Esparza, as chief of press.

After some six months, Yzurdiaga was forced to resign by the Church hierarchy. He had helped to establish the ultra-baroque language characteristic of the new regime, but for the Church leaders his use of religious language for fascistic politics, his lack of respect for the hierarchy (Yzurdiaga liked to refer to a "Catholicism of the apostles"), and his praise of Hitler were simply too much.[18]

Even as a state party, the press and propaganda of the FET remained subject to state censorship and were occasionally curtailed. They were full of praise for the military and consistently condemned liberalism, parliamentarianism, and the left, while running numerous articles expressing great admiration for Italy and Germany. In a speech at Vigo on 28 November 1937, Yzurdiaga replied to murmurers in the party, admitting that there was some truth in the charge that the Falange was not as revolutionary as in the past, saying that many changes had already been accomplished and that one must tread the path to revolution carefully.[19] The party's propaganda participated to some extent in the rising tide of Catholic fundamentalism in the Nationalist zone, but Falangist papers sometimes criticized the more Franciscan and pacifist aspects of Catholicism and even asserted that papal policies were not infallible.[20] There were also occasional diatribes against the Jews[21] (then virtually nonexistent in Spain).

When the Junta Técnica that administered Franco's government declared 1 October 1937, anniversary of Franco's elevation to supreme power, to be henceforth the "Fiesta Nacional del Caudillo," it fell to the FET to organize the celebration. This assignment further emphasized its preeminent functions in liturgy, propaganda, and ceremony.

Meanwhile months passed and no secretary general was named for the FET. This function was to some extent being filled by Serrano Súñer, but he had no intention of settling for an ordinary bureaucratic position, nor were some of the camisas viejas willing to accept him. Party legitimists still talked of the possible exchange of Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, last regular secretary before the war, who remained imprisoned in the Republican zone. Franco at first had no particular interest in this, undesirous of augmenting the influence of the camisas viejas, but after some months Serrano became aware that he was being referred to with increasing frequency as *el cuñadísimo* (the "supreme brother-in-law" of the Generalissimo) and that there were few candidates for secretary.[22] He therefore persuaded Franco to undertake the exchange, arranged with the good offices of Indalecio Prieto, who still hoped to foment Falangist dissidence.[23] When Fernández Cuesta appeared in the Nationalist zone in October, he went immediately to thank the Caudillo, whom he soon convinced of his general reliability.[24] He also quickly established contact with the Italian embassy, to which he looked for guidance. Fernández Cuesta had always been more sympathetic to the monarchy than were most camisas viejas, and, declaring that "the Falange has lost in intensity what it has gained in breadth," he gave the impression of being a decidedly moderate rather than radical fascist. At his first public appearance in Seville on 29 October 1937, the fourth anniversary of the party, he made the usual remarks that Falangists were "revolutionary, profoundly revolutionary," but emphasized that national syndicalism was fully compatible with capitalism and added that the party would not object if "a specific form of symbolic representation" (the monarchy) were restored,[25] drawing praise from the non-Falangist right.

Though Franco was still somewhat uncomfortable with camisas viejas, Fernández Cuesta seemed adequately conformist, and on 2 December was appointed first secretary of the FET. He was flattered by the appointment and was strongly urged to take it, though he seems to have had

personal misgivings and to have murmured "Yes, they appoint me so that I will fail."[26] Those legitimists who had first looked hopefully to him were already becoming disillusioned with his plodding habits and lack of initiative. In the words of Ridruejo, "We were completely wrong," for they soon realized that at best "he was a man of normal ability for a public responsibility of secondary rank."[27] A gulf quickly developed between the new secretary and the younger party radicals, which only deepened after he emphasized the syncretic character of the FET in a New Year's Day interview: "Sincerity and affection oblige me to say to the old guard that it must have an understanding spirit, without enclosing itself in exclusivism or adopting airs of repellent superiority, receiving with love and comradeship all those who come with good faith to Falange Española Tradicionalista."[28]

Fernández Cuesta was more moderate and more tolerant than many of the other Falangist chiefs and not unintelligent, but he lacked initiative and administrative talent. Moreover, as a camisa vieja he was not fully trusted by Franco, at least at first. Thus the principal director of domestic politics under Franco and the man who effectively pulled the strings in the Falange was still Serrano Súñer. Dressed in a well-tailored black business suit, he was practically the only important person in Salamanca who felt little compulsion to sport a uniform (a habit that would soon change). Serrano would later claim that "my work was mainly devoted to three tasks: helping to establish effectively the political leadership of Franco, saving and carrying out the political thought of José Antonio, and contributing to the structuring of the National Movement as a juridical regime, that is, instituting a state of law."[29]

A Falangist pedigree was quickly built up for Serrano, and his close relationship with José Antonio strongly emphasized.[30] By the close of 1937, he had completed the formation of a tacit pact between the new regime and most of the former leaders of the party. It was an arrangement relatively favorable to the latter, except for the fact that it eliminated their independence. For the most part, the FET would be led administratively and politically by the old Falangist leadership, with the Carlists increasingly marginalized. Falangists would lead a burgeoning media and propaganda network, as well as the new syndical system, and would be able to work for the implementation of all but the most radical of the remaining Twenty-Six Points.

During the final months of 1937, Serrano's bitterest opponents were monarchists, who blamed him for the development of a new fascistic partido único that might help Franco delay the possibility of restoration. Monarchists, together with Carlists, were the most active in spreading denunciations of the "cuñadísimo."[31]

Those complaints tended to overlook the fact that Serrano was executing Franco's policy. The new statutes described the Jefe Nacional as only "responsible before God and history," but despite his total authority it would be some time before the Caudillo felt fully comfortable with the party. He would never become a genuine Falangist and would never subscribe to the entire Falangist creed—particularly aspects of its social and economic radicalism—but he did accept the greater part of it, and later during 1938 his speeches would acquire a more fascistic, though never completely fascistic, tone.

Further demonstration of the character of the FET was provided through the function of the first National Council, whose fifty members were not announced by Franco until 19 October. Their ceremony of taking office was delayed until a special meeting at the monastery of Las Huelgas (Burgos) on 2 December, coinciding with the appointment of Fernández Cuesta. Nearly a third of this ceremony was spent swearing loyalty to Franco, who addressed his appointees as "my councillors." Fernández Cuesta was also made secretary of the National Council, and his first act was to give back to Franco the power to name six members of the Junta Política that the new statutes had initially accorded the Council.

The membership of the first National Council of the FET was eclectic. The first to be named was Pilar Primo de Rivera, followed by the conde de Rodezno, Gen. Queipo de Llano, and the alfonsino monarchist José María Pemán, in that order. Serrano Súñer was only listed twentieth. Of the fifty members, a maximum of twenty could be considered genuine Falangists (whether camisas viejas or serious neo-Falangists), while thirteen were Carlists, four were monarchists, and seven (later eight) were military commanders.[32]

According to Serrano, at the Council's first regular meeting its leading military member, Queipo de Llano—who had increasing difficulty adjusting to the full authoritarianism that he had helped bring about—complained that all appointments were being made by one man. Franco observed that this was not "a parliament" and soon ended the meeting.[33] Altogether, the first Council was convened only a few times, and it played no role of any significance.[34] Little more could be said for the new Junta Política. According to Serrano:

> Its labor was rather insignificant. It served, above all, to see to it that the party and the state not lose contact with each other. In some cases the meetings (let us not forget that both the official party and the National Movement in general were a conglomerate of forces) were tense and agitated. The political life of the regime lay primarily in the various ministries.[35]

