

might be the role of *Falange* in a State established by a military coup. His confidence that the risk was eliminated if the coup was prepared by 'a very capable minority which exists in the Army', was not confirmed by the use made of his party during the Franco regime.

72. *Arriba* (4 & 22 Sept. 1942). See also the edns of 5, 6, 10 & 12 Sept. 1942.
73. *Ibid.* (4 Sept. 1942).
74. Serrano Suñer, R., *Memorias*, p. 372.
75. Ridruejo, D., *Escrito en España*, p. 85.
76. *Arriba* (2 Jan. 1943).
77. *Ibid.* (20 Jan. 1943).

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The political demise of Serrano in September 1942 represented another important stage in the process of the absorption of the *Falange* into the fabric of the regime. With his departure from active politics, the hopes which Falangists like Perales and Ridruejo had cherished of being able, through him, to secure independent power for their party also disappeared. The direction of the *Falange* was, henceforth, more than ever in the hands of men who were, first and foremost, subordinate to, and identified with, the objectives and interests of the regime, adapting their particular beliefs and interests to these.

In international terms, this meant the acceptance of the de-fascitization of the regime's facade after 1945. In national terms, it meant being aware of, and adaptable to, the presence and ambitions of political rivals more acceptable in the post-world war international context. The most dangerous of the competitors in the political race were the Alphonine Monarchists, allied to whom were what the Falangists termed 'Christian-Democratic elements', who felt that an Allied victory in the war would oblige Franco to renounce his position as Head of State.¹

Some of Franco's own supporters also considered this a likely possibility and even had the temerity to write a collective letter to Franco, in June 1943, in which they suggested that he cede his place to the Alphonine Pretender, D. Juan de Borbón.² In fact, however, the Allies had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Spain to restore the monarchy, nor had Franco any intention of bowing out gracefully. On the contrary, a deliberate policy of isolation was practised against Spain by the victorious Allied powers and the Franco regime took advantage of this circumstance to adopt an equally deliberate independentist posture, which had its politico-economic expression in the period of autarchy which lasted until the 1950s.³

Nevertheless, after 1945, and in a context of international ostracism which contributed in no small measure to the long-term prospects of survival of the regime, Franco began to move slowly but unremittingly towards a monarchical solution to the as yet remote, but inevitable, question of the preparation of the post-Franco era. In spite of this being in contradiction to the anti-monarchical doctrine of José Antonio Primo de Rivera which the Falangists professed to defend,

they lent their support to this operation as the only possible means of securing their own political survival.

In the thirty years which stretched from the end of the Second World War to the death of Franco in 1975, there were four occasions which revealed with particular clarity the Falangists' disposition to accept whatever the *Caudillo* proposed: the Law of Succession, passed in 1947; the signing of the Hispano-American 'Pacts of Madrid', in 1953; the Law of the Fundamental Principles of the Movement, elaborated over a period of two years, between 1956 and 1958; and the process of the selection of Franco's successor, between 1966 and 1969. In each of these critical moments, FFE clearly demonstrated its identification with the regime, even to its own detriment, and with the continuation of Francoism, even in the form of a monarchy. The regime, for its part, showed its disposition to continue providing the *Falange* with its livelihood and its political *raison d'être*, in return for the Party's services in the structures of the administrative and socio-political bodies which, via a mixture of repression, coercion and cooption, guaranteed the state of popular inertia which permitted the untroubled development of the regime and the tranquil gestation of the provisions for its continuation in the event of Franco's death, incapacity or retirement.

On 28 March, 1947, the Spanish Government formally decided to submit to the *Cortes* a project for a Law of Succession. The project was made public on 31 March 1947, the eve of 'Victory Day', in a radio broadcast of the text of the Law. This was preceded by a speech in which Franco pointed to the need to 'confront the ultimate definition of our State, inseparably linked to the statute of succession in its highest echelons'.⁴ For the first time since the liquidation of the Second Republic, Spain was explicitly recognised as a kingdom. Nevertheless, the *Caudillo* retained for life the leadership of the State, the right to designate the members of the Council of the Realm to which any future monarch would ultimately be responsible, and the prerogative of nominating a Council of Regency which, in the event of the *Caudillo's* demise, would act as his substitute until such time as a successor could be appointed. Most important of all, Franco retained the right to designate his own successor, as King or Regent. No allusion was made, in either the Law or Franco's speech, to the *Falange* as a separate entity. On the contrary, also for the first time, it was made juridically specific that the political basis of the regime, the *Movimiento*, was to be an amalgam of forces, not the prerogative of any one in particular.⁵ The Law of Succession pleased neither the Monarchists nor the

Falangists. The Alphonsine Pretender, D. Juan, issued a manifesto condemning it on 7 April 1947. He made no secret of his opposition and conceded an interview to the *Observer* on 13 April 1947, which was also broadcast by the BBC and reproduced by the *New York Times*.⁶ The *Falange* was much more discreet in its opposition, of which the spokesman was José Luis Arrese, who had been relieved of his post as Secretary General of FET y de las JONS in July 1945, but who was still a member of the *Junta Política*. Arrese's criticism was contained in a document for internal consumption only, entitled *Notes on the Law of Succession: to the Cortes, but not as a private motion (Anotaciones a la Ley de Sucesión: a las Cortes, sin pretensión de voto particular)*. As the title indicates, Arrese wished his opinions to be considered as nothing more offensive than a few notes, and he was not prepared to commit himself as far as a private member's vote on the subject. Such caution was characteristic of Arrese at that time. In the same year, 1947, he published *Capitalismo, Cristianismo, Comunismo*, in which the chapter dealing with 'A Scheme for the Possible Organisation of the State' avoids all mention of the monarchy and does not touch on the clearly crucial question of what form the leadership of the State should take.⁷

As Arrese and his Falangist comrades realised, whilst Franco was not prepared to release *Falange* from its contract with the Movement,⁸ it was not his intention, either, to allow the Party to impose its aspirations of being the primary element in an institutionalised regime. They had little room to manoeuvre and Arrese's half-hearted dissent was the expression of that of no more than a small minority within the Movement *Falange*. The majority quickly 'suffocated, overcame and distorted'⁹ the objections raised by Arrese, who claimed to consider the regime 'non-existent',¹⁰ yet continued to participate in it. The view of a Falangist critic sums up the *Falange's* performance with respect to the Law of Succession: 'we must conclude that the *Falange*, at least through its most important ideologue of that time (ie. Arrese), cannot be considered to have played a very brilliant role, because of its reticent and vacillating attitude.'¹¹

