

The rejection of Arrese's attempt to impose the Falangist stamp on the new Fundamental Principles of the State undoubtedly represented an important setback for the *Falange*. The Cabinet reshuffle effected in February 1957 further reflected the regime's awareness that, in the wake of the socio-economic changes initiated in the first half of the decade, the Falangist project was a political anachronism. The Falangist attempt to assert and assure its presence was quashed in preference for the ideas and image of up-and-coming post-war politicians, whose attraction lay not only in the non-totalitarian doctrine they preached, but also in the modern, international capitalism they represented. Arrese and Salas Pombo were removed from the Party Secretariat; José Antonio Girón from the Ministry of Labour; and Blas Pérez González from the Ministry of the Interior. The disappearance of these strategic figures was scarcely compensated for the *Falange* by the retention of Jesus Rubio in the Ministry of Education, and Gabriel Arias Salgado in that of Information and Tourism, nor by the substitution of the moderate Fermín Sanz Orio for the radical Girón, and the garrulous José Solís for Arrese. Most important of all was the incorporation of three 'developmentalists' into three key positions: Alberto Ullastres as Minister of Commerce, Mariano Navarro Rubio as Minister of Finance, and Pedro Gual Villalbí as Minister without Portfolio and President of the newly-created Council for the National Economy.¹

The economy had never been the prerogative of the *Falange* in the distribution of fields of influence whereby Franco achieved the internal balance of power. However, whereas in the 1940s economic objectives were subordinate to political considerations, the position was to be reversed in the decade of the 1960s, and the incumbent of the politico-ideological sphere, the *Falange*, was relegated to a secondary position. The *Falange* reacted to this body-blow with inertia and the customary willingness to accept whatever the *Caudillo* dictated. The new situation, says Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, 'did not please' the Falangists, but there was no question of public protest.² On the contrary, the Secretariat of the Movement sent a circular to all the Provincial Delegations, in which it assured militants in soothing tones that,

The familiar lexicon, and the dearly-loved concepts contained in the Declaration of Principles, indicate clearly and perfectly what are the doctrinal sources from which the Movement's programmatic bases have been taken. The *Caudillo's* explicit declaration that these basic points are the same as those expressed in the Decree of Unification shows beyond all shadow of doubt that the initial programmatic norms have been definitively incorporated into the body of fundamental legal norms by which the lives of Spain and all Spaniards are to be ruled. . . . The promulgation of the Principles thus represents the first step towards the institutionalisation of the Movement, so often requested and now made reality.³

Besides, although it was the 'technocrats' (as the new occupants of the economic Ministries were termed by way of ideological identification) who concerned themselves from the end of the 1950s onwards with the economic future of Spain, it was still the *Falange* that was in charge of the socio-political control of the mass of the population which was to provide the man-power for, and bear the brunt of the inflationary effects of, 'development'.

In the first half of the fifties, as we have noted earlier, a combination of political convenience and economic pragmatism had obliged the regime to accept the reincorporation of Spain into the world capitalist system. The benefits of external aid undoubtedly went a long way to relieving the hardships resulting from the failure of autarchy and, at the same time, to easing the social pressures they generated. Nevertheless, and in spite of repression,⁴ the grievances of a traditionally politicised and militant working class could scarcely be entirely satisfied by the withdrawal of ration cards (in 1952) or the return of the foreign diplomats withdrawn in 1946.