The unification and the terms of development of the FET retained sufficient ambiguity and eclecticism to allow Franco to balance diverse polit-

ical interests. Though Falangists predominated, the growth of the FET would still maintain a state of at least partial equilibrium with the various other factions supporting the National Movement—the several "ideological families" of the regime, as commentators would later term them. The responsibility for this balancing act always rested ultimately with Franco himself. As the German ambassador noted:

> Franco has very cleverly succeeded, with the advice of his brother-in-law, . . . in not making enemies of any of the parties represented in the United Party that were previously independent and hostile to one another . . . but, on the other hand, also in not favoring any one of them that might thus grow too strong. . . . It is therefore comprehensible that, depending on the party allegiance of the person concerned, one is just as apt to hear the opinion . . . that "Franco is entirely a creature of the Falange," as that "Franco has sold himself completely to the reaction," or "Franco is a proven monarchist," or "he is completely under the influence of the Church."[36]

All the while the shadow of "el Ausente" (the Absent One), as the slain José Antonio was referred to, still lay over the party and was much resented by Franco. He told Serrano and a few others that he preferred to believe variously that José Antonio had been sequestered and castrated [*sic*] by the Soviets or reduced to the most craven whimpering and pleading for his life prior to his execution.[37] Publicly he could only respect what was now the burgeoning cult of José Antonio, whose execution still had not been officially announced. Meanwhile, as Foxá liked to say, Franco found himself in the position of a man who had married a widow and then was forced to listen to her endlessly praise the virtues of her first husband.

Basically the FET did what Franco asked of it for the remainder of the conflict. It provided an official organization that all supporters of Franco could join, an official radical nationalist program (whether or not much of it was being fulfilled), and manpower in the form of military volunteers and politico-bureaucratic cadres. It continued to grow steadily, the rapid expansion of 1936–1937 proceeding with little slack, and by 1942 reached a nominal total of more than 900,000 affiliates in all its major sectors combined. This was not at all equal to the even more bloated membership of the Nazi Party in Germany or the Fascist Party in Italy (nominally well over three million), but nonetheless far and away the largest membership of any political group in Spanish history.

Yet membership in the FET came to have somewhat limited significance, and many nominal members remained inactive or soon became so. A subsequent law of 1 October 1938 further increased the cadres by giving automatic membership to anyone jailed in the Republican zone for political reasons. Beyond that, anyone who proposed to get ahead, hide a liberal or leftist past, or merely cooperate fully with the regime for the duration was likely to join, however marginal the resultant membership might be. Serrano Súñer later admitted that "a large number of party members never went beyond being merely nominal affiliates. They were, in reality, people with their own interests and representatives of more or less cautious currents of free opinion,"[38] little influenced by the official Twenty-Six Points. The FET's new Servicio Nacional de Información e Investigación was charged with a purge of undesirables, but the expulsion of 1,500 members for disciplinary and other reasons during 1937–1938[39] had little effect on the size or zeal of the party's following.

The eclecticism of the party and the partial definition of the new state left the "fascism" and the "totalitarian state" of the regime's propaganda somewhat indeterminate. The most interesting commentary would be found not in Falangist publications but in the Jesuit journal *Razón y Fe*. In October 1937 Constantino Bayle asked, "Is the genuine spirit of Falange Española Catholic?"—a question that in turn posed the issue of fascism. Bayle was certain that the National Movement in general was not fascist but pluralist, being composed of a wide variety of forces. If, conversely, by "fascism" one meant simply the resurrection of the Spanish spirit, a true Spanish culture, and the reestablishment of law and order, there was no problem with "fascism": "If by that they understand fascism, then we are in agreement. And, carefully examined, the party or organization for whom the term is least ill-suited [the Falange] stands for nothing else [no otra cosa es]."

Spain's leading Catholic theorist of corporatism, the Jesuit Joaquín Azpiazu, was less ingenuous and more to the point concerning the structure of the new state. In his article "The Traditional State and the Totalitarian State," published in the same number, he asked:

> What is the concept of the totalitarian state and what does it represent? Above all—in Spain more than anywhere else—it represents a strong and complete type of state, shorn of the weaknesses and hesitations of the liberal and socialist state, a power representing all the vital forces of the nation. . . . For many—though mistakenly, in our judgment—the totalitarian state means a state that takes into its hands the direction and control of all the affairs of the nation. Such a concept is totally false, and one must expunge it. If that were true, the totalitarian state would be equivalent to the socialist state or, at least, very similar to it.
>
> . . . The state must assist the Church in achieving her most holy goal of the salvation of man to the greatest degree possible. This is

> not different from the goal of the state but simply superior to it. So that if we should try to define the essence of the totalitarian state in a single phrase, we would say that the Spanish totalitarian state should not be totalitarian in the objective sense—that would be equivalent to a socialist one—but in the subjective sense of a total and sovereign power, strong and not limited, directive and not frustrated. . . . If it were thus, let us have the totalitarian state, for that would be equivalent to the total resurrection of the pure and authentically traditional Spain, without shadows of foreign systems or the mixture of non-Catholic doctrines.

Though himself perfectly ingenuous concerning the supposed benefits of authoritarian government, Azpiazu was the only theorist who grasped the full implications of "totalitarianism." If taken literally, in terms of the complete and total control of all institutions—from cultural and social affairs to the economy—this would be more descriptive of the Soviet Union than of Fascist Italy, and would literally imply total control of the Church as well. Thus "totalitarian state" was being used primarily to refer to the total concentration of political power, which could intervene in other institutions, but not a system of total control of all society, culture, religion, and institutions. The ambiguities surrounding the meaning of totalitarianism—and the question of how "total" is "total"—have lingered to the present day.[40]

CARLISM AND THE FET

The greatest tension within the Nationalist zone vis-à-vis the FET would be found among their only official partners in the unification—the Carlists. Though an order of 30 April 1937 had stipulated equal representation for Falangists and Carlists on committees of fusion to integrate the activities of the FET in each province,[41] this had limited effect. In most provinces, the fusion was dominated de facto by Falangists, while Carlists continued to maintain their separate centers in each town until an order of 8 June declared that in towns with populations of less than 10,000 it was absolutely mandatory that Carlists and Falangists occupy the same quarters.[42] Plans were made to fuse the respective youth groups,[43] but these were never carried out, and some veteran Carlists simply refused FET membership cards. By the beginning of June, the Carlist members of the new Junta Política had sent a letter to Franco complaining about the wholesale adoption of the Twenty-Six Points and the almost complete predominance of Falangist symbolism in the FET.[44] There is no indication that Franco paid any particular attention to this complaint. The majority of camisas viejas reciprocated much the same sentiments about Carlism, and indeed about monarchism in general. One French journalist asked a camisa vieja leader what his local group would do if the monarchy was restored. "There would simply be another revolution," the latter replied, "and this time, I assure you, we would not be on the same side."[45] Young Carlists were occasionally heard in the streets of Salamanca shouting, "Franco and the King," to which young Falangists would respond "Franco and the Falange." In practice, the Falangists continued to wear their regular uniforms minus the red beret, which had been added by the unification, while most Carlists refused to wear the Falangist uniform at all. There was no official decree requiring that all members of the FET wear the proper uniform until January 1939, and even then it was not fully enforced.

The first large rally of students of the FET, held in Burgos on 12 October ("Día de la Raza"), dramatized the antagonism between the two forces. Reports claimed that between twelve and fifteen thousand SEU members participated, together with eight to nine thousand members of the Asociación de Estudiantes Tradicionalistas (AET). The AET leader José Ma. Zaldívar allegedly insisted that the AET members form in a completely separate area apart from the seuistas, while the latter generally monopolized the ceremony. Zaldívar was subsequently expelled from the FET, while two Carlist professors were temporarily suspended, being deprived of party rights for two years.[46] In compensation, to avoid alienating Carlists further, Franco made a personal appearance in Pamplona the following month to honor the signal contribution of Navarre to the Movement.