If Arrese was 'reticent and vacillating', the majority of his comrades were not. The projected Law was approved by the *Cortes* on 7 June 1947, and a popular referendum was called for 6 July. 'The provincial and local official organs of the Movement', in which most of the career Falangists were employed, 'set to work to achieve the greatest possible success for the referendum'.¹² In spite of the Law being against the anti-monarchical tenets of the Falangist credo, the Party Press lent itself wholeheartedly to the campaign:

The basic Laws included in the norms for the Succession indicate the constitutional status achieved by the régime and how far a system of permanence and continuity is indispensable.¹³

The National Government and its eminent leadership, in a magnificent act without equal in the political present or in the history of the most worthy-titled democracies, places a limit on itself, taking a Law to approval by national referendum.¹⁴

We are pleased to say that we affirm the Law of succession and we would affirm unconditionally any other proposed by the *Caudillo*. . . . For the *Falange*, to vote "Yes" – and not only to vote "Yes", but simply to vote – is something as primary as its active appearance in the streets and fields of Spain in its first days.¹⁵

We waged a war of Liberation to wrest the Fatherland from the claws of communism . . . if you do not wish to endanger all this, vote YES in the referendum.¹⁶

Their efforts were rewarded with a predictably large majority in favour of the Law: 14 145 163, as against 1 074 500 negative votes and spoiled ballots.¹⁷ This was hardly surprising, given the vast programme of propaganda which had recommended the 'Yes' vote, the prohibition on propaganda advocating a 'No' vote or abstention, and the sanctions which would be imposed on those who did not go to the polling stations. These were formidable indeed in a context of socio-political repression and economic hardship. A certificate was issued to each voter at the polling stations, which it was necessary to present in order to collect wages. In addition, ration cards had also to be stamped on voting and any card not stamped was subsequently invalid. Ballots were to be completed at home, thereby enabling spot-checks to be made on polling day, and the Catholic Church threatened to refuse absolution to anyone who did not vote 'Yes'. 'The weightiest factor', however, 'was that there was nothing else to be done, that it was impossible to fight or to abstain either individually or collectively.'¹⁸

The Falangist voice was among those which enthused over the result: 'the whole of Spain ratifies with its vote the independence of the nation and the powers of Franco. . . . Polling day was an example of enthusiasm and political morality'; 'if the *Caudillo* had only this to his credit, it would be sufficient to make him worthy of the highest historical glory. . . .'¹⁹ As the *Falange* had not dared to risk opposing the Unification of political parties in 1937, so in 1947 it did not dare to risk opposing this new limitation on its present status and future

prospects. However, the succession was hedged round with a complex set of controls and was, as yet, a matter for an indeterminate future. It was therefore still possible to hope that there would yet be opportunities to influence the course of events to the benefit of *Falange*. In 1947, *Falange* had nothing to gain from opposing the succession, but it still had a good deal to lose.

Events in 1948 seemed to prove Party leaders correct in their assessment of the situation. In the first place, and in terms of national politics, the tension already existing between D. Juan de Borbón and Franco became more acute in that year, in spite of the apparently cordial meetings on board the *Generalísimo's* yacht.²⁰

In the second place, the international situation had changed by 1948, strengthening the Franco regime with external support thereto denied to it. Winston Churchill's Fulton speech of 5 March 1946 had insinuated that the anti-communism of the Spanish Nationalists was politically acceptable and morally justified. By 1948, the Cold War was well under way. Given the strategic position of the Iberian Peninsula, it was now both convenient and necessary for the Allies to court Spanish favour, and to ensure the stability and permanence of a strong, friendly regime. Under such circumstances, the condemnation of two years earlier must be waived and Spain re-admitted to the West European fold. With material and ideological defence of the West the prime consideration, the democratic or non-democratic nature of one of the strategically most important defenders was of less concern. In 1945, it had been considered necessary by the regime to reduce the visible presence of the *Falange*, in order not to offend the representatives of liberal democracy. Now, three years later, it was possible to restore the second most important post in the Party²¹ without a murmur from those same liberal democrats, because the *Falange's* anti-communism more than compensated for its anti-democratic character.

The first steps were now taken towards lifting the international blockade. In 1948, supplies of oil and petroleum, plus military and para-military equipment, began to arrive from the United States via the Standard Oil Company. 1950 saw the arrival in Madrid of United States Economic and Military Missions and a Mission from the financial departments of the US Senate and Chamber of Deputies. In the Spring of 1951, Ambassadors from France, Great Britain and the United States presented their credentials to the *Generalísimo*, whilst the Ex-Im Bank made a first grant of \$86.5 million. In 1952, Spain was admitted as a member of UNESCO.²²

The political about-face on the part of the Western democracies was

inspired, as we have noted, by essentially pragmatic motives. The Franco regime's willingness to consort with powers which, until very recently, had been total anathema, was equally based on considerations of political and economic realism. By the end of the 1940s, the impracticability of economic self-sufficiency was manifest and, consequently, the socio-political stability of the regime which had adopted autarchy as its economic line was at risk.

The situation of shortages and poverty, characteristic of the years immediately after the end of the Civil War, stagnated and, in some respects, even deteriorated in the second half of the decade. By 1949, agricultural production, on which the policy of autarchy relied almost entirely to feed the population, had fallen even below its 1942-43 subsistence levels, as a result of lack of seeds and fertilisers, extremely low levels of mechanisation, and adverse climatic conditions.²³ Industrial production in 1949 was only 30% higher than it had been in 1929, and, in 1950, only 18% higher than in 1935, conditioned as it was by the difficulties in obtaining raw materials and mechanising antiquated production processes, and by shortages of fuels and electricity. In an attempt to contain growing economic inflation, restrictions were imposed on credit facilities in the Autumn of 1947, which not only failed to stop the inflationary trend, but also caused investment to stagnate and the number of enterprises declared bankrupt to increase.