Carefully regulated escape-valves were therefore created within the structures established in 1939 (and commended, it will be remembered, to the *Falange*), to ensure continued control of the working masses. Thus, in 1947, a law was passed which provided for minimal worker representation on works' committees (*Jurados de Empresa*), to be created within the framework of the official trade union system. However, the law was not implemented until 1953 and the first committees could not begin to function until 1956. Strike action was taken in Navarra, Barcelona, Valencia and the Basque Country in 1956, in which the principle demand was a guaranteed minimum wage of 75 pesetas per day.⁵ As a result, the Minimum Guaranteed Salary was introduced, fixing different minimum wages according to geo-

graphical area. In 1956, the highest wage fixed was 36 pesetas, in Madrid, which was not raised to 60 pesetas until 1963 – still 15 pesetas below the 1957 demand.⁶ In a similar way, the Law of Collective Contracts passed in April 1958 constituted an ostentatious, but controlled, step in the direction of achieving negotiated, rather than dictated, conditions of labour. Such negotiations, however, were carried on within, and under the supervision of, the *Central Nacional Sindicalista*, and the apparent recognition given to the division existing between workers' and employers' interests was contradicted by the cooperative nature of the official trade union system.⁷

That it should be deemed necessary to refocus labour relations was part and parcel of the general reconsideration of policies, particularly economic policies, reflected in the Cabinet changes made in February 1957. On the basis of the credits provided by such international financial bodies as the Ex-Im Bank and the IMF, together with the investments of private foreign capital, Spain had embarked on a programme of rapid industrialisation in the mid-1950s. The concentration on industrial development, to the detriment of the hitherto dominant agricultural sector of the economy, had, as one of its many social consequences, the rapid increase of urban working populations which, in turn, meant that wages could be kept depressed. At the same time, the substitution of cheap man-power for quantitatively and qualitatively deficient capital goods, coupled to the relatively high cost of raw materials and the increased demand generated by the increased urban populace, resulted in low production levels and high prices.

Between 1939 and 1959, industrial production rose by 200%, but industrial prices rose by 676.8%.⁸ Whilst the annual average increase in wholesale prices and the cost of living, between 1956 and 1959, was around 10%, the average annual increase in *per capita* income in the same period was approximately 5.5%.⁹ In early 1958, strikes occurred in protest against the rising cost of living and the falling purchasing power of wages, in Asturias, Barcelona, the Basque Country, Madrid, Valencia and Zaragoza.¹⁰ The official response was a mixture of coercion and cooption: suspension of Articles 14 and 18 of the *Fuero de los Españoles* and, subsequently, application of the collective bargaining procedures approved in April of that year, which invariably linked minimal wage concessions to productivity deals. Any optimism which the working classes might have felt in the light of the very limited gains made as a result of their organised protests was curtailed by the 1959 Stabilisation Plan which, for the working classes, meant a wage freeze; a prohibition on over-time which, according to a CNS official, cut

workers' wages by an average of 23%;¹¹ and contraction of the labour market as a result of the brake placed on credit and investment facilities.

The Stabilisation Plan heralded a decade of determined, programmed, economic development in which Spain began effectively to fulfil her role not only as the recipient of external inputs, but also as a new, virtually untapped source of benefits for multinational companies, the profitability of whose operations lay in the exploitation, *in situ*, of local materials, labour, infrastructures and consumers. A corporativistic trade union structure was scarcely compatible with an economy increasingly based on the operation of the free market and, in truth, by the beginning of the 1960s, the CNS was visibly insufficient to its task. With the creation, between 1958 and 1963, of a number of illegal, though not always clandestine, class-based trade union organisations,¹² trade union pluralism was a reality and many employers who did not want to lose production time in resolving labour disputes began to prefer direct negotiation with the unofficial, but authentic, representatives of their workers to the slow and complicated arbitration channels of the CNS.