At the end of November, however, Fal Conde rejected Franco's olive branch and officially resigned his recent appointment to the party's National Council, the only councillor to do so. In consequence, when the Carlist regent Don Javier of Borbón-Parma made his first visit to the Nationalist zone the following month, he was after some days officially expelled. Even so, Fernández Cuesta did not give up and urged Fal to reconsider; he was not officially dropped from the membership list until March 1938.[47]

Fal Conde's letter of resignation of 28 November had affirmed his basic opposition to "*the idea of the party* as a means of national unity, base of the state and inspiration of the government, which I understand to be contrary to our traditionalist doctrine, to our antecedents and to our very racial temperament."[48] His associates prepared their own "Sketch of the Future Political Organization of Spain Inspired by Traditional Principles," which among other things emphasized "the rights of the human person"

and the "rights" of "the family" and of "natural society," which are "prior to the state," as well as their aversion to lining up internationally with the fascist new order.[49]

By early 1938 there were physical incidents between Carlists and Falangists in the Basque Country. In this region Carlists predominated among Movement supporters, but Falangists insisted on having half of all party positions and perquisites, alleging that Basque nationalists were now masquerading as Carlists. Three Carlists were temporarily imprisoned for a strong statement demanding control of a contested newspaper in Guipuzcoa.[50]

By April 1938 even the conde de Rodezno, the most prominent advocate of Carlist collaborationism, called on Franco to protest that, as he put it, "My general, traditionalist doctrine is not that of fascism."[51] Franco put him off with his standard observation that the core Carlist doctrine was the best and the most Spanish of that of any political group, but that key aspects simply had to be brought up to date. Subsequently there circulated in Pamplona a pamphlet entitled *La gloriosa Comunión Tradicionalista a los pies de los caballos de unos advenedizos insolventes* (The Glorious Comunión Tradicionalista under the Horses' Hooves of a Group of Insolvent Upstarts), protesting that Falangists had taken over almost everything, suppressing the doctrines of monarchy and regional rights, and replacing Catholic corporatism with revolutionary national syndicalism. The pamphlet also alleged that Falangists exhibited "a purely decorative Catholicism," suppressed papal encyclicals, and sought to create "a nonconfessional state," while Franco "aimed to convert himself into a Spanish Hitler."[52] During the course of the year, Rodezno broke off personal relations with Serrano Súñer, whose power and increasing arrogance he detested, though he was forced to write to him in August 1938 to avoid further sanctions against Carlists in Navarre and against their official mouthpiece, the Pamplona newspaper *El Pensamiento Navarro*.[53]

RELATIONS WITH GERMANY AND ITALY

Relations between the FET and the representatives of the two senior fascist regimes in Italy and Germany were very friendly but less than intimate. The German representative, General Faupel, who was an enthusiastic Nazi, had overcome his earlier exasperation with Franco and, on the eve of the unification, had accepted his leadership as indispensable:

> If in his attempt to bring the parties together Franco should meet opposition from the Falange, we and the Italians are agreed that, in spite of all our inclination toward the Falange and its sound tendencies, we must support Franco, who after all intends to make the program of the Falange the basis of his internal policy. The realization of the most urgently needed social reforms is possible only with Franco, not in opposition to him.[54]

Moreover, Franco was very resistant to anything in the nature of German or Italian political pressure. Despite Faupel's partial understanding of this, Franco considered the German representative too officious and too ready to offer advice. During Yzurdiaga's term as chief of press and propaganda, Faupel tried to foist on the Pamplona priest a plan for a German-directed propaganda and cultural institute in association with the FET, to be named for Carlos V.[55] This was the last straw for Franco, who resented Faupel's arrogance as well as the price in mining concessions that Germany was demanding in return for continued military assistance. Faupel was soon replaced with a more restrained and professional career diplomat, Eberhard von Stohrer.

In keeping with Hitler's axiom that the Mediterranean was an Italian sphere, the Germans believed that Italian Fascists would be better tutors. As the German ambassador in Rome put it:

> Anyone who knows the Spaniards and Spanish conditions will regard with a great deal of skepticism and also concern for future German–Spanish relations (perhaps even for German–Italian relations) any attempt to transplant National Socialism to Spain with German methods and German personnel. It will be easier with Latin Fascism, which is politically more formalistic; a certain aversion to the Italians on the part of the Spaniards, and their resentment of foreign leadership in general, may prove to be a hindrance, but that is a matter for the Italians to cope with.[56]

The Italians were happy to offer a certain amount of advice, but, as has been seen, they too maintained a certain distance, neither Ambassador Cantalupo nor special envoy Roberto Farinacci being overly impressed with the Falange. By this point, the brief interlude of Italian ambitions for "universal fascism" in 1933–1934 had ended, and after unification their attitude did not greatly change. A senior Italian diplomat sent to Nationalist Spain at the end of September 1937 found that the Falange had "a progressive and democratic character in the Italian manner," and that the new FET was dominated by genuine Falangists and a fascist rhetoric, but also found it a very complicated situation. Various sectors of rightists were also influential, and Nationalist Spain was not ipso facto a purely fraternal fascist state; it was better for Italy to avoid any deep internal political involvement.[57]

By February 1938 von Stohrer would similarly recommend avoiding "any interference in Spanish domestic affairs." He explained to his superiors in Berlin:

> We have thus far confined ourselves to indicating our particular sympathies for that movement in the Falange which is called the "original Falange," the "revolutionary Falange," or the "Camisas Viejas," which is closest to us ideologically and whose aims, in our opinion, also offer Spain the best guaranty for the establishment of a new and strong national state that could be useful to us. We have, therefore, readily placed our experience at the disposal of the Falange, have shown our party organizations, social institutions, etc., in Germany to picked representatives of the Falange, and have advised them upon request. We have thereby considerably lightened their task here, but we have naturally not been able to strengthen them to the extent that the victory of this element is assured.[58]

There was considerable exchange of propaganda, and the women leaders of Auxilio Social enjoyed particularly extensive orientation tours in Germany, but there was no very deep or elaborate interrelationship:

> On request, the Falange receives from the German press office a wealth of material on German conditions and the organization, etc., of the NSDAP [Nazi Party]. There is no importunate propaganda or "intervention in the internal affairs" of Spain. Any objection of this type formerly made can at most refer to the beginnings of the Falange (the Hedilla affair).[59]

By the spring of 1938 Ernst von Weizsäcker would observe in the Foreign Office in Berlin that it no longer seemed worthwhile to cultivate the Falange as an independent entity.[60] Dionisio Ridruejo would recall that the party was never mentioned in any serious way on either of the trips he made to Germany in 1937 and 1938.

THE FET UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT OF 1938

Franco chose 30 January 1938, eighth anniversary of the downfall of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, to announce a new administrative law establishing the structure of his government; the names of his first regular cabinet ministers appeared on the following day. Article 16 of the new decree on government and administrative structure officially affirmed the powers of dictatorship, stipulating that "the Chief of State holds supreme power to dictate juridical norms of a general character."[61] This law also stated that the office of President of the Government was "united to that of Chief of State," permanently reserving the position for Franco. However, Serrano Súñer, who drafted the decree, also arranged to have its preamble declare: "In every case, the organization that is being carried out will be subject to the constant influence of the National Movement. . . . The administration of the new state must be infused with its spirit." Moreover, the law established certain procedural requirements for Franco's exercise of power when it declared that "the dispositions and resolutions of the Chief of State" must be made "at the proposal of the appropriate minister" and would be subject to "prior deliberation by the government" before becoming law.[62] This procedure was sometimes ignored, particularly during World War II.