In spite of ferocious repression and the implications of being indexed (*yichado*) in the files of the Ministry of the Interior, the people least able to defend themselves against the effects of economic autarchy, the working classes, showed increasing external signs of their discontent in the latter half of the 1940s and the first years of the 1950s. Sporadic protests against working conditions and the rising cost of living in Cataluña and Vizcaya in 1946 and 1947, had grown by the Spring of 1951 to much more serious conflicts in Madrid, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya and Cataluña. In Barcelona, a full-scale general strike took place on 12 and 13 March 1951 and a down-tools affecting some 250 000 workers occurred in Bilbao and San Sebastian on 23 and 24 April of the same year. The strikes were motivated primarily by economic hardship, but their political implications were clear – as, indeed, the regime itself recognised, denouncing the strike movement as the work of communist agitators.²⁴

In these circumstances, if the Western bloc needed Spain as an anti-communist ally, the Franco regime was more than willing to accept, in return, the life-line offered in the form of economic aid and international recognition. The process of *déleuve* culminated in the signing,

on 26 September 1953, of the Hispano-American agreement known as the 'Pacts of Madrid'. In socio-economic terms, this meant the end of autarchy and the beginning of the conversion of Spain into a modern, consumer society. In political terms, it meant a reinforcement of the status quo. This was a paradigmatic example of the peculiar capacity of the Franco regime to effect important changes at the economic and social levels without altering substantially the political super-structure.²⁵

In view of the nationalist and anti-liberal democratic emphasis of its doctrine, it might have been expected that the *Falange* would organise some kind of opposition to such mortgaging of the Fatherland to foreign powers. Once again, however, political survival coupled with opportunism took precedence over ideological consistency. Throughout the period leading up to the 'Pacts of Madrid', the Party Press conducted a campaign in favour of the new understanding reached between the two countries, laying emphasis on the anti-communist aspect of their mutual interests.²⁶ One month after the signing of the treaty, a further occasion arose for the *Falange* to voice its support to the regime's foreign policy. In October 1953, coinciding with the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of *Falange Española*, the First National Congress of FET y de las JONS was held in Madrid. It was organised and presided over by Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, Minister Secretary General of the Movement since 1951, and held in spite of 'strong opposition from other members of the Government, who said it was madness to give this sensation of revitalisation of the *Falange*'.²⁷ Franco, however, approved of the exercise and his approval was far more important than the grumblings of the sceptics. He even presided at, and addressed, the mass gathering of Falangists in the Chamartín sports stadium on the final day of the Congress, to the enthusiastic acclaim of the assembled comrades.²⁸

As in 1948, when the cooling of relations with the Alphonine monarchists had been accompanied by the restoration of the post of Secretary General of FET y de las JONS, *Falange* was now again visibly promoted to maintain the internal balance of power.²⁹ In spite of the international political successes of the preceding three years, the regime was being criticised by a certain sector of the Monarchist camp, and Franco looked to the *Falange* for public support. The Falangists, ever sensitive to opportunities to score over political rivals, organised the Congress (the first and only one in the history of the unified Party, and held sixteen years after the latter's creation) as an attempt to

save the force, opinion and doctrine of the *Falange* and to harmonise them with the political line being followed by Franco, which (was) directed towards saving the contemporary situation of Spain.³⁰

The resolutions adopted and the speeches made in the course of the Congress revealed both *Falange's* identification with the regime and its determination not to yield any ground to any force which might threaten to disrupt a balance of power then favourable to *Falange*:

Those comrades who fought on the battlefield, achieving by their effort and sacrifice the nationalist victory, will continue to be organised in Delegations of Ex-Combatants, a heroic reserve unit always prepared to become a combative force, lest, at any time, hesitation or betrayal should endanger our Revolution.³¹

The *Falange* will act severely against any liberalising deviations which may occur within or outside its ranks, reducing to silence any discordant voice which attempts to attack the Unity of the Victory.³²

The *Falange* maintains an alert and resolute vigil against attempts at the surreptitious organisation of political parties and certain tendencies which, whether they be Rightist or Leftist, would mean opposition to the unity of the Movement. Under no circumstances will the *Falange* permit the illegitimate action of cliques which aspire to undermine its condition of sole source of the political inspiration of the State, thereby also undermining the authority of *Falange's* Chief and *Caudillo*.³³

The speech made by Party Secretary Fernández Cuesta on 28 October 1953 contained a direct attack on the Alphonstine Monarchists' notion of establishing a 'third force', a 'social monarchy', in Spain:

Falangism . . . energetically rejects all accusations of anachronism or senility and opposes the effective strength revealed by the presence of one hundred and fifty thousand comrades, to the supposed existence in Spain of a third force.³⁴

With regard to the recent alliance with the United States, far from being critical, or even mildly disapproving, the *Falange* repeated its wholehearted support for the idea of creating a West European bulwark against the communist 'threat':

A new and necessary mission, a new and imposing reason, broaden our horizons and accelerate our pace. Our national mission, ever ongoing, grows and spreads to become a universal mission. Spain has associated herself, decisively and contractually, with the defence of Europe. For us, this is above all the defence of Western Christianity. We defended it in our Homeland as the prime *raison d'être* of our Falangist being and we shall have to defend it in the world. Now the dead of our Blue Division form the vanguard of the defence of Europe.³⁵

At most, Fernández Cuesta alluded discreetly to unspecified risks involved in Spain's new international role:

Falange continues to constitute the core of the unity of the Spanish people, of its incorruptible dignity and its national sense of independence, all the more important to maintain and proclaim, the more intense our international relations and the more possible outside influences.³⁶

This ostentatious and carefully orchestrated operation of mutual support and admiration need not have irritated the *Falange's* opponents nor encouraged excessively its partisans, for Franco was no more prepared now than he had ever been to promote any single sector of his following to sole power. The support publicly afforded to FET y de las JONS in 1953 was one more 'stroke' in the game of maintaining the balance of internal power whereby the regime contrived to survive and prosper. In so far as the *Falange*, like the other players, participated voluntarily in the game, accepting the rules, the risks and the method of play, it also contributed to the survival and prosperity of the whole system.

When convenient in the short term to counterbalance Monarchist pressures, the *Falange* was temporarily elevated to the position of protagonist of the political moment. It had been made clear in 1947, however, that the institutional framework of the regime was not to take totalitarian form, and it was therefore not politic in the long term to alienate non-Falangist support by excessive promotion of the Falangist component of the Movement. Thus, in spite of the tensions frequently existing between the regime and the exiled monarchy, the partisans of the Alphonstine Pretender were allowed to participate in the municipal elections held in November 1954 and, in December of the same year, Franco and Don Juan met on the estate of the Conde de

Ruiseñada, in the province of Cáceres. They had already exchanged letters in the course of the year regarding the education in Spain of Don Juan's son and heir, Prince Juan Carlos. 1955 was punctuated by declarations of mutual understanding which suggested that the question of the succession was settled and even relatively imminent.³⁷

Some of the younger members of *Falange* were incensed by the Monarchist advance, and voiced their anti-royalist feeling in shouting abusive slogans at the periodic gatherings of the *Frente de Juventudes*.³⁸ More significant for future developments than the mere vociferating of the rank and file, however, was the attitude adopted by a group of students who then comprised the leading ranks of the official union of students, the SEU: Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Gabriel Elorriaga, Rodolfo Martín Villa, Miguel Ortí Bordás, Antonio Castro Villacañas, Jorge Jordana Fuentes, and Miguel Sanchez Mazas.