Nevertheless, the *Falange*, in the person of the National Delegate for Syndicates and Secretary General of FET y de las JONS, José Solís, struggled to maintain the relevance of its domain. In 1963, a year in which strikes were staged again in Asturias, Cataluña, Andalucía and the Basque Country,¹³ Solís promised truly free and representative syndical elections. In the following year, a law was passed which provided for the sharing of organisation and decision-taking by workers and employers in any given enterprise¹⁴ and, in that same year, 1964, the official organisation made a final attempt to give institutional form to the conflict of interests between workers and employers, with the creation of separate Workers' and Employers' Councils for the negotiation of wages and working conditions.¹⁵

By the mid-1960s, however, the aspirations generated by the increasing availability of consumer goods; by contact with other, more open societies through emigration, tourism and imported cultural products; and such liberalising measures as the 1966 Press Law or the revision of Article 222 of the Penal Code, which admitted strike action for 'professional' motives, were only partially satisfied in economic terms, and largely frustrated in political terms. By 1966, the political future of Spain had once more been brought to the fore by a combination of socio-political unrest, economic crisis, Franco's advancing age, and the desire of those economic and social forces

which also constituted the most influential political forces for long-term solutions more effective and internationally acceptable than repression alone.

In response to these pressures, the penultimate step was taken in the attempt to guarantee the survival of the regime after Franco's death. On 22 November 1966, the Organic Law of the State was read before the *Cortes*. It was clear from the speech read by Franco as the introduction to the Law, that the military victory of 1939 continued to be the initial source of legitimation for the regime. The main concern, now, however, was to convey the notion that that victory, as the basis for 'growth' and 'progress' in material terms, was also to be the principle source of the regime's *continued* legitimacy.

In political terms, whilst 'acceptance of, and respect for a common denominator, a single field of play and a single set of rules . . .' were still necessary for the maintenance of the 'political order of unity, authority, justice and progress'¹⁶ it was felt that certain modifications should be made with regard to the future. The new order, nevertheless, was to be one of continuity:

In order that provision for the future be duly made, political action of continuity is necessary. . . . We are not talking about an emergency measure, but one of foresight. Today and for many years to come, stability is assured.¹⁷

'Valuable elements of permanent worth' would be retained from the Movement, but alongside 'flexible institutions capable of adapting to inevitable changes'. It was a question, Franco concluded, of 'following our path, the path which has saved Spain; and of continuing along it beyond any accidental event, safe from all threats.'¹⁸ How far Franco intended that Spain should continue along the same path was clearly indicated:

It is necessary to provide with precision the guarantees and formal procedures not only for the first succession, but also of those which will follow once the normal order has been installed.¹⁹

The *Falange* was not referred to once, even indirectly, in the entire text. Even within the limits imposed by the 'organic regulation of the totality of our institutions', the political life of the country, conceived of as 'the ordered concurrence of criteria', was a far cry, in November 1966, from the days when it had run through 'the sole channel of FET y de las JONS'.²⁰

Nevertheless, even before the Law was published, the career Falangists had expressed their customary identification with the *Caudillo's* policy: 'We are all with the *Caudillo*. Leaving aside marginal political differences with regard to the form, we agree upon the essence of the content.'²¹ Former SEUist Manuel Fraga, by then Minister of Information and Tourism, was unsinting in his enthusiasm:

What does Franco propose? He proposes that we go forward in the great historic enterprise of making Spain one, great and free . . . a nation respected in the world. . . . A Spain at once traditional and modern. . . . We must maintain stability. We must cement the continuity of the régime. . . . Stability and continuity are the conditions necessary for true evolution, which presupposes permanent principles, sure channels and a prudent rhythm.²²

His words were reminiscent of, and entirely in keeping with, the continuist line he had advocated in the pages of *Alcalá* fifteen years earlier. As in 1947 and 1958, so in 1966 the attitude of the Movement Falangists was based on a two-fold assessment of the situation in general and their own possibilities and interests in particular. Falangism in 1966 had no meaning if divorced from the regime born of the 1936 military rising. Furthermore, the changes envisaged were aimed at providing continuity, not revolution, and the prime consideration was the protection of the interests behind the regime, which the Falangists shared. One of the tutors of the future King Juan Carlos, and later, in 1969, Minister Secretary General of the Movement, expressed the Party point of view succinctly:

The succession must be continuity. . . . the King must be the personification of the historico-national legitimacy incarnated in the Spanish State to which the rebellion of 18 July 1936 gave rise.²³