The new cabinet, appointed on 31 January, replaced the Junta Técnica with regular government ministries and provided the first clear example of what would become Franco's typical balancing act, giving representation to all the main currents supporting the new regime. The senior position went to the able and respected Lt. Gen. Francisco Gómez Jordana, who was made vice president of government and foreign minister. He had served in the government of Primo de Rivera and most recently as head of the now-defunct Junta Técnica del Estado, where he had managed to bring greater order into domestic administration, so that his new role was an extension of his previous eminence. Jordana was a conservative monarchist and something of an Anglophile of the old school; his appointment greatly angered Falangists, who had hoped to see pro-Falangist generals in the cabinet. The Ministry of Justice went to the Carlist conde de Rodezno. Apart from Serrano, the only Falangists appointed were Fernández Cuesta, who was made minister of agriculture (a position for which he had no qualification, indicating how low a priority agriculture was for the regime, even though its strongest support came from the conservative agrarian north), and the neo-Falangist Pedro González Bueno, the new head of the inevitably Falangist Ministry of Syndical Action and Organization. Of eleven cabinet positions, three went to veteran generals who had served Primo de Rivera, two to right-wing alfonsino monarchists, one to a Carlist, two to relatively apolitical technicians, and three to Falangists, only one of whom was a camisa vieja.

Though the new government promised to begin construction of the "national syndicalist state," it represented primarily the military and the right, not the national syndicalists of the partido único. Subsecretaryships and other top administrative positions were filled in much the same proportions as the ministries, with a high ratio of state lawyers, civil engineers, and technicians, especially from Aragon, prewar home of Serrano Súñer. Technical personnel were of course more effective than Falangists in state administration, and it was the state apparatus (as in Italy), not the party, that dominated most affairs.

The most influential minister was not Gómez Jordana, the vice president of government and foreign minister, but Serrano Súñer. The *cuñadísimo* became the regime's first regular minister of the interior and also the new national delegate of press and propaganda for the FET.[63] These changes represented the definitive triumph of Serrano over Nicolás Franco, and he personally named many of the secondary personnel in various ministries. Even some of the nominal technicians were de facto *serranistas*. His own ministry had very broad scope, for Interior managed not only much of the domestic politics of the Nationalist zone but also local administration, health and welfare, and the "devastated regions." His own goal was clearly the construction of a formal and juridical authoritarian party-state, and he would later become increasingly outraged with Franco when the latter failed to move firmly and clearly in this direction.

From this point dated the development of Serrano's overweening arrogance. Totally elitist, believing himself the master craftsman of a firm new authoritarian regime, he made less and less effort to hide his sense of superiority. His manners became curt and arrogant, and his style increasingly unilateral, though its worse excesses would become manifest only after the end of the Civil War.

The principal functions of the FET would be social and propagandistic. All publishing activity was to be controlled by the new press law for Spain that Serrano introduced on 22 April. In presenting this measure—which would establish the norms of censorship in Spain for twenty-eight years[64]—Serrano declared that the FET constituted "the impetus and firm base of the state," whose goal was "carrying out the National Revolution" through "a state of war."[65] The law had actually been written by José Antonio Giménez Arnau, head of the Press Service in the ministry as well as FET national delegate for the press.[66] It declared that the press should "communicate to the nation the orders and directives of the state and its government" in order to build "the collective conscience," and thus it must be rescued "from capitalist servitude, and from reactionary or Marxist clienteles." The Press Law therefore established a rigid system of control and prior censorship, regulating the number and size of newspapers as well as the naming of their directors and the rules of journalistic and editorial procedure. In each provincial government there would be a censor from the Ministry of the Interior, with the power of complete confiscation of presses and enterprises, if necessary, to "punish governmentally any writing that directly or indirectly tends to diminish the prestige of the nation, hinder the work of government, or sow pernicious ideas among the intellectually weak." The only appeal was to the head of the government himself.

The young triad now in charge of Falangist propaganda and publications were Giménez Arnau, Antonio Tovar (head of Radio Nacional), and Ridruejo, the new national delegate of propaganda.[67] Ridruejo and Tovar, who were becoming close friends of Serrano, represented the most zealous elements within Falangism and burned to create a genuinely revolutionary and totalitarian system. Their empire grew rapidly; between 1936 and 1943 there developed a network of forty-five daily newspapers, numerous radio stations,[68] and many specialized publications.[69]

Ridruejo's goal was the development of a propaganda machine that would permeate and also help to regenerate Spanish culture. Still only twenty-five years old, he would be called by detractors the "Spanish Goebbels," partly in reference to his diminutive stature. A poet and writer of ability, he would also in later years earn a more serious place in Spanish letters than any other Falangist writer.

In practice, however, the new press and propaganda system was both more restrictive and more rightist than Ridruejo and Giménez Arnau intended, particularly at the local level. The censorship also restricted Falangist publications, discouraging elaborate denunciation of the "bourgeoisie" and "capitalism," though such denunciations would still be found not infrequently in the Falangist press.

Falangist leaders generally believed that the party had been slighted in the composition of the new government. They distrusted most of the military and all of the monarchists. On the one hand they feared that Jordana was too conservative to combat "the crime of Gibraltar" and resented the appointment of the very right-wing Gen. Severiano Martínez Anido to the Ministry of Public Order. Martínez Anido was resented not just because he was a military man, but above all because of the severity and, it was felt, the capriciousness of the repression of the left under his leadership. Some Falangists argued that his policies in the long run weakened rather than strengthened the regime. This feeling was given public utterance by Gen. Juan Yagüe, one of those responsible for elevating Franco to supreme power but also the nearest thing to a genuine Falangist among the senior generals. On 19 April 1938 Franco addressed a rather spectacular mass meeting in Zaragoza to mark the first anniversary of the unification.[70] Yagüe also spoke, attributing the war among other things to many years of social injustice. He suggested that greater leniency toward defeated Republicans could help overcome that, and also asked pardon "for the camisas viejas" who were still in prison, "soldiers of the old guard who have been mistaken, but who have been mistaken in good faith."[71] As Von Stohrer reported it:

> In particular it was felt that the parts of his speech in which he gave free recognition to the bravery of the Red Spanish opponents, defended the political prisoners—both the Reds and the "Blues,"

> who were arrested because of too much political zeal—and severely attacked the partiality of justice, went beyond his authority and represented a lack of discipline: the answer was his recall from command, at least temporarily.[72]

After the Nationalist Army broke through to the sea in April 1938, some expected a quick end to the war, but rather than rolling up a semi-defenseless Catalonia, Franco committed his army to a slow, difficult advance southward down the coastal road toward Valencia. This was followed by the Republican Ebro offensive in July, and for the first time a certain degree of war weariness was being registered among the Nationalists—among both some of the military and some of the Falangists. This was pointed out in Von Stohrer's report to Berlin on 1 July, which explained that some elements among the Nationalists now wanted an end to the war:

> This is especially true also because in circles of the original Falange, already angered by the Church policy of Franco and Suner [*sic*], the opinion is being expressed more and more that the regime of General Martínez Anido is unbearable and that it is desirable to bring about a change in these methods, regarded by wide circles in National Spain as unendurable in the long run. In this connection it is not without interest that the Falange recently demanded of Franco that the Ministry of Public Order be given over to it and that a Ministry of Public Health be created by Martínez Anido.[73]

The general, in turn, reciprocated the deepest animosity against the "cuñadísimo." Someone close to Martínez Anido handed the Italian consul a "confidential report" petitioning Mussolini to intervene with Franco to obtain dismissal of Serrano, whom Anido described as "proud, malicious, all-encompassing, inattentive to his government colleagues." The minister of public order insisted that "no one can be found who speaks well of him," and that he was so destructive he would ruin "fascism" in Spain.[74]

One response to all this was Franco's speech in Burgos on 18 July 1938, the second anniversary of the rebellion, which was both extremely nationalist and unusually fascistic, proclaiming a "National Revolution" that would create a state which would be both "missionary and totalitarian." In a preliminary draft he had written the phrase "fascist Spain," but thought better of it and crossed it out.[75] This in turn was only slightly balanced by the standard invocation of religion, with a feeble reference to "the human fraternalism that has its deepest tradition in the precepts of the Holy Gospel."[76]

Serrano Súñer, if not the Falange, won the contest with Martínez Anido. The elderly general fell gravely ill in August (dying four months later), and Serrano added public order to his already extensive powers and responsibilities.