The turnover of members in the *Frente de Juventudes* was very rapid and the political, or doctrinal, level low. The majority of long-term militants, except those who went to the 'José Antonio Training School' ('Escuela de Mandos José Antonio') subsequently staffed the lowest grades of the Party and administrative structures in their adult professional career. The SEU, on the other hand, although not providing any kind of autonomous stimulus to student politics as such, was the training ground for a significant number of those who were later to hold positions of political responsibility at a national level.³⁹

The position of the SEUists in the 1950s was not merely of resigned acquiescence in the regime, but of active support for its continuance through the combination of the legacy of the Civil War – Francoism – with an institutional structure appropriate both to Spanish traditions and contemporary national and international needs and convenience. Neither the republican nor the totalitarian models fulfilled all these conditions. Besides, Spain had been declared a kingdom in 1947 and the *Falange* had supported that declaration. To oppose the monarchist option now would have offered the double difficulty of going against Franco's will and of finding an alternative, neither of which were within the bounds of possibility for the SEU leaders.

They accepted what was, in theory, contrary to Falangist principles because they knew that the monarchist die was irrevocably cast. They were realistic in their appreciation of the contemporary situation and rejected any attempt to impede change simply by ignoring it. 'There is no way of eluding the historical situation at any given point in time', declared the SEU magazine, *Juventud*, in an article which discussed the relationship between the Movement and the Monarchy.⁴⁰ Whilst its

assessment of that particular 'given point in time' led to the conclusion that Spain needed a political structure other than the Movement, it nevertheless still advocated an institutional framework applicable to a country 'saved from the Communist invasion by the rising of 18 July 1936'.⁴¹

Unlike the older generation of *carnisa vieja* Falangists, the SEU leaders of the early 1950s were more concerned with the conservation of the political and ideological content of the regime than simply with the preservation of its structural form. Their attitude earned them the label of 'leftists' from the *Falange's* self-styled purists.⁴² They certainly belonged to the first post-war generation of Falangists, but they could not – and did not wish to – be considered as 'leftists'.

Beneficiaries of the Nationalist victory, but not participants in the war; upholding the values of Fatherland, Catholicism and anti-communism, but aware of the need for a certain flexibility in order to adapt to the immense social, political, economic and cultural changes brought about by World War II and its aftermath, they considered it not only possible but also necessary to combine 'revolution' with 'restoration', since theirs was a Lampedusian concept of change.⁴³ In them, for reasons of age, social background, political affiliation and professional ambition, lay the human basis for the transition from Francoism to Monarchy under Juan Carlos I. The combination which they incarnated, of political conservatism and socio-economic liberalism, made them ideal occupants for those positions of power from which it could be ensured that the transitional operation would take place without upheaval, without any power-vacuum, and without significant immediate change. It was, to a significant degree, through them as Ministers, Under-Secretaries, Director Generals and so on, that Franco made certain the realisation of his own forecast with regard to the institutional situation immediately after his death: 'The future of our Fatherland is tied up and well tied up.'⁴⁴

Clearly, this assessment is made in the light of events subsequent to the period under consideration here. In fact, however, it was possible from the 1950s onwards to distinguish where the political future of the 'SEU generation' might lie. Their publications, their involvement with the contemporary student movement and their desire for professional success were explicitly identified with Franco and the *Falange*: 'The *Falange* is with Franco . . . and Franco believes in Spain because he believes in the *Falange*.'⁴⁵ 'the mention of (José Antonio's) name is sufficient for those of us who seek in him our roots, our human model and the inspiration for new enterprises'.⁴⁶ Whilst they were forward-

looking in their attitude towards the social and political development of Spain, their starting point was the conservation of the Nationalist victory in 1939. 'Continuity is a political virtue of the first order',⁴⁷ affirmed *La Hora*, while *Alcalá* published the following eulogistic lines on the political figure of Franco:

The Spanish régime born of the rising of 18 July 1936 has been consolidated, enjoys an indisputable prestige, and has achieved, for the first time in centuries, an independent political line for the Spanish people. . . . The figure of Francisco Franco, and his political talent like his military talent before, have made possible a situation in which we may look to the future with optimism. Precisely for that reason, it is urgently necessary to consolidate the present and to make definitively sure of the future.⁴⁸

In similar vein, Rodolfo Martín Villa wrote that 'few things can inspire us with as much hope as the vitality and desire for continuity that we find in the *Sindicato Español Universitario*'.⁴⁹ He was right in pointing to the significance of the fact that his contemporaries in the SEU, young men who hankered after 'an idea, a myth, an archetype around which to group themselves' and who found attractive the idea of 'the habit of conquest', were those who were 'being trained for their role as the professionals of the future'.⁵⁰

Both the aggressive Falangists of the *Frente de Juventudes* and the more rational comrades of the SEU were, however, frustrated in their eagerness to effect their 'revolution' by the attitude of their elder comrades, ensconced in the Movement structures. The willingness of these Falangists to subordinate their own political line to 'whatever revisions life might demand',⁵¹ was accompanied by an explicitly threatening attitude towards 'certain foreign interests, which sometimes aspire to finding internal echoes',⁵² by which they meant as much those Falangists whom they termed 'leftists' as their traditional enemies, the socialists and communists.

So much was clear from the opposition of the Minister of the Interior, Blas Pérez González, and the Vice-secretary General of the Movement, Tomás Romojaro, to a 'Congress of Young University Writers of Spain', planned for November 1955 and organised by, among others, Falangists Dionisio Ridruejo and Pedro Lain Entralgo (then Dean of Madrid's Central University), with the participation of a 'reformist' group within the SEU.⁵³ Three months later, in February 1956, a serious incident occurred in the Madrid University campus

which demonstrated even more clearly that the main fear of the Movement Falangists was not that the *Falange* would not set a revolutionary process in motion, but precisely that it might. On this occasion again, fidelity to Franco was placed before solidarity with Falangist comrades, when the two came into conflict with each other.