In a similar way, the Secretary General of FET y de las JONS, José Solís Ruiz, had shown, before the public announcement of the Law, that the career Falangists like himself had perceived that their interest lay in accepting a measure designed to ensure continuity in change:

We must say "Yes" to whatever Franco asks of us. It is a question of showing that we want continuity, in the interest of the well-being of the Fatherland.²⁴

As in 1947, a referendum was to be held to submit the Law to popular approval. Once the pre-referendum campaign opened, the Movement *Falange* spared no efforts to ensure an overwhelming victory for the 'Ayes'. The referendum was to be held on 14 December 1966 and, between 13 November and 13 December, the indefatigable Solís addressed meetings of workers, employers, Movement officials, youth groups and trade unionists in no less than eleven different and widely-separated towns. Speaking always in favour of the Law as the culmination of the labours of thirty years, and the basis for those of at least another thirty, his words to Movement officials and syndicalists in Avila were typical:

The immense responsibility of achieving political continuity and of ensuring the succession, falls on the Spanish people. As the spiritual key to that continuity, we have the National Movement, in which are reflected the inalienable principles which have constituted the difficult task of achieving peace. . . . Franco has spoken to us of that peace and of the Law and the national future like a father, asking us for unity, concord and understanding. He has convoked us on 14 December with his hopes set on the future. . . . The time has come when we must choose between greatness and freedom, or misery and oppression.²⁵

In a letter to Party militants, Solís was equally unequivocal in his identification, as a Falangist, with the policy adopted with regard to converting the regime into an institution,

We are about to give our approval to the Organic Law of the State; the Law which will perpetuate, beyond the life of Franco and beyond our own lifetime, the ideals of peace, unity and justice which we were the first to proclaim and defend and which we have been the most faithful in serving.²⁶

The *Falange's* most important figures added the weight of their words to the efforts being made by Solís. The Vice-secretary General of the Movement, Alejandro Rodríguez de Valcarlos, qualified the Law as expressing the 'representative and democratic aims of the Spanish people'.²⁷ The man who had been Minister of Labour for a record term of eleven years, José Antonio Giron reappeared, after ten years of political absence, in a television broadcast in which he declared that 'the Law we are going to vote is a veritable constitution'.²⁸ Former Party Secretary Raimundo Fernández Cuesta

was unhesitating in his analysis of the relationship between *Falange* and Franco: 'Since the rising on 18 July 1936, as now, the *Falange* has had only one, decisive aim: obedience to Franco. . . . We did, we do and we shall continue to do, whatever Franco orders.'²⁹

As had occurred in 1947 with the referendum of the Law of Succession, the result of the 1966 referendum of the Organic Law of the State was massive approval. The Law consequently became part of the basic legislation of the State on 10 January 1967. The Falangists were, predictably, enthusiastic in their comments, though some evidently felt qualms sufficient to motivate public justification of their affirmative vote.³⁰ *Arriba*, the Party mouthpiece, went so far as to engage in a polemic with the Monarchist daily, *ABC* on account of an article the latter had published entitled 'La sucesión' and which *Arriba* saw as an attack on the Organic Law of the State.³¹ It was certainly ironic that the representatives of a party which had once deemed the Monarchy 'gloriously defunct' should now be defending a Law which assured the future of the Monarchy against the criticism levelled by that institution's own supporters.

The Minister Under-Secretary to the Presidency of the Government, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, had affirmed, four days before the referendum, that the 'Organic Law of the State ends all speculation about the future of the regime',³² and, in the decade following the approval of the Law, the preparation of the 'installation' of Franco's successor was of paramount importance. Indeed, it might be said that the death of Franco on 20 November 1975 occasioned no more than the succession as a juridical formality, whereas the transition as a *de facto* reality began in 1966. The logical conclusion and the culmination of the process of preparation of the post-Franco era came in 1969, with the designation of Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón as Franco's successor, 'with the title of King'.