SOCIAL POLICY

Demagogy was not a feature of Falangist rhetoric alone, for tough talk about "capitalism" and "bankers" was characteristic of the military leadership, particularly during the early phase of the war. Nationalist commanders had threatened stiff sanctions against employers who failed to honor the existing social legislation of the Republic,[77] and in an interview Franco had promised

> all possible reforms within the capacity of the nation's economy. We balk at nothing that the country's economy can stand. No use in giving poor land to poor peasants. It is not land alone that counts, but money to work it. Another twenty-five years will see the breakup of big estates into small properties and the creation of a bourgeois peasantry.[78]

In a subsequent interview he had emphasized that the goal of the Nationalist movement was not to "defend capitalism" but to save the national interest and the well-being of Spain. "We come for the middle class," he said, "we come for the humble class," not the wealthy. Franco promised state regulation of large concentrations of wealth and an agricultural development program featuring easier credit, the cultivation of unused land, reforestation, stimulation of the cattle industry, and special encouragement for such cash crops as tobacco, cotton, and flax.[79] Queipo de Llano, for his part, had declared, "We realize that the problem of class hatred can only be solved by the removal of extreme class distinctions. We realize, also, that the wealthy, by means of taxation, have to contribute toward a more equitable distribution of money."[80] Mola had early plumped for a "representative" kind of corporatism.[81] During the first months of the Civil War especially, the press in the Nationalist zone carried dire warnings addressed to "capitalists" demanding their conformity and financial contributions before it was too late.

During 1937 Franco had still tended to stress the roots in Catholic doctrine of the social policy of the new state, in a manner more Carlist than Falangist. He occasionally denounced "the dehumanized banker," as in his speech on the first anniversary of the rebellion on 18 July,[82] and later declared:

> We are carrying out a profound revolution in the social sense, which is inspired by the teachings of the Catholic Church. There will be

Women supporters of the Nationalists

> fewer rich, but there will also be fewer poor. The new Spanish state will be a true democracy in which all citizens participate in the government through their professional activity and their specific employment.[83]

If its new role as state party somewhat inhibited national syndicalist demagogy, the main thrust of Falangist economics lay not in Catholic reform or pure corporatism but in a policy of statism and control—perhaps as close as one can come to defining the general policy of "fascist economics." Thus when late in 1937 a group of businessmen in the Nationalist zone organized themselves as a "Junta Directiva Provisional de Fuerzas Económicas" to press for a relatively liberal policy, the writer Gonzalo Torrente Ballester, one of the new FET intellectuals, emphasized instead the need for widespread state control and intervention.[84]

Despite repetition of the Falangist slogan "National Revolution," neither Franco nor the FET spokesmen offered any clear proposal for systemic change, but much was promised along the lines of populist and nationalist reform to regulate large property and finance, to stimulate development, to provide greater opportunity for small business and small property, and greater social justice for the lower classes.

In January 1938 the National Council of the FET formed a committee to study the development of a plan to be called "Corporative Bases of the Spanish State,"[85] and at approximately the same time there appeared a book entitled *Manual del fascismo*, published under a pseudonym by Alfonso García Valdecasas, who had returned to the party and was the government's new undersecretary of national education. The chief purveyor of information on social policy both to the government and to the FET seems to have been the Italian labor attaché, Marchiandi, a rather radical Fascist national syndicalist, who had been sent to Spain the preceding summer.[86]

The first regular government of Franco therefore approved early in 1938 a proposal that a "Fuero del Trabajo" be prepared to fulfill the same function as the Carta del Lavoro (Labor Charter) in Fascist Italy. This would in fact be the regime's only major institutional statement on domestic policy during the Civil War.

Two draft projects were prepared, one by Pedro González Bueno, the neo-Falangist minister of syndical organization, and a few associates,[87] the second by two of the more radical neo-Falangists with academic backgrounds, Joaquín Garrigues and Francisco Javier Conde, working together with Rodrigo Uría and receiving some collaboration from Fernández Cuesta. The last four worked out of the General Secretariat of the FET. Their draft was originally entitled "Carta del Trabajo," reflecting its Italian inspiration, and turned out to be quite radical, proposing to place the national economy under the control of the "National-Syndicalist State" and its future syndical system, with a program based on an anticapitalist concept of property.[88]

The Garrigues–Javier Conde project was championed by Fernández Cuesta in a six-hour meeting of the Council of Ministers but rejected. It drew the opposition of all the rightist ministers and especially of Martínez Anido. The González Bueno project, conversely, was more moderate, though even here conservative amendments were desired, and the text was referred to the National Council of the FET for further polishing.[89]

Fernández Cuesta therefore convened a full meeting of the National Council in Burgos on 6 March. It was fully attended; both Franco and Serrano Súñer were present. Extensive discussion ensued, Carlists and other more conservative sectors seeking to make the Fuero more conservative and more Catholic, Falangists countering with amendments to make it more radical. Serrano tried to salvage the situation by recommending as the most acceptable outcome a general statement of aims and ideas, and Franco directed that a third draft be prepared by a special commission headed by Fernández Cuesta. It began work immediately. The Italian labor attaché Marchiandi remained in active contact with members of the commission, working particularly with three of the rightist

members—José Yanguas Messía, the Carlist Esteban Bilbao, and Eduardo Aunós (Primo de Rivera's labor minister). It has been suggested that he worked more with the right because Marchiandi now saw radical Falangists as becoming increasingly influenced by Nazism.[90]

The resulting document, called the "Fuero del Trabajo," was approved unanimously by the National Council on 9 March. In its final redaction, it adopted much of the language of social Catholicism, while retaining the basic principles and ideas of the Italian Fascist Carta del Lavoro. The historic if anachronistic Castilian term "Fuero" was adopted in place of the mimetic Italian term in order to avoid the appearance of imitation and emphasize the traditional Spanish principles and identity of the regime. Thus the terminology of "young nations with a totalitarian sense," as initially reported,[91] was consciously rejected in favor of more traditional phrasing. The resulting compromise pleased most sectors—except for the most radical Falangists—drawing the approbation of Catholics[92] as well as the general approval of Italian Fascist authorities. It nonetheless marked a further step in the fascistization of the regime.