9 February is the anniversary of the death of the Falangist proto-martyr, Matías Montero, commemorated annually by his comrades. On their way back from the commemorative events of 9 February 1956, a group of Falangists encountered a group of student opponents in one of the main thoroughfares of the student quarter in Madrid.⁵⁴ A violent clash ensued, in the course of which a young Falangist, Miguel Alvarez Pérez, was seriously wounded by a bullet in the head. He was taken to hospital and underwent emergency brain surgery, being suddenly converted into the focus of the tension between the most reactionary elements in the régime and those who aspired to seeing even the mildest breeze of change blow through its structures.

Predictably, the response of the former was repressive and, in Ridruejo's opinion, absurdly exaggerated.⁵⁵ The governing body of the University immediately announced the suspension of classes. The Secretary General of the Movement, Fernández Cuesta, was urgently recalled from an official visit to Brazil and Santo Domingo. The meeting of the Council of Ministers held on 10 February decreed the suspension for three months of Articles 14 and 18 of the *Fuero de los Españoles* (Spaniards' Charter), which guaranteed, respectively, freedom of movement within 'the national territory' and release or prosecution within seventy-two hours for anyone arrested.

The Monarchist daily, *ABC*, added to the violence of the atmosphere with an Editorial in the 11 February 1956 edition entitled 'Patriotic alert', in which it declared its solidarity with 'the Falangist faith' and warned against the 'hidden hand' which supposedly controlled 'the authors of the crime'. Responsibility was implicitly laid at the door of the exiled Socialist leader, Indalecio Prieto, who was quoted as writing in a recent issue of *El Socialista*, 'I think the moment has arrived again to stimulate and cultivate from outside the noble attitude symptomatic of the young people inside Spain'.

Even though Alvarez was still alive, *Arriba* headlined its 10 February 1956 edition, 'They've killed Matías Montero again', while *El Español*, published by the Ministry of Information and Tourism, carried an article entitled 'The conspiracy has names' ('*La conjura tiene nombres propios*'). The piece constituted a violent attack on certain students, whom it accused as 'Communist intriguers', and

denounced the proposed 'Young Writers' Congress' as a typical *agit-prop* tactic, strongly condemning the participation of 'people from inside our own house'.⁵⁶

In Falangist circles, the most extreme comrades were thirsting for vengeance and a 'night of the long knives' was feared if Alvarez should, in fact, die. The orthodox members of the SEU and the extreme Right-wing Falangist organisation the *Guardia de Franco*, then under the leadership of Dr Luis González Vicén, were on the alert for any new developments and their premises were placed under Army surveillance in order to forestall any attempt at reprisals.⁵⁷ In the event, Alvarez survived, with severe brain damage. His official compensation was the Falangist medal for bravery and the income from a small, open-air bar in the centre of Madrid.⁵⁸

The net result of the February 1956 crisis was that the attempt to reform from within the University in general, and the SEU in particular, had come to nothing and was even counter-productive. The Cabinet changes which took place immediately afterwards, and in clear reaction to what had happened, removed the would-be reformers Lain Entralgo, Joaquín Ruiz Jiménez (then Minister of Education) and Manuel Fraga (then General Technical Secretary for Education, and considered 'progressive'). The new Minister of Education, Jesus Rubio, was an 'Old Shirt' Falangist with almost twenty years of service in the Educational Department of FET y de las JONS. Fraga Iribarne's successor, Antonio Tena Artigas, was the former Head of Radio Services in the Party Propaganda Secretariat for the province of Madrid. There were also important changes for the most reactionary members of the *Falange*. Fernández Cuesta was replaced as Secretary General by José Luis Arrese, and Romojaro as Vice-secretary by Diego Salas Pombo.⁵⁹ The 'incompetence' of those dismissed was thus castigated without making too great a concession to the anti-Falangist supporters of the regime.

The political significance of what occurred in the Universities in the first half of the decade of the 1950s was, of course, far deeper than the changing of Cabinet posts in 1956 implies. Indeed, the analysis of this critical period as a watershed for the entire Spanish political spectrum, both inside and outside Spain, goes beyond the limits of the present study. For the *Falange* in particular, however, it can be said that the crisis, and the solution provided by the regime, gave rise to a clarification of positions within the ranks from which two, or even three, currents emerged.

On the one hand, there were those whose dissatisfaction with the

regime was radicalised by the events of 1955-56. Some left the *Falange* altogether others formed 'purist' Falangist groups, in order to 'rescue' the original doctrine from its 'usurpation' by the Movement. The emergence and development of these groups will be examined in Chapter 7.

On the other hand, there were those other Falangists who realised that, in a trial of strength between the forces of reform and those of conservatism, the latter would always win, if only for the simple reason that they held control of the means of physical repression. These Falangists, mainly to be found in the *Frente de Juventudes* and the SEU, were pragmatic and even reformist in their outlook but not, as we have noted earlier, leftist. Applying their pragmatism now to the political situation in 1956, they understood that, for the moment at least, the structural framework of the regime was not going to be changed. As Fraga Iribarne's dismissal intimidated, the furtherance of their political careers depended not on advocating such change, as they had done at the beginning of the decade, but on installing themselves in the ramifications of the Establishment, in order to 'play the system'.

With the situation in the Universities once more under control, the new governmental team was commissioned to produce a blue-print for a revised version of the Party Statutes, for a Law of the Fundamental Principles of the State, an Organic Law of the Movement, and an Organisational Law of the Government. On the basis of this vote of confidence in the *Falange*, it prepared to reassert its presence and influence in the elaboration of what was conceived of as tantamount to a Constitution. A study group was formed, composed by Arrese, González Vicén, José Antonio Eiola, Diego Salas Pombo, Rafael Sánchez Mazas and Javier Conde. Arrese's speech in Valladolid on 3 March 1956 referred to what the group, as representatives of the *Falange*, saw as their prime objectives: 'to win the man in the street and to structure the regime'.⁶⁰

Although Salas Pombo comments that Arrese was far more concerned with the latter than with the former, at least at the outset Arrese laid emphasis on the need to increase *Falange's* popular appeal:

The mission of the *Falange* is to root itself in the conscience of all Spaniards, in the knowledge that the future will not be uncertain whilst the *Falange* is firmly implanted, well-loved, and at one with the very existence of the Fatherland.⁶¹

Vice-secretary Salas held a similar view, believing that 'it is people who

make institutions, and it is the popular foundation of a system which guarantees its permanence',⁶² by which he meant the permanence of the regime through that of the *Falange*, and *vice versa*. Unlike Arrese, however, Salas Pombo was especially concerned with the question of broadening, or at least maintaining, the social base of the *Falange* at a time when 'Franco's peace' and the first tastes of the benefits of a consumer society were more attractive than political militancy to the middle classes which had formerly constituted *Falange's* active clientele. A certain process of 'proletarianisation' had even taken place, in so far as the upper middle class and aristocratic elements which had constituted an important part of the militant base of the pre-war *Falange* now formed part of the élite of the post-war single party, whilst rank-and-file militants now came mainly from the urban lower middle and service classes, swelled by immigrants from impoverished rural areas attracted by the relative prosperity of the urban centres.⁶³ Whilst the *Falange's* patron survived, the question of its independent strength scarcely arose. With an economically, socially, culturally and politically debilitated rank and file, however, the party's chances of survival without Franco, or some other form of official protection, were not good.