In the preceding three years, the *Falange* had received several indications that, at least in its original form, it was considered outdated. In 1967, the 'Falangist General', Agustín Muñoz Grandes, was replaced as Vice-President of the Government by Admiral Carrero Blanco, whose political sympathies lay with the Monarchist cause. In the same year, changes were made to the *Fuero del Trabajo* which effectively cancelled *Falange's* thereto exclusive access to administrative posts in the Syndical Organisation.³³ 1968 saw the publication of the 'Regulations of the Movement' (*Reglamento del Movimiento*) in which *Falange* was not afforded a status any different to any of the other political tendencies represented in the amalgamous

Movement. Finally, in 1969, former SEUist Fraga Iribarne and Party Secretary Solís Ruiz were ousted from the Government in the wake of a financial scandal in which their only involvement was its discovery.³⁴

Yet the Falangists voted in favour of the nomination of Prince Juan Carlos as future King. Some justified their action alleging that what they had approved was a new Monarchy, installed by Franco, not the old Monarchy, 'the caricature of the institution of Monarchy' known and condemned by José Antonio Primo de Rivera.³⁵ The official Falangist Press was favourable, if not effusive, in its reception of Juan Carlos as Franco's successor, and duly contributed, whenever the occasion arose, to the public relations operation designed to promote the Prince's image as Franco's legitimate heir. In so doing, the Falangists considered that they were doing no more and no less than they had always done: realise 'the politics which have put Spain where she is today'.³⁶

There was, however, a defiant note in the Falangist Press of 1969, which conveyed the warning that the *Falange* was not yet a spent force. It was not without grounds, for it was during the decade of the 1960s that the young SEUists of the 1950s had been serving their political apprenticeship in Movement – and even, in the case of Manuel Fraga, ministerial – posts.

To a certain extent, the popular view that 'here, every Tom, Dick and Harry has been in *Falange* at some stage', was true. The obligatory nature of organisations like the SEU or the *Frente de Juventudes*, the lack of legal alternatives for organised political activity, and the pressure towards demonstrating Falangist membership as a security measure in a repressive regime, did indeed have the effect of exposing far more people to *Falange* than the party's founders could ever have hoped for otherwise. Although, as we have noted earlier, average permanence in the Falangist organisations was short, it was nevertheless long enough to leave a lasting mark on all of those who passed through Party hands and, in some cases, was consciously used as a trampolin to a career in national politics. Thus, the changes made in the Cabinet and Administration in November 1969, as well as incorporating such seasoned Falangists as Carlos Iglesias Selgas, José Utrera Molina and Torcuato Fernández Miranda, brought a number of post-war Falangists into important positions in the power structure. Miguel Ortí Bordás was appointed Vice-secretary General of the Movement; Rodolfo Martín Villa took over from Solís as leader of the Syndical Organisation; and a man who had not belonged to the SEU but who was of the same generation and who had come up through the

ranks of the *Falange*, Adolfo Suárez González, was made Director General of the State radio and television broadcasting corporation.³⁷

It was precisely these neo-Falangists who were to be entrusted with the task of effecting the transition from Francoism to democracy. Adolfo Suárez, for example, was Secretary General of the Movement from December 1975 to July 1976, and President of the Government in the crucial period from July 1976 to December 1980, in which the foundations of the post-Francoist Parliamentary democracy were established. Rodolfo Martín Villa, for his part, was Minister for Syndical Relations in the first Cabinet of the Monarchy and Minister of the Interior in the second (July 1976).³⁸ It was of these men that the *Arriba* correspondent Ismael Medina was thinking when he wrote in 1969,

The political future of Spain will depend, in the final analysis, on the creation of a Francoist school of understanding politics among those who will ultimately be responsible for the peaceful realisation of the succession process.³⁹

Whilst the new generations of Falangists climbed up the politico-professional ladder, the old school Falangists nevertheless remained at the ready. Decadent, embittered and *démodé*, but surviving, their presence at the annual gatherings in homage to Franco, in the ramifications of an ever more inadequate trade union organisation, and in the offices of the Public Administration, helped to sustain a regime increasingly harassed by the problems generated by its own immobile structures. Their uninterrupted and 'unshakable fidelity' in turn guaranteed that, while Franco lived, the *Falange* would not be completely pensioned off.