The document announced the goal of "renovating the Catholic tradition, social justice, and high human sentiment that informed the legislation of our Empire." It emphasized Catholic identity and the appeal to tradition, containing specific references to the family in a manner absent from the Italian Carta del Lavoro. At the same time, the Spanish state was declared a "totalitarian instrument in the service of the integrity of the Patria," repeating language from the official Falangist program. Strikes were condemned as "a crime against the Patria," and whereas the Carta del Lavoro referred to theoretically separate and semiautonomous worker and employer organizations joined in the corporations, the Fuero spoke of a "single and vertical" syndicate that would organize all "branches of production hierarchically under the direction of the state," again faithful to the original Falangist concept. As Tusell has observed, one might find greater theoretical semipluralism in the original Italian Fascist document.[93]

The Fuero proclaimed an economic middle way equidistant from "liberal capitalism" and "Marxist materialism," leading its defenders later to claim that the Fuero was not merely a statement of norms of labor relations but a proposal for a new structure for the economy. It declared labor both a duty and a right and defined capital as "an instrument of production." Private initiative and ownership was recognized as the most effective means of production, but owners and managers were given the responsibility of advancing that production for the common good. State protection was promised in limiting the work day and in guaranteeing Sunday rest, holidays, annual vacations, and the development of recreational facilities. The principle of a minimum wage was endorsed, together with family assistance and the goal of a "gradual, but inflexible" increase in the standard of living. Point 10 promised such basic social security measures as sickness, unemployment, and retirement insurance, while strikes and lockouts were both proscribed as "crimes against the supreme interest of the nation." Special labor tribunals were planned to adjudicate between capital and labor. Social justice within large industrial enterprises was made the special responsibility of an ambiguously defined "head of enterprise." The most radical provision was that which obligated the state to "try to give every peasant family a small parcel of land," while protecting long-term rent leases and working toward the ultimate goal that the land may belong eventually to him who works it.

At the same time, it was made clear that the economy would continue to rest on private property, whose protection was guaranteed. The state was envisioned as undertaking economic initiatives only when private enterprise failed or "the interests of the nation require it." The Fuero promised protection to artisans, as well as guaranteeing enough income to entrepreneurs to make it possible for them to increase wages. Point 9 promised regulation of credit to make it available for large and small loans.

Construction of national syndicalism nominally began with the formation of the Ministry of Syndical Organization and Action under Pedro González Bueno on 30 January 1938. It was to comprise five National Services: Syndicates, Jurisdiction and Harmony of Labor, Social Welfare, Emigration, and Statistics. A subsequent decree of 30 April elaborated the upper echelon of the syndical bureaucracy. A Central Syndical Council of Coordination was provided for, with national syndicalist centers to be established in each province.[94] On 13 May provisions were made for the establishment of magistracies of labor to adjudicate disputes.

Three months later Fernández Cuesta made the following distinctions between the nascent Spanish national syndicalism and Italian Fascist corporatism:

> Nor is the vertical syndicate a copy of the Italian corporation. In those countries in which the leaders have found on coming to power, as has happened in Italy, a class syndicalism they could not dismantle, they saw themselves forced, as a lesser evil, to convert it into a state syndicalism and to create afterwards supersyndical organs, first, for liaison, and later for self-discipline in defense of the totalitarian interest of production. And those organs are the corporations. The corporation, then, had a forced basis in class syndicalism. The vertical syndicate, on the other hand, is the point of both departure and arrival. It does not suppose the previous existence of other syndicates.

> Horizontal structures do not interfere with it. It is not an organ of the state, but an instrument at the service of its economic and utilitarian policy.[95]

The Falangist state, he said, would not be a national syndicalist state per se.

> When we say "the national syndicalist state" we are referring to only one aspect of the state, the economic aspect. We mean that the state, to discipline the economy, employs the instrument of the syndicates, but we do not mean that the state is based exclusively on the syndicates nor that national sovereignty lies in the syndicates.[96]

In a public statement, González Bueno had agreed that "decisions in the economic field" would be made by the state, but declared that "their study will always be carried out by the Syndical Organization."[97]

González Bueno enjoyed little success. Wartime conditions were disturbed, and the authority of his ministry was in fact limited. A professional engineer, he seems to have lacked full capacity for the job. Three small syndical organizations already existed in the Nationalist zone: the Spanish Confederation of Worker Syndicates (CESO), the Catholic organization, which before the war had counted no more than 300,000 affiliates; the Carlist Obra Nacional Corporativa, formed after the start of the war, with modest membership;[98] and the existing Falangist syndicates. The latter consisted of the Confederation of National-Syndicalist Workers (CONS), dating from 1934, and the Confederation of Nationalist Syndicalist Employers (CENS). The Carlist Obra Nacional Corporativa had published its own *Plan* of corporative theory in May 1937, though a series of steps had been taken at that time to bring together the Falangist and Carlist groups, even if only on paper. Confusion so abounded prior to the creation of the new ministry that Fernández Cuesta had dispatched a public order to all local press and syndical leaders: "YOU WILL COMPLETELY ABSTAIN FROM PUBLISHING ANY WRITING WHICH MAY PRETEND TO INTERPRET THE CONTENT OF THE CITED POINT."[99] As it turned out, the ministry had such difficulty alleviating this confusion that some provincial chiefs referred to the hapless González Bueno as the "minister of syndical disorganization," and a few even resigned.

The first step began late in April 1938 with the beginning of the formation of a Central Nacional-Sindicalista for each province, to be headed by a delegado provincial de sindicatos who was both a local official of the FET and a state official. The Centrales did not so much organize syndicates as begin to create "syndical services" that dealt with particular economic problems such as agricultural credit, fertilizers, rural cooperatives, and fishing and construction materials—branches of economic organization and assistance more than syndical organization. This was followed in July by the creation of "commissions for the regulation of production" for major economic sectors. Their function was to arrange allocation of imports and organization of exports, otherwise serving mainly an informational role.[100] Little was done actually to organize syndicates while the war lasted, and the first formal plan of syndical organization, drawn up late in 1938, was officially canceled in January 1939.[101]

In agriculture no more was accomplished. Though Fernández Cuesta might invoke in some detail variations of José Antonio's support for agrarian reform,[102] there was no intention of introducing even minor reforms so long as the war lasted (and afterward there would be no money). The Nationalist zone benefited from the fact that it included the greater share of Spain's agricultural production and could thus concentrate on obtaining steady, normal output from the existing structure of cultivation. It never faced the severe food shortages, eventually bordering on starvation, that afflicted the larger Republican cities in the winter of 1938–39.

The problems would begin to arise immediately after the war, with the full panoply of statist regulations and controls for agriculture under the national syndicalist system. This would create a nightmare of restrictions and allocations that would totally disrupt much of Spain's food production after 1938. In Paul Preston's view, "By means of the rigid imposition of a corrupt syndical administration in the countryside, Fernández Cuesta helped to turn the great wartime agricultural surpluses of the Francoist zone into the famine of the 1940s."[103]

THE WOMEN'S AND YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS

The most effective social action of the FET was being achieved not by any of the standard pompous masculine organizations but by the Sección Femenina, whose membership expanded to approximately 580,000 by the end of the Civil War[104]—the largest women's organization in Spanish history. The Sección Femenina created a conservative social and moral framework for female activism that took hundreds of thousands of women out of their accustomed routine to a greater extent than any single organization on the Republican side. It provided practical assistance on an increasingly large scale in the form of nursing and family and children's welfare, as well as significant support for the Nationalist Army.[105]

Notable political divergence also developed within the female auxiliary leadership. After the unification, Carlist women's auxiliaries led by María Rosa Urraca Pastor were given direction of the Service of Fronts and Hospitals and did not fully cooperate with the national leadership headed by Pilar Primo de Rivera.