Salas Pombo was undoubtedly aware of this problem. Speaking in 1977 of the difficult two-year period in which he was active in the elaboration of the Law of Fundamental Principles, he commented:

The institutionalisation of the Movement seemed to me far less important than the recovery of the vitality and strength that the *Falange* had progressively lost with the passage of time. The important thing was to recover the support, and restore the faith, of our people, who, as a consequence of inactivity and routine, no longer had the tension they had in 1939 or that they had maintained until 1953, when the Concordat with the Vatican and the pact with North America made people relax in the belief that everything was done now.⁶⁴

Arrese, however, was intent on spearheading the 'institutionalisation of the Movement', and commissioned from the Institute of Political Studies a preliminary study for the three Laws which were to be prepared.⁶⁵ The report it duly produced made no reference to the monarchy, in spite of the fact that, in accordance with the 1947 Law of Succession, the institutional framework in which the Movement would be inserted was, *a priori*, that of a kingdom. On the contrary, increased

importance was given to the role of the Movement in general and of the National Council and the Secretary General of FET y de las JONS in particular, within the context of the unspecified leadership of an undefined State. The question of the succession was left equally vague. The successor was referred to as 'the one called to the leadership', though it was not explained how the 'calling' was to be effected.⁶⁶

The proposals met with the disapproval of Falangist Luis González Vicén, of Franco's close collaborator Luis Carrero Blanco, and of the Minister of Justice, Antonio Iturmendi. Carrero's comments spoke clearly of establishing a 'social monarchy', based on the Fundamental Laws and on the 'principles which inform the National Movement'. 'The fundamental elements of this system', he continued, 'must be the Crown, the Council of the Realm, the National Council of the Movement, the Cortes and the government'.⁶⁷ Neither the *Falange*, nor the Secretary General, as autonomous elements, entered into this scheme at all.

The criticisms made by Iturmendi were of a similar nature, and he went further. He commissioned from Laureano López Rodó, then General Technical Secretary to the Presidency of the Government and closely connected to Carrero Blanco by political, ideological and religious affinities, a 'study for the Laws, which would complete the constitutional organisation (of the State)'.⁶⁸ The 'thirteen dense pages' which López Rodó submitted in response to Iturmendi's request, and which formed the basis of a report presented to Franco entitled 'Ideas on the Fundamental Laws', were aimed quite clearly at limiting the powers of the Movement as an institution and at exalting the values of the Monarchy.⁶⁹

In addition to the excessive importance they considered to be given to Falangist concepts, the objections to Arrese's project were based on what was seen as Arrese's tactic of 'taking the matter of the Fundamental Laws out of the Government's hands and placing it exclusively in those of the National Council and the *Junta Política*', thereby trying to give these bodies a new significance even before the Laws were passed.⁷⁰ In effect, it was Arrese's intention to present the Cabinet with a finished project, which would then follow the normal legislative procedure. The non-Falangist members of the Cabinet saw this as an attempt at a Falangist *coup de main* and, evidently considering such a thing a real possibility, expressed their total opposition.

At the same time, there was strong opposition to the Falangist proposals from the upper echelons of the Spanish Church hierarchy.

Franco received a group of Cardinals, who expressed the opinion that Arrese's proposals were inadmissible because of their 'totalitarian' nature and because they had been elaborated 'behind the back of the Government and of the social forces of the nation'.⁷¹ Arrese instructed Salas Pombo to send a copy of his proposed Laws to all the Captains General of the Armed Forces, the Rectors of the Universities, and the most important Church dignitaries. The military men replied in terms which indicated that they were prepared to participate, with the contribution of their opinion, so that the project would be 'the product of the collaboration of all'.⁷² The Cardinals, however, held firm, in spite of modifications introduced into the original draft. A speech made by Arrese in December 1956, in which he attempted to demonstrate that Falangist participation in the institutions of the State was minimal,⁷³ did not sway them either. The intense activity of Salas Pombo, who tried to persuade them of the non-totalitarian nature of Arrese's proposals, was equally in vain. The Falangists knew, moreover, that Franco was going to be more influenced on this occasion by the combined effects of Carrero's criticisms, the apprehensions of the Church's representatives, and the 'political reticence' of such prestigious military colleagues as the Captain General of Cataluña, Juan Bautista Sánchez, than by the insistence of Arrese and Salas Pombo.⁷⁴

From the outset, there had been indications that Franco intended to control closely the process in hand. In July 1956, in a speech made before the National Council, he told the assembled Councillors that the Programmatic Points of the *Falange* were out of date and that a new formula must be found, more appropriate to the contemporary reality of Spain.⁷⁵ Salas Pombo relates the remarks made to him by Franco afterwards

Speaking to me alone, explaining to me what he was going to do, and what he thought, he announced to me the Fundamental Principles which eventually came out in 1958. He said to me, 'Look, the 26 Points have done their time. One of them deals with separatism and says "The Republican Constitution in force, in so far as it threatens the unity of Spain, should be annulled. We demand its immediate annulment." It doesn't make sense to go on talking about the Republican Constitution when we've already annulled it years ago.'⁷⁶

It was clear, then, that whilst a desire for ideological continuity

underlay the decision to make the Falangists responsible for the Fundamental Principles project, it was not intended that the *Falange* itself should be converted into an institution. Like the young Falangists of the SEU, the regime was concerned to preserve its essential content whilst adapting its form to the needs of the socio-political moment, whereas the career Falangists around Arrese intended also to maintain and even strengthen the form of the preceding twenty years. Thus when, in January 1957, Franco told Arrese that, for the time being, his project must be left to one side, the official *Falange* was obliged to realise that it had lost the opportunity ('which we felt intuitively might well be the last⁷⁷') definitively to secure its own future as an integral and indispensable part of Francoism.