By the beginning of the 1970s, however, the official situation of political singularity had been superceded by a real situation of (as yet illegal) plurality. In the field of labour relations, for example, both employers and workers were anxious to be free of the encumbrance of the excessively slow and rigid Syndical Organisation, and had for some time been by-passing it, where possible, in negotiations. The Trade Union Unity Act of 1971, which permitted the formation of 'Professional Associations', constituted an eleventh-hour attempt to convert the CNS into an entity of representation and participation rather than of repression and control, in anticipation of the post-Franco era. This attempt to bring politicised conflict back into the orbit of the official channels and away from illegal opposition unions

proved, ultimately, to be in vain. The organisation of free, spontaneous trade unions was legalised in March 1977 and the official CNS lost its *raison d'être* after thirty-eight years of 'unshakably faithful' service to the Francoist cause.⁴⁰

In the strictly political field, too, plurality of ideologies and organisations was a reality, as even the regime had been forced to admit, with the promulgation, in December 1974, of a Statute of Political Associations.⁴¹ *Falange* stalwarts Fernández Cuesta, Girón and Blas Piñar López,⁴² were quick to attempt to perpetuate *Falange's* existence in the new situation and to project it into the future, now as a 'political association', as defined by the new Statute. Ironically, they were deprived of the use of the party's original title precisely as a result of their own labours to popularise their ideology, for the National Council of the Movement decided that the title FE de las JONS belonged to the entire Spanish people and could not, therefore, be appropriated by any one 'association'.

There now began a bitter, intra-*Falange* struggle for recognition and, even before Franco died, the Falangists were jockeying for positions in what was to be the post-Franco era. After Franco's death, on 20 November 1975,⁴³ it became clearer than ever how far FE had needed Francoism to hold together. In the absence of its father-figure, *Falange* returned to the incoherence and fragmentation which had characterised it in the period prior to the Civil War.

The 1974 Statute of Political Associations was replaced, in June 1976, by a Law which, whilst not recognising the existence of political parties as such, effectively opened the way to their creation. At the same time, the Law implied the dismantling of the Movement.⁴⁴ Significantly, the Law of Political Associations was presented to the *Cortes* by the Minister Secretary General of that same Movement, Adolfo Suárez González. It marked his first step out of political obscurity and into the realms of fame and popularity which he was to enjoy for almost five years after his designation as President of the Government shortly afterwards, in July 1976.

By 1976, there were four aspirants to the title of *Falange Española de las JONS*, each claiming to be the only group with the right to bear the name *Falange Española* as a post-Francoist political party. The first claimant was the *Frente Nacional Español* (Spanish National Front), led by Raimundo Fernández Cuesta. In addition, there was *Falange Española (auténtica)* (Authentic *Falange Española*), headed by Narciso Peralas and Pedro Conde; the *Junta Coordinadora Nacional Sindicalista* (National Syndicalist Coordinating Committee), led by an

obscure Madrid Falangist, Eduardo Zulueta;⁴⁵ and an untitled group of notoriously violent ultra-Right wingers, headed by the leader of the *Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey* (Warriors of Christ King), Mariano Sánchez Covisa.

Each denied the right of the others to the title, on the grounds of their having betrayed *Falange's* ideals during the Franco regime. Thus, the group led by former Blue Division volunteer, Sánchez Covisa, denounced the claim of the other Falangists since they had 'for forty years . . . been saying that political parties are the cancer of this country'.⁴⁶ The application of this group excited the opposition of all three other competitors, who felt that 'such extremist Right wing groups' would use the title to construct a party with 'the same characteristics as the National Movement'.⁴⁷ This was, indeed, a strange objection from men who had participated in the National Movement since its creation, and had devoted all their efforts to maintaining and institutionalising it.