Pilar Primo de Rivera, head of the Sección Femenina

As indicated in the preceding chapter, the most important formation of the Sección Femenina was Auxilio Social, directed by Mercedes Sanz Bachiller, much influenced by the work of the National Socialist Frauenschaft in Germany. It became the regime's national social assistance agency, with woman power provided in part by a decree of 7 October 1937, which established an obligation of six months of "social service" for all unmarried women between seventeen and thirty-five. Though not made absolutely compulsory, this became a requirement for most young women who sought professional qualification or certain forms of employment.[106] Ultimately a severe personality conflict and power struggle developed between Mercedes Sanz and Pilar Primo de Rivera, and it was not fully resolved by a subsequent decree of 28 December 1939 that directly subordinated the welfare agency to the leadership of the Sección Femenina.[107]

Though the women's auxiliary of the FET never achieved the goal of politically educating and indoctrinating Spanish women as a whole, its far-flung social and cultural programs had a significant impact on the well-being of the less fortunate in the Nationalist zone, produced much more tangible and positive results than did the work of its male counterparts, and contributed more than a little to the generally good morale and social cohesion of the war effort.

The Falangist youth organization originated early in the Civil War, but the official Organización Juvenil (OJ) was established as a Technical Service only on 4 August 1937, and its official code of conduct, "The Twelve Points of the Flecha," was approved in the autumn of 1937. "The Twelve Points" created a strange amalgam of the Christian, military, and imperial, with such precepts as "1. Christian faith is the basis of my acts"; "8. Life is militia"; and "12. By land, sea, and air we will build the Empire." Three categories were formed: "Pelayos" for children from seven to ten years, "Flechas" for those aged ten to seventeen, and "Cadetes" for those seventeen to nineteen, with separate sections for girls. They were formed in a sui generis pseudo-military structure of "escuadras, pelotones, falanges, centurias, banderas y legiones."

Ridruejo gave considerable thought to the Organización Juvenil and prepared a fairly elaborate program, but it was decided that he was too young, too radical, and too much of a womanizer to serve as an example to youth. The first leaders received only temporary appointments until Sancho Dávila was finally named national delegate on 19 May 1938.[108]

Enthusiasm tended to decline during the final year of the war, but new sections were automatically formed as the eastern provinces were occupied during 1938 and 1939. Marches were a favorite activity, the most notable being a very large one in Seville on 29 October 1938, but the OJ

could not be modeled on paramilitary activity alone, especially for the girls, and from the end of the war sports and culture began to play a larger and larger role.[109]

THE FET IN THE LAST YEAR OF THE CIVIL WAR

Only two months after taking over the Secretariat of the FET, Fernández Cuesta had become minister of agriculture, leaving the work of the Secretariat to his assistants. They were a relatively able group, featuring such personalities as Joaquín Garrigues, Francisco Javier Conde, Rodrigo Uría, and Pedro Laín Entralgo. In decisive matters, however, Serrano Súñer's judgment usually remained uppermost.

Though Italian commentators continued to complain that the FET was far too eclectic and not a real party,[110] this in fact suited Franco. His concern was "not to let any portion of the Falange become too strong," as von Stohrer put it in February 1938.[111] He seems not to have been greatly pleased with the executive organs of the party, distrusting the National Council and its potential for either new initiatives or obstructionism. Similarly, the divisiveness and potential radicalism that had surfaced during the preparation of the Fuero de Trabajo had displeased him.

The FET's second Junta Política, selected in March 1938, comprised five Falangists, four reliably collaborationist Carlists, two monarchists (Eduardo Aunós and the education minister Sainz Rodríguez), and the pro-Falangist Gen. Carlos Asensio as the military member in place of the obstreperous and increasingly anti-Falangist Queipo de Llano.[112] Though he was somewhat suspicious of the Junta Política as well, Franco often presided over its meetings, which were rather more frequent than those of the National Council.

Since the role of the FET was still limited and partly undefined, in June 1938 the Junta Política appointed a commission of three—Dionisio Ridruejo, Gamero del Castillo, and the Carlist Juan José Pradera—to draw up a plan to reorganize the FET and its role within the state. Gamero and Pradera realized that no bold adjustment would be favored, but the young firebrand Ridruejo proposed a system for a totalitarian party-state. His two associates shied away from his proposals but suggested that he advance them on his own initiative. Presented at the next meeting of the Junta, these would have made the FET Militia autonomous and increased the party's power throughout the state.

Opposition was led by Sainz Rodríguez, whose ire had already been drawn by Ridruejo's criticism of the great influence that his ministry had granted the Church in education. He declared that the new proposal "breathed through all its pores lack of confidence in the government." Franco agreed and, in one of the rare occasions on which he seemed to lose his temper, cut in to add, "Yes, lack of confidence in the government and above all in the Caudillo." Ridruejo defended himself by saying that he had simply drawn up a proposal as requested by the Junta itself, and that there could be no "lack of confidence" when Franco himself was the Chief of the party whose powers would have been increased. Franco quickly regained control of himself, and Ridruejo escaped formal censure,[113] but the strong opposition in the Junta was further indication of the general rejection, most of all by Franco himself, of a genuine party-state. Franco had already lost interest in the National Council and henceforth would rarely preside over the Junta Política.

This incident only increased Franco's suspicion of camisas viejas, and he soon took action against two of the most prominent ones, Agustín Aznar and Fernando González Vélez, who were charged with political conspiracy. Vélez was known to be highly critical of the failure to go ahead with the development of a mass national syndicalism during the war and was alleged to want to lead a radical new "Frente de Trabajo" (Labor Front), whose name was derived from the Nazi Arbeitsfront. But as Serrano Súñer would later explain:

> From an anti-Franco viewpoint, the most dangerous Falangist in not accepting the unification was not Vélez but Agustín Aznar, because the latter, though a man of limited ideas, was firm, very brave, a fighter, intolerant. He was the real leader of the Falangist resistance. And with him there were many more, among them Vélez and Salvador Merino, who had some talent as an agitator and knew how to approach people.
>
> This group of irreducible Falangists maintained constant communication with those who were fighting at the front, whom they wanted to influence.[114]

It seems unlikely that there was any real conspiracy, but murmuring had continued among the camisas viejas, and Aznar certainly remained the most active of the former legitimists. He and González Vélez apparently approached Gen. Antonio Aranda, perhaps the most liberal (and one of the most politically minded) of the top commanders, about reviving an autonomous Falangist militia, and may also have taken the matter up with Yagüe. Aranda is said to have revealed the conversation to Franco, and the two were further denounced by someone in the party's General Secretariat. The phrase "Franco should be sent to command a division" was attributed to Aznar. Two days after Aznar and González Vélez had left the meeting of the Junta Política and returned to the front, they were arrested. With Ridruejo, they had constituted two of the three most authentic Falangists on the Junta, but Franco was taking no more chances: he replaced them with two loyal military men. Both Aznar and

González Vélez were prosecuted by military courts and sentenced to lengthy terms. Their expulsion from the FET was initiated by Antonio Luna, national delegate of justice and law, and Fernández Cuesta did little to defend them, a weakness which he later claimed to have regretted but which further reduced his prestige among the camisas viejas.[115] As usual, it was up to Serrano to mitigate Franco's wrath, and by the end of the war the sentence of Aznar (who, it must be remembered, was by this point married to a cousin of José Antonio) was commuted to one year of house arrest. Vélez, however, remained in prison several more years and died soon after his release.[116]

The Serrano core group directing the FET, composed partly of camisas viejas and partly of neo-Falangists, made it clear during 1938 that there must be an end to all dissonance within the party and that better coordination must be achieved. Franco personally ordered a judicial investigation of FET problems in the province of Toledo, though observing that the investigators were simply looking into "what must not be more than very modest rumors."[117] Giménez Caballero, still an important "cultural Falangist," prepared a "Report" for Franco to warn that the shadowy "FEA" was in fact dangerous and must be stamped out, and that it was also important to control dissident Carlists. "Gece" emphasized that "the Franco party should be made up of the combatants in this war" and that the Generalissimo "should do what you consider opportune for your victory." "Today Your Excellency should abandon patience, courtesy, and respect to prevent these people from ruining your work."[118] The "FEA," however, was so thin and distant a confabulation that few besides Giménez Caballero took it seriously. Nonetheless, in the police state that Franco had developed, measures were regularly taken against nominal dissidents, and a figure of the relative importance of Joaquín Garrigues had to spend several months in jail on charges stemming from rumors of "defeatist" statements.