Since it had no viable alternative, the *Falange* was obliged to accept, as it had accepted other adverse situations in the past, the Fundamental Principles which were finally approved in May 1958 and which made no special provision for the role of the Party within the framework of the regime. Arrese's subsequent transferral from the Party Secretariat to the Ministry of Housing should not be seen as demotion, says Salas Pombo, but as testimony of Franco's gratitude for faithful service, which Arrese took with the same sense of duty, decorum and fidelity.⁷⁸

Notes

1. For the development of the Alphonine cause and of the relations between Franco and D. Juan de Borbón during the period 1939-1945 see Gil Robles, J. M., *La monarquía por la que yo luché* (Madrid: Taurus, 1976) pp. 15-150; Sainz Rodríguez, P., op. cit., pp. 275-310; and López Rodó, L., op. cit., pp. 13-70.
2. The text of the letter is reproduced in López Rodó, L., op. cit., pp. 37-8. The Falangist signatories included Pedro Gamero del Castillo, Manuel Halcón, Juan Manuel Fanjul (then Vice-secretary General of the Movement), Antonio Gallego Burín and Jaime de Foxá.
3. For a detailed study of the period of economic autarchy, see Ros Hombravella *et al.*, op. cit., *passim* and the references given therein. See also, Esteban, J., loc. cit. A contemporary account of the general socio-political context of the early 1940s is given in Barba, B., *Dos años al frente del Gobierno Civil de Barcelona* (Madrid, 1948) and that of a foreign historian in Gallo, M., *Spain under Franco*, pp. 85-160.
4. *Arriba* (1 Apr. 1947); López Rodó, op. cit., p. 90. See also Suárez Fernández, L., op. cit., vol IV, pp. 160-4.
5. The text of the Law was published in the 27 July 1947 edn of the *Boletín Oficial del Estado*.

6. *The Observer* (London, 13 Apr. 1947); López Rodó, L., op. cit. pp. 91-3.
7. Arrese Magra, J. L., *Capitalismo, Cristianismo, Comunismo* (Madrid: Ediciones Radar, 1947), ch. XVII, *passim*.
8. A letter written by Dionisio Ridruejo to Franco in Feb. 1947, suggesting the convening of 'liberating' the *Falange* from its connection with the official structures of the regime, went unheeded as had a similar request made by Ridruejo in 1942 (Ridruejo, D., *Casi unas memorias* pp. 282-4).
9. Martínez Val, J. M., *¿Por qué no fue posible la Falange?* (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1975) p. 95.
10. Arrese, J. L., *Anotaciones a la Ley de Sucesión...*, quoted in Martínez Val, op. cit., p. 97.
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Ibid.*
13. 'La fiel historia', leading article in *Arriba* (8 Apr. 1947).
14. *Arriba* (10 June 1947).
15. 'La Falange y el Referendum', leading article in *Arriba* (22 June 1947).
16. *Ibid.* (25 June 1947).
17. *Ibid.* (27 July 1947). Cf. Preston, P. in *Historia 16*, Extra no. XXIV (Dec. 1982), who gives 3033649 as the total of 'no's', spoiled ballots and abstentions.
18. Gallo, M., op. cit., pp. 178-9; *BOE* (9 & 25 June 1947).
19. Arriba (8 & 23 July 1947).
20. For Franco's interview with Don Juan on board the *Azor* on 25 Aug. 1948, see López Rodó, L. op. cit., p. 106; Gil Robles, J. M., op. cit., p. 265; *ABC* (Madrid, 29 Aug. 1948).
21. The post of Secretary General of FET y de las JONS had been vacant since the dismissal of Arrese. It was now assigned (although as yet without Ministerial status) to Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, who, at the same time, was Minister of Justice.
22. Hovey, H. A., *U.S. Military Assistance*, Praeger, New York 1965, p. 175; Tamames, R. *Estructura económica de España*, Madrid 1964, pp. 564-6; Gallo, M., op. cit., pp. 202-6.
23. In October 1946, a commercial agreement concluded with Argentina provided for the import of 520 000 ton of cereals in 1947 and 400 000 in 1948. Further imports of basic foodstuffs were agreed on for a period of five years (although this agreement was revised in 1948 and the proposed imports from Argentina were substituted by produce from Mexico). Ros Hombravella, op. cit., pp. 165-6.
24. Ros Hombravella, op. cit., pp. 138-206; Gallo, M., op. cit., pp. 180-97, 207-14; Ferrí, L., op. cit., pp. 74-194; Esteban, J., loc. cit., pp. 159-67; Soler, R., 'The New Spain' in *New Left Review*, no. 58 (Nov.-Dec. 1969) pp. 3-10; Calamai, N., *La lotta di classe sotto il Franquismo*, (Bari: De Donato Editore, 1971) pp. 11-14.
25. Cf. Migué, A. de, *Sociología del franquismo* (Barcelona: Euros, 1975) *passim*.
26. See, for example, the following Editorials in *Arriba*: 'España y Norteamérica', 5 July 1952; 'Intereses y Simpatías' (22 Aug. 1952); 'Línea anticomunista' (31 Aug. 1952); 'Advertencia a Occidente' (6 Aug. 1953); 'La amenaza de esta hora' (19 Aug. 1953); 'España no puede ser