Not surprisingly, given the high proportion of *carriosa vieja* Falangists in its ranks and their forty-year connection with the administrative structures charged with assigning the title, the group led by Fernández Cuesta, the *Frente Nacional Español*, was granted the right to change its name to *Falange Española de las JONS* on 1 October 1976, the fortieth anniversary of the designation of the late Francisco Franco as Head of State.

Thus, even after the death of the *Caudillo*, the name of *Falange Española* was inseparably linked to his memory and its partisans still reaped the benefit of their contribution, spread over forty-years, to his political career.

Notes

1. Cf. Equipo 'Mundo', *Los 90 Ministros de Franco* (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1970) pp. 255-56.
2. Raimundo Fernández Cuesta, interview, 15 July 1977.
3. *Texto de las orientaciones que se consideren con valor permanente*, Secretaría General del Movimiento, Madrid, Jan. 1961, quoted in Ros Hombravella, op. cit., p. 319, n. 20.
4. See above, pp. 67, 100.
5. Blanc, J. 'Las hueglas en el movimiento obrero español', in *Horizonte español* (2 vols), vol. II, Ruedo Ibérico, Paris 1966; see also Fernández de Castro, I. & Martínez, J. *España hoy* (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1963) p. 29.

6. Fava, I., Compta, M. & Huertas Clavería, J. M., 'Conflictos laborales que dejaron huella', in *Cuadernos para el diálogo*, Extra no. XXXVIII (Feb. 1973) p. 36.
7. The Law, although not passed until 1958, was elaborated primarily on the initiative of José Antonio Girón, Falangist Minister of Labour until 1957. For an analysis of its content and implications, see: Amsden, J. *Collective Bargaining and Class Conflict in Spain* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977) pp. 129-62; Oficina Internacional del Trabajo, op. cit., pp. 200-35.
8. Soler, R., loc. cit., p. 5.
9. Ros Hombravella, op. cit., pp. 338-40, 438.
10. Fernández de Castro, I. & Martínez, J. op. cit., p. 34.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
12. The most important of these was *Comisiones Obreras*. Others were the communist *Oposición Social Obrera (OSO)*; *Alianza Sindical*, formed between 1959 and 1960 by socialists, anarchists and members of the Basque *STV*; and two left-wing, Catholic organisations, *Acción Sindical de Trabajadores (AST)* and *Unión Sindical Obrera (USO)*.
13. Fernández de Castro, I. 'Tres años importantes, 1961, 1962, 1963' in *Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico*, no. 16, pp. 79-97. Blanc, J. 'Asturias: minas, huelgas y comisiones obreras' in *Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico*, no. 1, pp. 70-4.
14. Ley de Consejos de Administración, *BOE*.
15. See Oficina Internacional del Trabajo, op. cit., pp. 148-50; Iglesias Selgas, C., *El Sindicalismo Español*, pp. 49-50, 90, 125-30.
16. Franco's speech to the Cortes, in *Arriba*, 23 Nov. 1966.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. Franco's speech in Barcelona, 28 Jan. 1942 (*Arriba*, 29/1/42).
21. Leading article, *Arriba*, 16 Nov. 1966.
22. Fraga Iribarne, M. in *Arriba*, 25 Nov. 1966.
23. Fernández Miranda, Torcuato, in *Arriba*, 29 Nov. 1966.
24. Solís Ruiz, J. in *Arriba*, 17 Nov. 1966.
25. *Ibid.*, 2 Dec. 1966.
26. *Ibid.*, 8 Dec. 1966.
27. *Ibid.* Rodríguez de Valcarlos was addressing a meeting of National Delegates for Associations in the Institute of Political Studies, Madrid, when he made this statement.
28. *Ibid.*, 10 Dec. 1966.
29. *Ibid.*, 11 Dec. 1966. Fernández Cuesta makes no mention of the Ley Orgánica del Estado in his memoirs.
30. Such as José Antonio Girón in *Arriba*, 17 Dec. 1966, and Jesus Suevos, *Arriba*, 27 Dec. 1966.
31. *Arriba*, 23 and 27 Dec. 1966; *ABC*, 21 Dec. 1966. The Falangist daily had already joined editorial battle with its rival, *Madrid*, on the same grounds: see *Madrid*, 1 Dec. 1966 and *Arriba*, 2 Dec. 1966.
32. Speech broadcast on radio and television on 10 Dec. 1966, and reproduced by the national Press on 11. Dec. 1966.