As for the Carlists, their main achievement in 1938 was a set of new religious regulations introduced by Rodezno as minister of justice, which, flanked by the education policies of Sainz Rodríguez, began the "re-Catholicization of Spain." The Carlists had virtually ceased to vie for influence within the FET and left the initiative almost exclusively to the Falangists.

Alfonsino monarchists were also brought to heel. They had urged the political unification of the preceding year because they had calculated that, among other things, it would dilute and control the fascistic radicalism of the Falange, creating a more amorphous organization that might be dominated by the monarchist right. When they found that this was not to be the case, but that the dictatorship and the FET had dynamics of their own, a few monarchists became more confrontational. Chief among them was the national councillor Eugenio Vegas Latapié, who sought to encourage new leadership and a different orientation for both the FET and its Council. He was therefore expelled from the National Council in March 1938 and, when he tried to volunteer for the Legión, assigned to a form of internal exile in Ceuta instead. By November he had indicated to Serrano his willingness to work within the new system.[119] Similarly, no concessions were made to anti-Falangists within the military, such as Gen. Queipo de Llano in Seville.[120]

Thus by the final year of the Civil War the political unification could, from Franco's point of view, be judged a success. It had not succeeded in unifying all the diverse political tendencies or in creating a completely effective and monolithically fascist state party, for these had never been Franco's primary goals, but it had succeeded in unifying all the main political tendencies around the person and leadership of Franco, which was the most basic goal of all.

The man who might have been his only genuine rival within the Falange—a theoretical possibility that can never be tested—had now been dead for two years. José Antonio's age at the time of his execution—thirty-three years—was the same as that of Alexander the Great when he died or the imputed age of Jesus Christ at the time of his crucifixion (later, Evita Perón would die at thirty-three). As the figure of José Antonio assumed increasingly messianic proportions, the official cult was initiated by a government decree of 16 November 1938, which declared 20 November an annual day of mourning. Plaques commemorating José Antonio and other insurgent dead were to be placed permanently on the walls of churches. Chairs of political doctrine, named for José Antonio but appointed by Franco, were to be established at the universities of Madrid and Barcelona. Various press and propaganda initiatives were to be undertaken under the honorary patronage of the Founder. Projects were outlined for naming trade schools and special military units for the fallen leader. All centers of learning were directed to give a special lesson on his exemplary life and works.[121]

On 20 November 1938 Franco delivered a special address over Radio Nacional in honor of "El Ausente,"[122] who had become the secular patron saint of his regime. Franco did not object to the cult so long as it had no practical consequences directed against the Caudillo. A safely dead José Antonio—another of Franco's "providential dead"—could figure as proto-martyr of the cause, a symbol and metaphor for the "half-million deaths" that the Nacionalists claimed to have suffered in the war (the real figure was scarcely more than a quarter of that). He was a messianic example to the youth of Spain to follow the ideals of the Falange, but this increasingly would mean in practice serving the regime of Franco.

The ultimate apotheosis took place after the war ended, when José

Antonio's remains were removed from their original gravesite in Alicante. Between 10 and 20 November 1939, endless relays of young Falangists bore the bier of their vanished Jefe on a ten-day, torch-lit trek of 500 kilometers across Spain to a grand and solemn burial in front of the high altar in the church of San Lorenzo de El Escorial, which held the pantheon of the kings of Spain in a royal crypt below. Carefully and elaborately scripted every step of the way, with manifold brief ceremonies during the lengthy course of the funeral march,[123] this was perhaps the longest such funeral march in world history and was also the most endlessly elaborate ceremony in the contemporary history of Spain—a far cry from the "austere" and "plain" style that its subject had held should be characteristic of the Falange. It was certainly a fitting expression of the fascist cult of death and of the fallen, which up to a point could be made to coincide with ceremonial and theological aspects of the traditional Catholic culture, so resurgent during the Civil War. The cult of José Antonio would become, in fact, the most extraordinary death cult associated with any deceased political figure of western Europe in the mid-twentieth century, one that foreigners might look upon as "typically Spanish," though also typically fascist. It was only the most elaborate of the many new neobaroque styles and ceremonies of the FET and of the regime, as an extensive new calendar of national observances was created between 1938 and 1940.[124]

By the close of the Civil War, observers believed that the Falange had largely been domesticated and was a secondary factor compared with the power of the new state itself and of the military. The generally well-informed von Stohrer reported to Berlin on 19 February 1939:

> *The influence of the original Falange has decreased. What direction will the Falange take after the war?*
>
> As far as the Falange itself is concerned, its influence has probably declined vis-à-vis the victorious Army, and within the Falange proper the power of the original Falange has doubtless been considerably diminished by the skillful political measures of the Caudillo against the extreme Leftist (as well as Rightist) elements and by the lack of real leaders that has frequently been mentioned in the past. This goes so far that there is talk that some of the original Falangists who occupy the most important party and government positions, especially the Secretary General of the Party, Minister of Agriculture Fernández Cuesta, are supposedly attempting to retire to diplomatic posts abroad. It remains to be seen whether the "Camisas viejas" still at the front will be in a position to imbue the original Falange with new life at the end of the war. I consider it entirely possible.[125]

In fact, the future influence of the Falange would depend not so much on the end of the Civil War as on the course of the general European war that would break out five months later. Only a generally "fascist Europe" would guarantee the full fascistization of Spain. As it was, the FET developed in the first phase of the Franco regime as a kind of hybrid fascist party whose fascism was diluted primarily by its Catholic identity. More categorically yet than the original Falange, the FET took the official position that the religious teachings of the Catholic Church were correct and binding, and that the Spanish state must be a strongly Catholic state that would help to imbue Catholic teachings in the national society. There was of course a basic tension here between the fascist pretensions of the core Falange and the Church that would not be resolved until the victory of political Catholicism and the downgrading of the Falange that took place at the end of World War II.

But during the Civil War and afterward, the Church always accepted the FET as a Catholic institution, even though it would not categorically endorse fascism or every aspect of the FET. A situation of "double membership" existed for hundreds of thousands of Catholics who were simultaneously members of the FET or the Sección Femenina and of the major Catholic organizations. "Falangist anticlericalism"—which could never be formally anti-Catholic—had to do with areas of conflict in cultural and educational matters but never went beyond that.[126]

Similarly, the image and influence of Falangism abroad was felt primarily among radical nationalist forces that were also strongly Catholic. The Falange Socialista Boliviana that was formed in La Paz was not categorically fascist but a right-radical and Catholic authoritarian party.[127] Conversely, the Falanga organized in Poland by Boleslaw Piasecki was an attempt to marry extreme fascism (in this case, heavily influenced by Nazism) with Polish nationalist Catholicism.

The FET was modeled primarily but far from exclusively on the Partito Fascista Italiano, just as the original Falange had been. By 1939, however, the radical sector of the party was increasingly oriented toward and inspired by Nazi Germany. Nor was this radicalism merely a matter of the camisas viejas, most of whom had largely accommodated themselves to the compromises of the new regime. Radical Falangists, increasingly Nazophile, came from the youngest party members and also from the most radical sectors of the "camisas nuevas," as well as from the extremist sectors of camisas viejas. They would reach the height of their influence during the first three years after the close of the Civil War.