- indiferente a la defensa occidental' (1 Oct. 1953).
27. Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, interview, 15 July 1977; see also, Fernández Cuesta, R., *Testimonio*, pp. 237-8.
 28. *Arriba, Pueblo* (29 Oct. 1953).
 29. On his appointment and duties as Secretary General and the growing tensions within the regime, see Fernández Cuesta, *Testimonio*, pp. 233-8.
 30. Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, interview, 15 July 1977.
 31. *I Congreso Nacional de FET y de las JONS* (Minutes of the Congress) Madrid, Oct. 1953, p. 104.
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
 33. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
 34. *Ibid.*, p. 175; *Arriba* (30 Oct. 1953). The idea of the 'social monarchy' and the 'third force' was proposed by the sector of Monarchist partisans whose most prominent spokesman was *Opus Dei* member Rafael Calvo Serer. It was first expressed by him in an article entitled 'The internal politics of Franco's Spain', published in *Ecritis de Paris*, September 1953, which constituted a joint attack on the *Falange* and the Christian Democrats.
 35. *I Congreso Nacional de FET y de las JONS*, p. 166.
 36. *Ibid.*, p. 175.
 37. López Rodó, L., op. cit., pp. 115-17. On the Monarchist participation in the 1954 municipal elections, see González, A. A. '¿Pucherazo en Madrid?' in *Los domingos de ABC* (Madrid, 24 Dec. 1975).
 38. Alcocer, J. L., op. cit., pp. 16, 18, 30-8, 73-6; personal conversation with sociologist and former Falangist Angel de Lucas, (Madrid, 13 Mar. 1977).
 39. I am grateful to the current Director of the Institute for Youth (Instituto de la Juventud) in Madrid, D. Juan Saez Marín, for his insights into the nature and functioning of the *Frente de Juventudes* and the SEU during the Franco period.
 40. 'Instauración y Movimiento' in *Juventud* (Madrid, 28 Aug. 1952).
 41. *Ibid.*
 42. 'El juego de la reacción' in *Haz*, no. 4 (1 Mar. 1952). *Haz* was the official mouthpiece of the SEU.
 43. Fraga Iribarne, M. 'Revolución y restauración' in *Alcalá*, no. 28 (Feb. 1953). Cf. Tiguero, J. 'La generación de Fraga y su destino', in *Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico*, no. 1, (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, June-July 1965).
 44. Francisco Franco, speech made on 11 Nov. 1971, at the opening of the tenth legislature of the Spanish Cortes.
 45. 'El juego de la reacción', loc. cit. (1 Mar. 1952).
 46. Castro Villacañas, A., 'La organización del Estado en el pensamiento de José Antonio', in *Alcalá*, no. 45 (Madrid-Barcelona: 25 Nov. 1953).
 47. 'Continuidad revolucionaria' in *La Hora*, no. 101 (Apr. 1954).
 48. Arroita-Jaurregui, M., '18 julio: punto de partida' in *Alcalá*, no. 13 (25 July 1952).
 49. Martín Villa, R. 'En el camino', in 24, no. 17 (Madrid, 1954). In 1960, Martín Villa was appointed National Chief of the SEU.
 50. *Ibid.*
 51. Fernández Cuesta, R., *I Congreso Nacional...*, p. 178.
 52. Fernández Cuesta, R., speech broadcast by *Radio Nacional* on 19 Apr.

- 1955 (28th anniversary of the Unification) and reproduced in Fernández Cuesta, R. *Continuidad falangista al servicio de España* (Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento, 1955) pp. 183–5.
53. Laín Entralgo, P., *Descargo de conciencia (1930–1960)*, (Barcelona: Barral Editores, 1976) pp. 404–25; Arrese Magra, J. L. *Una etapa constituyente* (hereafter *UEC*) (Barcelona: Planeta, 1982) pp. 7–10, 16–18; Ridruejo, D., *Escrito en España*, pp. 116–20, 127.
54. Former Falangist José Luis Rubio Cordon, interviewed in Madrid on 23 Mar. 1979, states his opinion that the encounter was deliberately engineered by the Ministry of the Interior, in order to provoke a situation in which repression in the University would appear to be justified from the point of view of public order.
55. Ridruejo's analysis of the situation is contained in an unpublished report compiled for submission to the *Junta Política* of FET y de las JONS, dated 1 Apr. 1956. A copy was given to the present writer by D. Diego Salas Pombo. A slightly modified version, prepared, but not published, in 1957, is reproduced in Ridruejo, D. *Casi unas memorias*, pp. 337–55. A complete 'dossier' of contemporary documents was published in 1982 by the Universidad Complutense, Madrid, compiled by Roberto Mesa, under the title, *Jaraneros y Alborotadores* ('Rowdies and Troublemakers') – Franco's description of the dissident students.
56. *El Español*, Madrid 24 Feb. 1956, *ABC*, 4 Mar. 1956, reproduced the article with remarks of support for the line taken by *El Español* and of condemnation for the declaration made on 9 Feb. 1956 to *l'Humanité* by exiled communist Santiago Carrillo, in solidarity with 'the struggle of the intellectuals against present-day Spain'. Ridruejo, in his report for the *Junta Política*, states that the article in *El Español* and, indeed, the entire coverage given to the incident by the Press, was a deliberate, malicious and infantile fabrication of lies, designed to justify the imposition of official authority via the exorcism of a supposed communist bogey.
57. Narciso Perales, interview 7 Jan. 1977; José Luis Rubio, interview, 23 Mar. 1979; Enrique Múgica Herzog – one of those arrested in February 1956 accused of subversive activities – in *El País*, Madrid, 3 Oct. 1976.
58. Múgica Herzog, E., loc. cit.; cf. Arrese, *UEC*, p. 29.: 'I made the General Secretariat buy him a small-holding in Barajas . . .'
59. Fernández Cuesta gives a brief account of the Feb. 1956 crisis in *Testimonio*, pp. 243–5.
60. Arrese Magra, J. L., *Hacia una meta institucional* (Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento, 1957) p. 118. See also, Arrese, *UEC, passim*, esp. pp. 56–267, which gives a truly blow-by-blow account of the two years which the process of the elaboration of these Laws lasted.
61. Arrese, J. L., *Hacia una meta institucional*, pp. 120–1.
62. Diego Salas Pombo, interview, 21 Nov. 1977.
63. Cf. Jerez Mir, op. cit., pp. 101–33.
64. *Ibid.*, pp. 101–33.
65. Arrese, J. L., *Hacia una meta institucional*, p. 214; *UEC*, pp. 73–7.
66. From the draft of the Organic Law of the Movement, quoted in López Rodó, L., op. cit., p. 126.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 127; Arrese, J. L., *UEC*, pp. 79–80; González Vicén, L. in *Genius* (Madrid, 1 Aug. 1976) and *La Gaceta Ilustrada* (10 Oct. 1976).
68. López Rodó, L. op. cit., p. 128.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 128–32; Arrese, J. L., *UEC*, pp. 84–5.
70. Salas Pombo, D. interview, 21 Nov. 1977; López Rodó, L., op. cit., pp. 133–4.
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 133–4.
72. Salas Pombo, interview, 27 Dec. 1977 and unpublished correspondence in the possession of Sr. Salas which this writer was permitted to examine very briefly.
73. Arrese, J. L., *Hacia una meta institucional*, pp. 212–13.
74. Salas Pombo, D., interview, 27 Dec. 1977; Arrese, J. L., *UEC*, pp. 212–6, 251, 262–4.
75. Arrese, J. L., *UEC*, pp. 98–103.
76. Salas Pombo, D., interview, 21 Nov. 1977.
77. Fernández Cuesta, R., interview, 15 July 1977; Arrese, J. L., *UEC*, p. 259.
78. Salas Pombo, D., interview, 27 Dec. 1977; Arrese, J. L. *UEC*, pp. 247–8.