33. In the text approved on 10 Jan. 1967, Point 4 of the 1938 edition, which had stated that the CNS would be staffed by Falangist militants, was suppressed. *Fuero del Trabajo*, 3rd edn, Ministerio de Trabajo (Madrid, 1975); Oficina Internacional del Trabajo, op. cit., pp. 167-8.
34. On the 'Matesa' scandal, see e.g.: Carr, R. and Fusi, J. P., *España, de la dictadura a las democracias* (Barcelona, 1979) p. 247; Alvarez Puga, E. *Matesa. Mas allá del escándalo* (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1974) *passim*; Diario 16, *La historia del franquismo*, 2 vols, Madrid 1984-85, vol. 2, ch. 46.
35. Falangist and National Councilor Jesus Suevos, in *Tiempo Nuevo*, no. 98 (Madrid, 30 July 1969).
36. Manuel Blanco Tobío in *Arriba*, 7 Nov. 1969.
37. For the biography of Adolfo Suárez González, see, e.g.: *Documentos '80*, no. 1, 'Adolfo Suárez, todos los cargos del Presidente' (Barcelona, Feb. 1979); Morán, G., *Adolfo Suárez, historia de una ambición* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1979).
38. For the biography of Rodolfo Martín Villa, see e.g.: *¿Quién es quién en la política española?* Documentación española contemporánea, S.L., no. 4 (Madrid, 1977) p. 293; *Cuadernos para el Diálogo*, no. 228 (10 Sept. 1977) pp. 15-19; Durán Mazuque, M. *Martín Villa*, LUR (Madrid, 1979).
39. *Arriba* (3 Nov. 1969).
40. Cf. *Revista Internacional del Trabajo*, vol. 85, no. 3, OIT, Geneva, Mar. 1972. The Syndical Organisation had, in reality, already been dismantled in Dec. 1976. Although in many respects it lived on, as the *Administración Institucional de Servicios Socioprofesionales (AISS)*, created by Royal Decree in 1976.
41. For the development of the clandestine and tolerated opposition during the Franco regime, see Preston, P., 'La oposición antifranquista' and the bibliographical references therein, in Preston P., *España en crisis*, pp. 217-63; Heine, H., *La oposición política al Franquismo* (Barcelona: Editorial Crítica, 1983).
42. Leader of the extreme Right-wing group *Fuerza Nueva*.
43. This was also the date of the death of the *Falange's* founder, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, in 1936. There is room for speculation as to the veracity of the date given as that of Franco's death: many Falangists saw the 'coincidence' as the ultimate Francoist 'usurpation' of their iconography.
44. The huge reproduction of the Falangist yoke-and-arrows symbol was finally removed from the façade of the General Secretariat of the Movement in Madrid, on 10 May 1977, barely a month before the first democratic general elections since 1936.
45. For the creation of *Falange Española (auténtica)* and the *Junta Coordinadora*, see below, p. 169.
46. Alberto Royuela, in *El País* (18 Sept. 1976)
47. Márquez Hortallo, D. in *El País* (18 Sept. 1976)